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Abstract 
 
 
‘Prime Ministerial Exercise of the War Prerogative in the Iraq Affair:  
An Analysis’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study sets out to investigate an arcane, ancient and currently unreformed area 
of the British constitution; the war prerogative.  This Crown power continues to lie 
with the monarch at law, though in political reality it is exercised by the Prime 
Minister with the support of Parliament.  The war power has come to vest in the 
Prime Minister due to the office’s colonisation and resultingly close interrelationship 
with the institution of monarchy.  The study will argue that there are prevailing 
cultural, structural and legal influences of monarchy which potentially benefit the 
premier in his exercise of the war prerogative.  This and related issues will be 
afforded specific and detailed consideration in the context of the March 2003 
decision to deploy troops in Iraq.  The Iraq affair constitutes an invaluable case study 
as one of the most controversial warfare decisions in recent history, one that 
generated topical debate and new scrutiny of the war prerogative. 
 
This study conducts a detailed investigation of the legal and constitutional checks 
and balances upon the prime ministerial war prerogative with specific focus upon 
their operation in the Iraq affair. The study discusses significant shortcomings in the 
functioning of constitutional checks in the lead up to military action in Iraq, 
particularly the convention of collective Cabinet responsibility and the requirement 
that Parliament supports warfare.  The study also appraises the efficacy of legal 
checks upon the war and related prerogatives in the judicial arena; it considers 
developments over the course of the broad Iraq period, paying specific attention to 
advances in judicial review.  The roles of constitutional components such as the 
Crown and conventions in these constitutional dynamics are identified and analysed 
where relevant.  Furthermore, the extent to which post-Iraq proposed reforms might 
overhaul the area and address constitutional inadequacies will be considered. 
 
In undertaking its investigation into this constitutional area the study employs two 
analytical devices which provide illuminating insights upon the war power, the checks 
upon it and its exercise by Mr Blair in the Iraq affair.  The first device involves the 
identification and exploration of divergences between the legal framework governing 
this area and the political reality occurring beneath.  Applying this device exposes 
material contradictions between the law and reality in this area, allows the accuracy 
and efficacy of legal terminology to be assessed and finally reveals assumptions or 
ideologies underlying the legal framework.  Over the course of this study it is argued 
that the various disparities between the law and political reality in this area act to 
benefit the Prime Minister in his exercise of the war prerogative.   
 
The second device entails careful consideration of the role of boundaries between 
law and non-law (particularly politics) in this area.  Such boundaries play a central 
role in judicial understandings of both conventions and prerogative power, and are 
vital to the maintenance of coherence and legal purity in this area.   This study 
focuses particularly upon the judicial erection of boundaries that distinguish between 
justiciable and non-justiciable prerogatives such as the war power.  It demonstrates 
that despite appearances of progress in judicial review, these boundaries are based 
upon selective judicial interpretations and approaches to evidence which inherently 
act to favour government.  Thus, in disputes concerning the war and related 
prerogatives the judiciary is institutionally incapable of political neutrality, instead 
being geared towards the support of strong government.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
‘Prime Ministerial Exercise of the War Prerogative in the Iraq Affair: An 
Analysis’ 
 
 
 
Despite the constitutional significance of the office of Prime Minister there is a dearth 
of analysis by constitutional academics, particularly lawyers, of the office itself and 
the constitutional mechanisms that play an integral role in its operation.  Instead, 
academic debate concerning the premiership has primarily focussed on the political-
historical context,1 perceived increases in prime ministerial power2 or concerns about 
presidentialism.3  The reason that constitutional lawyers have tended not to explore 
the arcane territory of the Prime Minister is perhaps due to its informal status and the 
sparsity of legal regulation surrounding the office and Cabinet.  Referring to the 
latter, Maitland comments, “this is certainly a most curious state of things, that the 
law should not recognize what we are apt to consider an organ of the state second 
only in importance to the parliament.”4  However, though the premiership is not 
created by law, law does remain inextricably linked to the constitutional-legal 
concepts (such as the Crown, prerogative and conventions) that create it.  The office 
of Prime Minister and its powers is therefore a worthwhile and fertile area for legal 
analysis and critique. 
 
As its title suggests, this study is specifically concerned with providing an account 
and analysis of the British war prerogative - a power to declare war or undertake 
other military action abroad.  A recent government green paper stated that such a 
decision is amongst the most important in politics,5 yet incongruously the authority to 
undertake military action still stems from an ancient Crown power that is exercised 
by Prime Ministers. 
                                                     
1
 See the excellent study by P Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders Since 1945 
(Penguin, London, 2001). 
2
 For example see: A H Brown, „Prime Ministerial Power (Part 1)‟ [1968] P.L. 28, p 29; K O Morgan, 
„New Labour and the New Premiership‟, featured in The Law, Politics & the Constitution, Essays in 
Honour of Geoffrey Marshall (Ed: Butler, Bogdanor & Summers), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1999, p 32. 
3
 M Foley, The British Presidency (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000). 
4
 F W Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1931) 
p 388. 
2 
 
Debates concerning the prime ministerial war power gained prominence over the 
premiership of Mr Tony Blair between 1997 and 2007.  Over this decade the war 
prerogative was used by Mr Blair on no less than six occasions.  Peter Hennessy 
has written that Mr Blair “presiding over British involvement in five military conflicts 
over six years (Iraq in December 1998, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq 
2003) [held] a strike-rate unprecedented since 1945 if you exclude the colonial 
emergencies which were running at the same time as Korea and Suez.”6  But despite 
undertaking military action across a range of countries and circumstances Mr Blair‟s 
most controversial and high-profile use of the war prerogative was undoubtedly his 
decision to conduct military operations in Iraq in March 2003.  Such was the 
controversy of the Iraq decision it resulted in up to 1 million protestors marching 
through London in February 2003, the largest demonstration in British history.7  The 
Iraq decision furthermore generated a wealth of literature, commentary and legal 
challenge.  Finally it initiated a spate of parliamentary activity in the form of select 
committee reports and reforms proposed by government,8 much of which occurred in 
the recent post-Blair period.  As a result of this material, this study will focus upon 
the Iraq decision as a revealing example of prime ministerial exercise of the war 
prerogative. 
 
 
Aims of Study 
 
In its coverage and analysis of the prime ministerial war prerogative over the course 
of the Iraq affair, this study will specifically aim to achieve the following: 
 
(1) To establish a detailed understanding of the three key constitutional 
components that play a fundamental role in the prime ministerial exercise of 
the war power, namely conventions, prerogative powers and the Crown. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
5
 “There are few political decisions more important than the deployment of the Armed Forces into armed 
conflict.”  Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, „The Governance of Britain‟ (CM 7170, 
2007) para 25, p 18. 
6
 P Hennessy, „Informality and Circumscription: The Blair Style of Government in War and Peace‟, 
Political Quarterly, 2005, Vol. 76(1), p 3.  Hennessy does not include the September 1999 UK 
deployment as part of a UN force in East Timor in his list. 
7
 „Million‟ march against Iraq war‟, BBC Online (London, 16th February 2003) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2765041.stm> accessed 15
th
 May 2008. 
8
 To be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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(2) To consider how these constitutional concepts operated and interacted in the 
period leading up to, during and after the decision to deploy troops in Iraq in 
March 2003. 
 
(3) To identify and discuss the deeper insights that the Iraq affair reveals about 
the prime ministerial war prerogative and the effectiveness of constitutional 
checks and balances that regulate it. 
 
In the process of addressing these three aims this study will, where necessary, 
employ the two analytical devices outlined at the end of this introduction. 
 
 
Emergence of the Office 
 
A brief account of the evolution of the premiership is vital at the outset because it 
provides important background context which aids understanding of current 
constitutional arrangements.  The office of Prime Minister is the most prominent 
political position within the British constitution.  The holder is leader of the country‟s 
democratically elected government, Minister for the Civil Service and „First Lord of 
the Treasury‟.9  The position has emerged by fortune rather than design, a „product 
of indigenous dynamics‟.10  Its origins can be traced back over centuries, through an 
ongoing combination of political events, constitutional culture and even the personal 
idiosyncrasies of prominent political players.   
 
The foundations for the premiership germinated in an informal fashion in the mid-
sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries.  Early English monarchs had always relied 
to a varying extent on trusted advisers and confidants.11  However, Elizabeth I‟s 
heavy reliance on Sir William Cecil (Lord Burghley) is viewed by some as a 
precursor to the sovereign-Prime Minister relationship.12  A further significant 
development can be found during the reign of Charles II.  This period saw the 
inception of an embryonic „Cabinet‟ (or „cabal‟), a select group within the Privy 
Council, that ancient collective of advisers to successive monarchs.  At this time, 
                                                     
9
 Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th edn, Butterworths, London, 1996) vol 8(2), para 395. 
10
 Foley (n 3) 26.   
11
 “For centuries monarchs had their principal advisers: in Tudor times Henry VII’s Morton, Henry 
VIII’s Wolsey and Cromwell”.  H Wilson, The Governance of Britain (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
London, 1976) p 12.   
12
 F W G Benemy, The Elected Monarch, The Development of the Powers of the Prime Minister (Harrap 
& Co, London, 1965) pp 2-4. 
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Cabinet members remained very much ministers of the King, being chosen by and 
answerable to him only.  “Cabinet government … meant at this stage government by 
favourites”,13 and ministers faced initial parliamentary hostility to their positions.14 
  
The Glorious Revolution in 1688 and subsequent Bill of Rights was a further event 
that indirectly contributed to a shift towards the prime ministerial position because it 
essentially emasculated monarchical power by placing Parliament above the King 
and in charge of the national purse strings.  The monarch of the day, William III, 
maintained close connections with the Whig party who had supported him, 
appointing them to occupy the leading positions in government.  “By the close of 
1695 the Whig party was in power in a sense in which no party had ever been in 
power before.”15  However, the King was still firmly in command and did not always 
deign it necessary to discuss state business with his Cabinet. 
 
The reign of George I (1714-1727) saw an increase in Cabinet power, primarily 
caused by his frequent absences from Cabinet meetings due to poor English and 
prolonged European visits.  Cabinet chairmanship inevitably became the task of the 
leading minister, and decisions were necessarily made without monarchical sanction.  
In 1721 Sir Robert Walpole came to hold the position of First Minister and is 
commonly acknowledged as the „first prototype of the modern Prime Minister‟16 and 
„de facto father of the breed‟.17  Nevertheless, the title „Prime Minister‟ was still not 
attached to the office at this stage.  Instead, it was occasionally used by opponents 
as a derogatory term against the First Minister.18  Upon the accession of George II in 
1727, Walpole continued as First Minister despite concerted efforts by the former to 
replace him.  The King failed in his attempts due to the fact that there was no viable 
alternative candidate able to control the House of Commons.  However, it is 
important to note that Walpole‟s power was not institutional, but arose from a 
combination of fortuitous circumstances and personal attributes which many of his 
later counterparts did not enjoy.  His revolutionary approach emphasised a firmer 
                                                     
13
 M Taylor Blauvelt, The Development of Cabinet Government in England (The Macmillan Company, 
New York, 1902) p 32. 
14
 Benemy (n 12) 6. 
15
 Blauvelt (n 13) 78. 
16
 Hennessy (n 1) 22. 
17
 Ibid 39.  Walpole‟s premiership is viewed by Elizabeth Wicks as one of eight key moments in British 
constitutional history: E Wicks, The Evolution of a Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2006, Oxford) ch 3.  
18
 Wilson (n 11) 12; Hennessy (n 1) 39. 
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trinity of Cabinet unity, strong leadership and parliamentary support.19  According to 
Hennessy, during Walpole‟s time as Prime Minister “the enduring DNA-like strands 
were spun which continue to determine the strength and scope, as well as the 
vulnerabilities of the job.”20   
 
During the reign of George III another pivotal figure in prime ministerial history 
emerged; William Pitt (the Younger), who held office for 18 years between 1783 and 
1801.  Pitt was responsible for the continuing increase in Cabinet unity during this 
period.  Cabinet became a tighter machine, replacing previous models which had 
been “loosely compacted bodies lacking in unity, definition and solidarity”.  Instead, 
Cabinet discussions were now “confined to persons actually holding office and in 
agreement with the views of their colleagues.”21  Because the Cabinet now acted as 
a unit, the King‟s capacity to intervene in its business was curtailed.  Related to this 
development was an upsurge in the dominance of the Prime Minister in relation to 
his Cabinet colleagues, though this was primarily due to Pitt‟s autocratic style of 
leadership.22  Additionally, communications between the King and ministers were 
channelled through Pitt, a role that his modern counterparts continue to this day.23  
Despite these practices, the Prime Minister was viewed as primus inter pares (first 
among equals).24     
 
These combined factors led ultimately to a “substitution of the authority of the Prime 
Minister for that of the King”, the latter of whom according to Keir was “was slowly, 
but quite unmistakably, losing effective leadership of his own government.”25  George 
III continued his efforts to maintain royal influence in government,26 but was hindered 
by well-documented mental problems which incapacitated him for lengthy periods.  
                                                     
19
 “The Whig administration of Sir Robert Walpole sets the precedent for party ministries and 
thenceforward, though there are occasional aberrations, the bonds of party are drawn tighter.”  
Maitland (n 4) 395. 
20
 Hennessy (n 1) 41. 
21
 D L Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain since 1485 (9
th
 edn, Adam & Charles Black, 
London, 1975) p 382. 
22
 Carter writes that during this time “it was the Prime Minister’s authority vis-à-vis his ministerial 
colleagues which expanded most noticeably, not his independence of the King.”  B Carter, The Office 
of Prime Minister (Faber & Faber, London, 1956) p 29. 
23
 The Prime Minister “acts as medium of communication between Cabinet and Crown”.  Halsbury’s 
Laws of England (n 9) para 412. 
24
 Benemy (n 12) 6. 
25
 Keir (n 21) 383.  
26
 “Throughout Pitt’s long ministry, George III continued in countless ways to rule as well as to reign.  
He criticised and even opposed the policy of his ministers, discussed legislative proposals, and 
controlled appointments to office.”  Ibid 380. 
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Maitland claims that in the circumstances, “George III’s attempt to govern as well as 
to reign was, we may now say, a retrograde attempt.”27 
 
The nineteenth century saw further consolidation of prime ministerial office, partly as 
a result of the changing political and constitutional climates in that century. The 
Reform Acts of 183228 and 186729 extended voting rights and indirectly contributed to 
the prime ministerial role in a number of ways.  Firstly, the act whittled down the 
King‟s prerogative power of patronage; his ability to appoint government ministers 
and his resulting influence in both Parliament30 and Cabinet31 was diluted.  Secondly, 
Cabinet was now increasingly reliant upon a majority following in Parliament.  A 
stable majority required strong party discipline and leadership combined with loyalty 
of members in the House of Commons, as well as in Cabinet.  
 
Furthermore, in the nineteenth century there emerged a series of prominent Prime 
Ministers who bolstered the powers and profile of the office.  Robert Peel acted as 
premier between 1841-6, and for nearly a twenty year period between 1868 and 
1885 the office swung pendulously between the Conservative Benjamin Disraeli and 
Liberal William Gladstone.  To obtain and preserve electoral support the Liberal and 
Conservative parties inevitably became stronger and centralised organisations.  The 
ties of party loyalty became tighter, impacting heavily upon the independence of 
MPs.32  The resulting shift in the Commons from once unpredictable factions of MPs 
towards more compliance along party lines bolstered the position of the Cabinet.  
Because government was more able to rely on a solid base of support it came to 
exert de facto control over Parliament rather than vice versa:  
                                                     
27
 Maitland (n 4) 397. 
28
 The 1832 Act extended the electorate by half to bestow voting rights on one thirtieth of the total 
population.  The increase was restricted to the affluent middle classes, whose property was worth more 
than £10 per year.  Additionally, the Reform Act modified the distribution of seats in the House of 
Commons.  Large industrial towns such as Manchester were now represented, and the seats of corrupt 
„rotten boroughs‟ were removed.  For an interesting account of the passage of the 1832 Act see Wicks 
(n 17) ch 4. 
29
 This Act continued the impetus of its predecessor by awarding household suffrage, thus doubling the 
electorate to include urban working class male voters. 
30
 This was highlighted in November 1834 when the King (William IV) dismissed the entire ministry of 
Viscount Melbourne and appointed Robert Peel as Prime Minister, despite the fact that the latter did 
not have a majority in the Commons.  An election was called and Peel failed to gain a parliamentary 
majority.  He resigned in April 1835 after a series of parliamentary defeats.  The King was no longer 
able to construct a government of his choice.  See I Jennings, Cabinet Government (3
rd
 edn, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1965) p 406. 
31
 Keir (n 21) 405. 
32
 “Party discipline within Parliament became more rigid as the battles grew keener and the issues 
tended to resolve themselves into holding or gaining power.”  J Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (3rd 
edn, Stevens & Sons, London, 1977) p 203. 
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“Ever tougher whipping and tautened parliamentary procedure were 
reducing the behavioural scope of the individual member, and the 
power to initiate legislation was moving steadily away from Parliament 
and into the executive.”33     
 
Gaining the ultimate prize of office came to resemble the familiar contest between 
two men and their parties.  The “gulf between the two principal parties was 
aggravated by animosity and rivalry of the leaders, Disraeli and Gladstone.”34  Thus 
surfaced a second feature of the period, overlapping with the strengthening of party: 
the personalisation of politics.  Carter writes: 
 
“The effect of the suffrage extension was to personalize elections in 
such a way that they were to a large degree personality contests 
between party leaders.”35 
 
Events of the twentieth century, particularly two world wars, bolstered the prime 
ministerial role yet further.  Additionally, this was the first century in which the office 
was recognised formally36 and statutorily.37  The post-World War period also 
contributed to prime ministerial power.  “When the war ended the State stood 
possessed of such a range of authority as the constitution had never previously 
conferred”,38 primarily due to the vast legislative powers that had been bestowed 
upon the upper executive.39  The newly elected Labour Party, headed by Clement 
Attlee, utilised these latent powers40 to enable creation of the vast welfare state41 and 
                                                     
33
 Hennessy (n 1) 41. 
34
 Benemy (n 12) 8. 
35
 Carter (n 22) 37. 
36
 Halsbury’s states that the first reference to the prime ministerial office was on 2nd December 1905 
when a Royal Warrant was placed in the London Gazette:  “The warrant is noticeable as containing an 
official recognition of the office of Prime Minister.”  The only earlier reference seems to be when Lord 
Beaconsfield signed the Treaty of Berlin describing himself as Prime Minister. Halsbury’s Laws of 
England (n 9) para 395 footnote. 
37
 The Chequers Estate Act 1917. 
38
 Keir (n 21) 461. 
39
 Rossiter writes: “The most significant change worked by the war is the permanent establishment of 
government by administrative decree, the cutting edge of the sword of delegated legislation.  In this 
instance as in many others however, the experience of the war only capped a long and steady progress 
in this direction.”  C Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, Crisis Government in the Modern 
Democracies (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1948) p 204. 
40
 “The wartime centralisation of power in the person of the Premier was in no way reduced by Mr 
Attlee; … the point of decision, which in the 1930s still rested inside the Cabinet, was now 
permanently transferred either downwards to … powerful Cabinet committees, or upwards to the 
Prime Minister himself.”  R H S Crossman, Introduction to W Bagehot, The English Constitution 
(Collins, London, 1963) p 49. 
41
 “The extending reach of the state through the nationalized industries and the expanded welfare 
apparatus meant a considerable growth in the flow of appointments and patronage that passed 
through No 10.”  Hennessy (n 1) 169-70. 
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the associated necessary economic controls.42   
 
So it seems that the current office of Prime Minister is a result of the cumulative 
effect of a myriad of influencing factors and forces interacting over centuries.  Many 
of the modifications have emerged organically and imperceptibly.  But the overall 
trajectory follows the waning of monarchical authority and inversely proportionate 
bolstering of the prime ministerial role, reflecting the fact that “the powers of the 
prime minister … have been wrestled away from the Throne.”43  Because of this, the 
relationship between premier and monarch remains a key element in constitutional 
understandings of modern prime ministerial power. 
 
 
The Blair Premiership 
 
The period with which this study is concerned is limited to the broad period leading 
up to, during and after the Iraq affair.  This decision was taken by then Prime 
Minister Mr Blair who led the Labour government from May 1997 to June 2007 
following three successive general election victories.44  Over the course of this 
decade a number of issues related to the office of Prime Minister gained topical 
relevance and became the object of public debate.  For example: how should 
premiers exercise powers of patronage?45  Do autocratic styles of conducting 
Cabinet undermine its traditional collegiate basis?46  How is the political neutrality of 
the senior civil service to be preserved?47  All of these issues relate to a Prime 
Minister‟s ancient prerogative powers and, despite their current importance, are by 
no means new dilemmas raised solely by the Blair premiership.   
 
As confirmed above, this study will explore just one of the Prime Minister‟s 
prerogative powers: that of declaring war, a power that falls within the wider 
prerogative to conduct foreign affairs.  The power to conduct foreign affairs has 
                                                     
42
 “In December 1945 the Atlee government secured the passage of the Supplies and Services 
(Transitional Powers) Act which authorized a five-year extension of the war controls over labor, 
prices, transport and materials.”  Rossiter (n 39) 204. 
43
 T Benn, Arguments for Democracy (Penguin, London, 1982) p 20. 
44
 In May 1997, June 2001 and finally May 2005. 
45
 Public Administration Select Committee, „A Matter of Honour: Reforming the Honours System‟, HC 
(2003-04) 212-I; Public Administration Select Committee, „Propriety and Peerages‟, HC (2007-08) 
153. 
46
 Foley (n 3). 
47
 Committee on Standards in Public Life, „Defining the Boundaries within the Executive: Ministers, 
Special Advisers and the Permanent Civil Service‟ (Cm 5775, 2003). 
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always been a vital one for premiers, though its role is arguably increasingly 
important due to the onset of globalisation and the escalating interaction between 
countries at international level in recent decades.  It enables a Prime Minister to 
carry out a variety of activities on behalf of the country, such as entering treaties and 
conducting diplomatic relations with foreign nations.48  In a topic of this nature one 
cannot overlook the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,49 the 
Cabinet minister charged with specific responsibility for that task.  Over the Blair 
premiership the office was held by three individuals: Robin Cook acted as Foreign 
Secretary over the course of Blair‟s first term between May 1997 and June 2001.  
Following the Labour Party‟s second electoral victory Cook was replaced with Jack 
Straw who acted until May 2006 when the position was taken over by Margaret 
Beckett.  Mrs Beckett left the post in June 2007 when Mr Blair‟s premiership ended.  
Though Foreign Secretaries will often utilise the prerogative powers to conduct 
foreign affairs, history is replete with Prime Ministers who have personally 
undertaken the task.  In 1951 Laski wrote that “while the position of Foreign 
Secretary remains, under all circumstances, an important one, it is nevertheless 
always true that a Foreign Secretary must work under what it is difficult not to call the 
direct supervision of the Prime Minister.”50  In recent decades Prime Ministers have 
continued to take a central role in this task; research conducted by Hennessy into 
prime ministerial files since 1945 indicates that foreign policy and defence are 
political priorities which occupy the most prime ministerial time and have thus been 
an integral part of the premier‟s role throughout the twentieth century.51 This relative 
predominance in the foreign affairs field was illustrated throughout the Blair 
premiership which displayed a strong international dimension, particularly following 
the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11th 2001.52  The 1997-2007 period 
thus continued to demonstrate the truth of Hennessy‟s claim that “war is an intensely 
prime ministerial activity”.53  
 
 
 
                                                     
48
 To be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
49
 Hereinafter referred to as „the Foreign Secretary‟. 
50
 H Laski, Reflections on the Constitution (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1997) pp 103-4. 
51
 Hennessy (n 1) 91-98.  Former minister Blunkett confirms that foreign affairs and defence matters 
dominate Cabinet discussion; David Blunkett, The Blunkett Tapes, My Life in the Bear Pit 
(Bloomsbury, London, 2006) p 11. 
52
 See for example, A Seldon, Blair (Free Press, London, 2005) pp 498-507; ibid (Blunkett) pp 311, 316, 
320. 
53
 Hennessy (n 1) 103. 
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Overall Structure of Study 
 
This study will investigate three constitutional components that are integral to the 
prime ministerial office and its powers, namely conventions, prerogative and the 
Crown.  The complex and esoteric interaction of these elements is essentially what 
forms the premiership in its constitutional context.  Indeed, mention of a prime 
ministerial „office‟ is slightly misleading as no formal office exists per se.  As Ward 
states, “Prime Ministers, it seems, just are.  The office of Prime Minister is what they 
do.”54  Nevertheless, consideration of the premier and war prerogative over the 
course of the Iraq affair involves understanding this intricate fusion of Crown, 
prerogative and convention. 
 
Chapter 1 sets out the vital political and factual background to Mr Blair‟s use of the 
war prerogative in the Iraq affair, the leading and most scrutinised example of his 
use of the war power.  This chapter provides a basis for subsequent discussion in 
Chapters 2-5 by setting out a chronological account of the main political and 
constitutional events of that episode before identifying relevant constitutional issues 
to be elaborated upon in later chapters.   
 
Chapter 2 explores the enigmatic concept of „the Crown‟, the symbolic apex of the 
British constitution embodied by the monarch.  The Crown is the source of all 
prerogative power available to a premier and thus all foreign affairs are conducted in 
the name of the Crown.  Therefore an understanding of this legal framework 
governing the area is important at the outset.  This chapter will pay specific attention 
to the unique relationship between monarch and premier, particularly the extent to 
which the institution of the former continues to influence and underpin the latter.  
This relationship forms the root cause of many of the issues regarding the Prime 
Minister and the war power discussed in Chapters 3-5. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates the nature and operation of constitutional conventions, non-
legal norms viewed as playing a vital regulatory role within the British constitution.  
Conventions are particularly significant in relation to the premiership because firstly, 
the office and its powers have emerged as a matter of convention and secondly, 
conventions continue to regulate a Prime Minister‟s use of prerogatives, including the 
war power.  Chapter 3 will consider and analyse the specific conventions that were 
                                                     
54
 I Ward, The English Constitution, Myths and Realities (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) p 71. 
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materially relevant to Mr Blair‟s exercise of the war prerogative over the course of the 
Iraq affair. 
 
Chapter 4 considers the prerogative itself, the residue of absolute power once 
wielded by monarchs of old.  In keeping with the historic lineage of the office, current 
prime ministerial powers still primarily stem from the prerogative; it covers a broad 
range of areas enabling a premier and his Cabinet to undertake a range of activities 
that are necessary to govern the country, including the conduct of foreign affairs and 
engagement in warfare.  Chapter 4 will conduct detailed investigation of the war 
prerogative and other select prime ministerial prerogatives that impacted upon Mr 
Blair‟s exercise of the former in the Iraq affair. 
 
Chapter 5 considers judicial views on the war and related prerogatives over the 
broad Iraq period.  These years saw a number of important cases which challenged 
ministerial prerogative decisions.  The Iraq deployment and related foreign affairs 
decisions triggered a number of legal challenges to this traditionally non-justiciable 
area, and these cases will be discussed and analysed in detail.  Specific attention 
will be paid to the effectiveness of judicial checks upon the prime ministerial war 
prerogative and the rationales that determine the courts‟ approaches to such cases.   
 
Finally, a conclusion will draw together and summarise discussion of Mr Blair‟s 
exercise of the war prerogative in the Iraq affair covered in Chapters 1-5.  The 
conclusions drawn will specifically address the three aims of this study outlined at 
the start of this Introduction.   
  
 
Analytical Approach to be Adopted in this Study 
 
The investigation of the prime ministerial war prerogative across Chapters 1-5 
considers caselaw and mainstream academic views of their respective subject 
matter.  Much leading British constitutional literature encourages one to see the 
constitution in terms of a legal framework of statute and common law supplemented 
by longstanding concepts such as the rule of law, conventions and the separation of 
powers etc.  Such views tend to depict the constitution as a self-contained, self-
regulating totality; essentially the definitive article.  This has important implications 
for ongoing critique and reform of the British constitution.  First it requires criticism of 
existing constitutional features to be couched in the terminology, framework and 
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values of these particular mainstream understandings.  Second, any reforms are 
likely to be devised from within the existing system by utilising or modifying prevailing 
models.   
 
In its investigation of the area, this study will employ two analytical devices to 
critically explore the mainstream approaches: first, it will identify and investigate 
divergences between the legal framework and political reality in this area and 
second, it will consider the role of boundaries between law and non-law in this area.  
These two analytical devices are drawn from themes that recur across the range of 
literature in this area and allow this study to look behind mainstream representations 
of the constitution where relevant.  They encourage it to consider the extent to which 
these views may be outmoded, ineffective or even a contributory factor towards 
perceived inadequacies in the area of prime ministerial power.  This method 
materially differs from general mainstream approaches which tend to attribute 
constitutional failures to particular weaknesses in the workings of existing models, 
failures which could therefore be rectified by mere modification.  Instead, the two 
devices in the context of this study lead one to question whether central 
constitutional components such as the Crown and conventions could be the very 
source of certain problems in this area.  Specifically, applying the analytical devices 
will allow this study to assess how constitutional components concerning the prime 
ministerial war prerogative may fail to adequately check political power, or even how 
they may actually provide opportunities for the exercise of power in politically or 
morally dubious ways. 
 
The following preliminary explanations of the two analytical devices can be made: 
 
[1] Divergence between constitutional framework and practice 
 
The first analytical device adopted in this study will involve investigating the extent to 
which developments within the British constitution, such as the emergence of the 
premiership outlined above, may have resulted in a discrepancy between the 
traditional legal-constitutional framework and constitutional reality.  A distinction will 
be made between the legal edifice concerning the war prerogative and its exercise 
by Mr Blair in practice.  To what extent might there be a rupture between de jure and 
de facto understandings of the Prime Minister and the war powers he exercises, 
particularly over the broad Iraq period? To what extent may these legal and factual 
positions even oppose or inherently contradict one another? 
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Distinguishing between legal models and constitutional reality engenders an array of 
further supplementary issues: to what extent do legal labels and constitutional reality 
in this area accurately correspond?  Have political or other developments outpaced 
the dominant legal models governing the Prime Minister and war, leaving 
constitutional lawyers tied to obsolete concepts that no longer reflect practice? What 
are the implications of such developments on the labels used by constitutional 
lawyers?   Is the lawyer‟s view of the premiership and war power merely a 
misrepresentative facade?  Considering these issues in relation to convention, 
Crown and the prerogative generally where relevant may yield deeper insights about 
the prime ministerial war power.  
 
It is not the claim of this study that theory and practice must exactly correspond.  
Indeed, the existence of „gaps‟ between the constitutional framework and political 
reality is an inherent aspect of most constitutions.  Feldman has written:   
 
“In the UK’s constitution, as in all constitutions, what appears on the 
surface is often an illusion, and what appears to be absent is 
sometimes present (although often in an unexpected form).  In every 
constitution there are gaps between appearance and reality.”55 
 
Nevertheless, considering the accuracy of prevailing constitutional components 
(such as convention, Crown and prerogative) will lead to an assessment of their 
constitutional role and efficacy in relation to the premier and his war power.  
Furthermore, exploring the gaps between law and practice in this area can enhance 
understanding of, and afford deeper insights into, the former by revealing any 
assumptions or ideologies underlying it.   
 
[2] The role of boundaries between law and non-law 
 
A second analytical device adopted by this study will involve considering the role of 
legal boundaries in the area of the premiership and its war power where relevant.  It 
will be seen that boundaries of various sorts are erected by the judiciary when 
considering legal issues relating to the war prerogative.  This study will identify and 
investigate instances where such boundaries or limits are utilised by the judiciary.  It 
will pay particular attention to the boundaries between law and non-law, between 
                                                     
55
 D Feldman, „None, One or Several?  Perspectives  on the UK‟s Constitution(s)‟, C.L.J. 64(2), July 
2005, pp 329-351, p 331. 
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legal issues or considerations which are the concern of the courts and wider non-
legal matters (such as policy, politics or ethical issues) which are not.  The following 
quote by Douzinas and Warrington epitomises this position: 
 
“Jurisprudence sets itself the task of determining what is proper to law 
and of keeping outside law’s empire the non-legal, the extraneous, 
law’s other.  It has spent unlimited energy demarcating boundaries that 
enclose law within its sovereign terrain, giving it its internal purity, and 
its external power to hold court over other realms … Jurisprudence’s 
task is to impose upon law the law of purity and of order, of clear 
boundaries and of well-policed checkpoints.”56 
 
This study will consider the extent to which such a claim is accurate in relation to the 
prime ministerial war prerogative, a highly political and frequently contentious field 
where legal regulation is limited.  What is the impact of judicially-drawn boundaries in 
this area and, vitally, what are the principles or reasons that inform where and how 
those boundaries are drawn?  How consistent, how concrete or contingent, are their 
foundations?  Contemplating these questions will provide vital deeper insights into 
the war prerogative and the effectiveness of judicial checks upon it.  They prove 
particularly significant over the Iraq period which witnessed a number of high profile 
cases where various groups sought to legally challenge the deployment and related 
prerogative decisions.  The challenge facing the judiciary in such cases is 
acknowledged by Jowell who has stated: 
 
“The appropriate balance between those decisions which are in the 
province of politicians and those which belong to the law is one of the 
most fundamental questions in all constitutional theory and has great 
practical importance.”57 
 
Discussion in subsequent chapters will examine how caselaw concerning the war 
prerogative has approached this most fundamental of questions. 
 
                                                     
56
 C Douzinas, R Warrington & S McVeigh, Postmodern Jurisprudence, The Law of Text in the Texts of 
Law (Routledge, London, 1991) p 25.  See also M Horwitz, „Why is Anglo-American Jurisprudence 
Unhistorical?‟ (1997) O.J.L.S. 17(4) pp. 551-586. 
57
 Professor Jowell quoted by the Constitutional Affairs Committee, „Constitutional Role of the Attorney 
General‟ HC (2006-7) 306, para 3, p 5.  
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Chapter One 
Use of the War Power in Iraq:  
Political Background 
 
 
 
Before considering the constitutional issues concerning the Prime Minister and his 
war prerogative, an overview of the important events in the Iraq affair is essential at 
the outset.  The factual account in this chapter will form the basis for wider 
discussion of the roles of convention, prerogative and Crown in the war prerogative 
in Chapters 2-5.  This chapter therefore focuses upon the political and parliamentary 
context of Mr Blair‟s exercise of the war prerogative in relation to Iraq.    
 
Part 1 of this chapter provides a detailed, descriptive account of the decision to 
conduct military action in Iraq, providing a comprehensive background chronology of 
the main political and constitutional events concerning the decision.1  Drawing upon 
preceding discussion, Part 2 summarises the relevant constitutional issues that 
arose in the Iraq affair; subsequent chapters conduct detailed investigation of these 
matters in their constitutional context. 
  
 
 
[1] Background to the Iraq ‘War’: Chronology 
 
 
[1.1] Early 2002: Policy Towards Iraq Changes 
 
 
The roots of the UK‟s current military involvement in Iraq can be viewed in the first 
Gulf War in 1991 and the subsequent Operation Desert Fox in 1998.2  Following the 
                                                     
1
 For a useful general overview see also Information Commissioner Decision Notice FS50165372 
(19/2/09), paras 16-28. 
2
 Operation „Desert Fox‟ involved four days of air attacks upon Iraq undertaken by the UK and US 
between 16
th
 and 20
th
 December 1998.  The operation was instigated as a result of Saddam Hussein‟s 
expulsion of UN weapon inspectors in November 1997 and subsequent obstructions over the course of 
1998; A Seldon, Blair (Free Press, London, 2005) pp 387-9; A Rawnsley, Servants of the People, The 
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9/11 terrorist attacks in New York there was a shift in UK government policy towards 
Iraq in early 2002.3  This shift towards stronger attempts to „enforce Iraqi 
disarmament‟4 was a result of increased concerns based on intelligence 
assessments about the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons5 in Iraq6 and 
other countries.7   
 
Coates and Krieger outline four related justifications for invading Iraq that were 
typically advanced by the UK and US governments from 2002.  Those justifications 
included: (1) potential links between terrorist groups such as Al Qaida and the Iraqi 
regime under Saddam Hussein, (2) the dangers of allowing the Iraqi regime to 
develop weapons of mass destruction, (3) Iraq‟s record as a „rogue‟ state 
responsible for internal human rights abuses and invasions of neighbouring states 
and (4) the undermining of global governance caused by Iraq‟s persistent breaches 
of UN resolutions.8  Coates explains that the weighting and emphasis of each of 
these justifications varied over the course of the Iraq war.9  A detailed exploration of 
these justifications is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Inside Story of New Labour (Penguin, London, 2001) ch 14.  The aim of operation „Desert Fox‟ was 
the containment of the Iraqi weapons program.  No free-standing UN Security Council resolution was 
passed to specifically authorise Operation Desert Fox.  Instead the UK and US relied on United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 678 ((29 November 1990) UN Doc S/RES/678) which was passed 
prior to the 1991 Gulf War.  Domestically, though decisions regarding the operation were made by 
ministers via prerogative, the House of Commons had given approval to use of military force if 
necessary in February 1998 (Hansard HC vol 307, cols 173-187 (24 Feb 1998)).  Intermittent air 
strikes in Iraq continued across 1999, 2000 and 2001. 
3
 Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (chair: Lord Butler), „Review of Intelligence on Weapons 
of Mass Destruction‟, HC (July 2004) 898, paras 257-258.  See D Coates & J Krieger, Blair’s War 
(Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004) pp 27-33 for an outline of the US position.   
4
 Butler Report, ibid para 258.  
5
 Ibid para 257. 
6
 Ibid para 255. 
7
 Ibid para 256. 
8
 Coates & Krieger (n 3) ch 5.  Another interesting justification for the Iraq invasion is explored by 
Naomi Klein who suggests that advancing the free-market democratic state model was an important 
motivating factor; N Klein, The Shock Doctrine, The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Penguin, London, 
2008), part 6, specifically pp 325-331. 
9
 See also Lord Alexander QC, „The pax Americana and the law‟, Justice website (London, 14 th October 
2003) <http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/Iraq-thepaxAmericanaandthelaw.pdf> accessed 3
rd
 
April 2009 
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[1.2] April 2002 onwards: Cabinet Weakened 
 
 
One critical constitutional development occurred in the lead-up to the Iraq decision; 
collective Cabinet responsibility weakened.  Collective Cabinet responsibility is a 
constitutional convention that requires Cabinet to make important policy decisions 
collectively.10  Such decisions are binding on all government members.11  Despite the 
Ministerial Code setting out specific provisions, the collective Cabinet responsibility 
convention is generally viewed as flexible.12  This quality enabled it to be 
marginalised in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion.  It appears that Cabinet was often 
bypassed as a decision-making body in the period from April 2002 leading up to the 
Iraq deployment.13  Evidence suggests that many important decisions regarding Iraq 
were made outside of Cabinet14 which inevitably acted to limit the Blair Cabinet‟s 
involvement in such decisions.  This trend was confirmed by the findings of the July 
2004 Butler Report which expressed concerns with the lack of collectivity in the 
government‟s formulation of Iraq policy.15  Leading commentator Hennessy concurs, 
claiming that the Iraq affair saw a „systems failure‟ of Cabinet government.16  Chapter 
3 conducts detailed investigation of the operation of collective Cabinet responsibility 
in the Iraq affair, drawing upon a range of vital evidence such as ministerial diaries, 
the Butler Report and leading literature.   
 
Significantly, the weakening of collective Cabinet responsibility is arguably 
attributable in part to Mr Blair‟s use of the Cabinet chairmanship powers.  As Prime 
Minister Mr Blair possessed powers to determine the Cabinet agenda, the papers 
that went before Cabinet and the frequency of its meetings, in addition to chairing 
and summing up those meetings.17  Over the course of his premiership, and 
particularly during the Iraq affair, Mr Blair exercised his chairmanship powers in a 
                                                     
10
 Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, July 2005) para 2(2)(a) 
<http://www.Cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/Cabinetoffice/propriety_and_ethics/assets/ministerial_code.p
df> accessed 16
th
 August 2008. 
11
 Ibid para 2(3) 
12
 Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd. & Others [1976] Q.B. 752.  Though there is essential 
agreement about the core tenets of collective Cabinet responsibility, uncertainty arose in this case as to 
its wider application and a range of opinions as to the scope of this convention created difficulties; see 
Lord Widgery, p 764. 
13
 Butler Report (n 3) para 609.   
14
 This evidence will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
15
 Butler Report (n 3) para 611.   
16
 P Hennessy, „Informality and Circumscription: The Blair Style of Government in War and Peace‟, 
Political Quarterly, 2005, Vol. 76(1), p 3, p 9. 
17
 Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th edn, Butterworths, London, 1996) vol 8(2), paras 398, 405, 407, 408. 
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particularly distinctive way.  Evidence discussed in Chapter 4 establishes that under 
Mr Blair‟s direction Cabinet meetings were frequently brief, informal and not subject 
to a detailed agenda.18  It furthermore suggests that in the lead-up to the Iraq 
deployment information-sharing within Cabinet was limited and papers were not 
circulated in advance of meetings.  Vitally, there was a lack of substantive policy 
discussion in Cabinet; from April 2002 discussions regarding Iraq were taken by the 
Prime Minister and a small informal group of advisers outside of Cabinet and war 
Cabinet.19  Evidence indicates that ministers were not always privy to substantive 
discussions regarding Iraq and did not always have the necessary papers or 
information to assess the emerging situation.  Though not necessarily undertaken in 
bad faith, the exercise of prime ministerial power in the way outlined above 
effectively contributed to the marginalisation of collective Cabinet responsibility.  
Chapter 4 details the prime ministerial prerogative powers, including his Cabinet 
chairmanship powers.  It considers how Mr Blair‟s use of these powers may have 
impacted upon his exercise of the war prerogative in relation to Iraq.   
 
 
[1.3] September 2002: Dossier Published 
 
 
Over the course of 2002 questions surrounding potential military action in Iraq were 
widespread across the UK public and media.20  In response to this on 3rd September 
2002 the government commissioned a dossier to outline the threat posed by Iraq‟s 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).21  The dossier was based on various existing 
intelligence assessments that had been previously produced by the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC).22  The JIC took responsibility for authorship of the dossier.23  The 
document, entitled ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’ was published on 24th 
September 2002, the day Parliament was recalled.  The Prime Minister made a 
statement to House of Commons introducing the report.24   
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 See Chapter 4, Part 2.2. 
19
 Seldon (n 2) 580.  
20
 Butler Report (n 3) para 309. 
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 Ibid para 290. 
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 Hansard HC vol 390, cols 1-155 (24 Sept 2002) specifically cols 3-4. 
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[1.4] November 2002 - March 2003: UN Negotiations 
 
 
On 8 November 2002 United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 144125 
unanimously.  Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq was in breach of its obligations to 
provide full disclosure and allow UN inspection of its weapons programmes under 
previous resolutions.26  Furthermore it demanded that Iraq „co-operate immediately, 
unconditionally, and actively‟ with inspections27 or face „serious consequences‟.28  In 
a later legal challenge, CND claimed that the omission to include the term „all 
necessary means‟ (terminology which includes the option of force) in resolution 1441 
was significant.29 There had been much disagreement and negotiation between UN 
members over the precise wording of resolution 144130 and as a result it contained 
what Seldon terms „several fudges‟.  Different interpretations of the resolution‟s 
meaning prevailed.31  The most problematic ambiguity related to the nature of the 
UN‟s response in the event of a further Iraqi breach.  Seldon writes: “The end 
compromise [stated in the resolution] was that the Security Council would meet, but 
it remained unclear whether this would be a consultation meeting prior to war (the 
American view) or the forum to debate a second resolution (the French view).  
Herein lay the seed of the future battle”.32  
 
It became clear that Iraq would fail to fully comply with resolution 1441 by late 
2002.33  The UK government began attempts to obtain support among UN members 
for a second resolution authorising military action.  Ultimately this arduous task was 
made impossible by a number of factors including a lack of effort to build up UN 
support on the part of the US,34 the claim by France, Germany and Russia that they 
would not allow a resolution authorizing force to pass35 and a further French 
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 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 ((8 November 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1441). 
26
 Ibid pre-amble and para 1. 
27
 Ibid para 9. 
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 Ibid para 13. 
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 R (on the application of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v Prime Minister and others [2002] 
EWHC 2777 (admin), [2002] All ER (D) 245 (Dec) para 10.  See also Alexander QC (n 9).  
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 Seldon (n 2) 586.   
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 Seldon (n 2) 587; J Kampfner, Blair’s Wars (Free Press, London, 2004) p 220.  See also the comments 
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Mar 2003). 
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 Seldon, ibid 592.  
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 Coates (n 3) 41.  
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statement on 10th March that it would veto any second resolution.36  At a press 
conference on 17th March the US reiterated its view that a second resolution was not 
necessary and had been pursued solely to assist allied countries to obtain public 
support for involvement.37  Attempts to gain a second resolution were abandoned 
and no second resolution was obtained. 
 
 
[1.5] March 2003: The Attorney General’s Advice 
 
 
Ongoing problems obtaining a second UN resolution caused problems for Mr Blair.  
At a meeting on 28th February 2003 the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, initially 
provided advice to the Prime Minister regarding the legality of undertaking military 
action without a second UN resolution, advice later confirmed in a formal minute on 
7th March.38  The Attorney-General‟s initial advice on this issue was qualified and 
reticent about military action, concluding that „there would be no justification for the 
use of force against Iraq on the grounds of self-defence against an imminent 
threat.‟39  Though Goldsmith accepted that „a reasonable case‟ could be made that 
military action would be authorised without a second resolution, he made a vital 
qualification to this point.  The qualification was this: that proceeding without a 
second resolution and relying solely on resolutions 678 and 1441 “will only be 
sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to 
take the final opportunity [to comply].  In other words, we would need to be able to 
demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non-co-operation.”40  This initially 
private advice was later publicised in the Butler Report.41 
 
On 11th March the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, indicated to the 
Prime Minister that the international lawfulness of any military action must be clearly 
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 Seldon (n 2) 591-2; Kampfner (n 32) 286-7. 
37
 Coates (n 3) 41.  
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 Butler Report (n 3) para 378. 
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 Ibid para 374.  
40
 R (on the application of Gentle and another) v Prime Minister and others [2006] EWCA Civ 1689, 
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confirmed before he could order forces to take action.42  Vitally the Attorney General 
later changed his opinion regarding the international legality of military action.  On 
17th March, days after his initially sceptical advice, the Attorney-General produced 
advice indicating an alternative legal view.43  His new advice (drafted by Professor 
Christopher Greenwood)44 contained none of its earlier qualifications and claimed 
that „the authority to use force under resolution 678 has revived and so continues 
today‟.45  This new advice was provided to Parliament and Cabinet, the latter body 
meeting to discuss the emerging situation on 13th March,46 and more significantly, on 
17th March.  The Attorney attended this later meeting and his amended advice was 
presented to ministers.47  The Information Tribunal recently commented that “it may 
have been that members of Cabinet without a legal background were inclined to rely 
on the Attorney’s [shorter and more certain] advice.”48 
 
This apparent u-turn in legal advice has proved controversial and, in the words of the 
House of Lords Constitutional Select Committee, “the differences [in advice] … gave 
rise to speculation that the Attorney had been placed under political pressure to 
temper his opinion to align it with the government’s intentions.”49  This episode in the 
Iraq affair highlights the potential significance of another constitutional feature; 
namely that the Attorney-General is a government minister appointed by the Prime 
Minister.  As Prime Minister, Mr Blair was able to exercise the Crown power to 
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appoint and dismiss ministers, including the Attorney-General.  The potential 
interrelation of this prerogative and the war power in the Iraq affair is discussed 
further in Chapter 4.  Additionally the domestic legal significance of the Attorney‟s 
above advice will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
 
[1.6] 18th March 2003: The Parliamentary Vote 
 
 
Though the power to conduct military action or declare war lies in fact with the Prime 
Minister, parliamentary support for a deployment is politically vital.50  However 
debate has surrounded whether parliamentary approval of war is required as a 
matter of constitutional convention.51  During the Iraq affair questions arose as to the 
precise role of Parliament in approving warfare, specifically whether such 
parliamentary approval required a debate or a more onerous formal vote on the 
matter.52  Chapter 3 outlines the attempts of government minister Robin Cook to 
obtain a substantive parliamentary vote and will detail the potential significance of 
the Iraq vote as a constitutional precedent.  
 
Parliamentary approval was particularly vital in relation to Iraq because the decision 
to deploy was controversial and British public opinion was hostile to the idea.53  
Ultimately a Commons debate and substantive vote to determine whether troops 
should be deployed took place on 18th March 2003.54  Extensive background 
negotiations were undertaken by ministers to ensure Labour backbench support in 
the lead-up to the vote.55  There was clearly uncertainty among MPs (and indeed the 
wider populace) as to the international legality of conducting military operations in 
Iraq, a point made repeatedly in the Commons debate.56  Nevertheless following 
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intensive discussions a motion in support of war was passed by majority of 396 to 
217.57 
 
The parliamentary vote regarding military action in Iraq was viewed by some, for 
example Cook, as a constitutional victory in that it established Parliament‟s right to 
formally vote on such matters.58  Nevertheless, the practical significance of the vote 
in the Iraq decision was arguably limited.  The outcome approved military action and 
thus endorsed the Prime Minister‟s preferred exercise of the war power.  This may 
have been partly attributable to two vital leverage devices utilised by Mr Blair, both 
involving a fusion of convention and prerogative.  First, prior to the Iraq vote Mr Blair 
publicly stated that he would resign if he lost the vote.59  This incident represented 
the functioning of two established constitutional features: first, a Prime Minister‟s 
power to advise the monarch to use Her prerogative to dissolve Parliament,60 and 
second, the long-standing constitutional convention that a premier and his 
government must resign if they lose a vote of confidence in Parliament.61  The nature 
of this combination of convention and prerogative, and vitally its implications upon 
the war power in the Iraq affair are afforded further consideration in Chapter 4.  A 
second integral point must also be noted; the defence prerogative which authorises 
the conduct of defence matters62 had already been exercised when Parliament voted 
on 18th March.  The defence prerogative authorised the prior deployment of troops; 
forces had been installed and were awaiting orders near the Iraqi border when the 
parliamentary debate took place.  The impact of this exercise of the defence 
prerogative upon the war prerogative in Iraq will also be investigated in Chapter 4.  
 
 
[1.7] July 2004: Dossier discredited 
 
 
Over a period of months questions were raised about the reliability of the content of 
the government‟s 2002 dossier, ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’.  In early 2004 
a committee of Privy Counsellors headed by Lord Butler was appointed to 
investigate the matter.  The original JIC intelligence assessments which formed the 
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basis of the dossier did raise concerns about Iraq‟s attempts to develop WMD but 
the Butler Report found that the strength of their respective evidential bases varied 
greatly.  Some of the intelligence assessments, particularly those relating to missile 
development, were based on strong evidence.63   But it is clear that other intelligence 
was much weaker.  For example, assessments from March 2002 presented some of 
the information in qualified, provisional terminology and specified potential 
deficiencies in sources.64  Another assessment from August 2002 was identified by 
the Butler Report as lacking a solid factual basis and a balanced approach to 
analysis.65  A further JIC assessment featured in the dossier indicated that select 
Iraqi WMD could be deployed within 45 minutes.  This claim was also highlighted by 
the Butler committee as one that should have been stated in more accurate and 
careful terms.66   
 
The Butler Report confirmed that there was no evidence that government had 
embellished the dossier.67  However the committee did conclude that in its translation 
from JIC assessments to the dossier, certain qualifications to the information were 
„lost‟ and the “language in the dossier may have left readers with the impression that 
there was fuller and firmer intelligence behind the judgements than was the case.”68  
The report further identified a degree of disparity between the motives of the 
government and JIC:  
 
“The Government wanted an unclassified document on which it could 
draw in its advocacy of its policy.  The JIC sought to offer a 
dispassionate assessment of intelligence and other material on Iraqi 
nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes.” 69   
 
Ultimately the Butler committee concluded that in these circumstances publication of 
the dossier in the JIC‟s name „had the result that more weight was placed on the 
                                                     
63
 “We have examined the intelligence underpinning these judgements on missile development and found 
it substantial.”  Butler Report (n 3) para 281.  Elsewhere the report stated: “there was strong evidence 
of continuing work on ballistic missiles.” para 306(c).  
64
 Ibid paras 270–281.     
65 “The JIC made clear that much of the [August] assessment was based on its own judgement … But we 
were struck by the relative thinness of the intelligence base supporting the greater firmness of the 
JIC’s judgements in Iraqi production and possession of chemical and biological weapons, especially 
the inferential nature of much of it.  We also noted that the JIC did not reflect in its assessment, even 
if only to dismiss it, material in one of those reports suggesting that most members of the Iraqi 
leadership were not convinced that it would be possible to use chemical and biological weapons.”  
Emphasis added.  Ibid para 304.  
66
 Ibid para 509, 511.   
67
 Ibid para 310.  
68
 Ibid chapter 8 conclusions, para 33.  Para 34 continues: “the limitations of the intelligence were not 
made sufficiently clear in the dossier.”  
69
 Ibid para 31, 32.  See also paras 325-327 of main report. 
25 
 
intelligence than it could bear‟.70  A 2003 Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
additionally concluded that the Prime Minister‟s original presentation of the dossier to 
Parliament „misinterpreted its status and thus inadvertently made a bad situation 
worse.‟71  
 
 
[1.8] March 2008-Present: Military Involvement in Iraq 
 
 
The bombing of Iraq began on 20th March and UK troops crossed the border into Iraq 
on 21st March.72  UK and US forces achieved victory within a month.73  Subsequent 
instability and violence arose in Iraq following the invasion74 and this led to ongoing 
UK military involvement beyond the end of Blair‟s premiership in June 2007.  No 
weapons of mass destruction have yet been found in the country.75   
 
Subsequent UN resolutions were passed authorising creation of a multi-national 
force in October 200376 and affirming sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government in 
June 2004.77  The official withdrawal of British troops from Iraq began in late March 
2009, with US troops to follow in late 2011.78  Nevertheless over the course of 
engagement in Iraq strong opposition has continued in the UK and internationally, 
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critics claiming that the invasion constituted a crime of aggression in international 
law.79  
 
On 15th June 2009 Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced to Parliament that he 
was ordering an independent inquiry into the Iraq affair to be undertaken by a 
committee of Privy Counsellors chaired by Sir John Chilcot.80  The inquiry is charged 
with the specific objective of identifying lessons to be learnt from the eight-year 
period of British involvement in Iraq.  The inquiry was initially to be held in private, 
though following widespread criticism most of the proceedings will now be public.81  
Recent Lords82 and Commons83 debates have highlighted other concerns about the 
inquiry, including its predicted year-long timescale and the fact that it was originally 
not to apportion any blame for the Iraq affair. 
 
 
 
[2] Relevant Constitutional Issues Identified 
 
 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that a combination of prime ministerial-
related conventions and prerogatives played a subtle but significant role in the 
exercise of the war prerogative in the Iraq affair.  The specific operation and 
interaction of these constitutional components, as well as their cumulative impact 
upon the checks and balances regulating the premier‟s war prerogative in the Iraq 
deployment will be considered in Chapters 3 and 4.   
 
Discussion in this chapter has identified a number of constitutional conventions that 
played a role in the use of the war prerogative in Iraq: first, collective Cabinet 
responsibility which required the warfare decision to be made by Cabinet collectively; 
second, the potential „convention‟ that Parliament must vote to approve military 
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action.  Chapter 3 will investigate in detail these constitutional conventions and 
others of relevance that impacted upon Mr Blair‟s exercise of the war prerogative in 
Iraq.  From the account in Part 1 it is also clear that a number of prime ministerial 
prerogative powers may have played a material role in Mr Blair‟s exercise of the war 
prerogative specifically.  In addition to the war power, four main prerogatives have 
emerged as potentially significant in some way to the Iraq deployment: first, the 
premier‟s powers of Cabinet chairmanship; second his power to appoint and dismiss 
ministers, particularly the Attorney General; third his power to request that the 
monarch dissolves Parliament; and fourth, the defence prerogative which authorised 
the deployment of troops prior to the parliamentary vote.  Chapter 4 will conduct in-
depth discussion of these prerogative powers and their operation in the Iraq war 
decision.  Finally, though the factual account provided in this chapter entails little 
discussion of „the Crown‟, Chapters 2-4 demonstrate that the concept does occupy a 
central role in the office of Prime Minister, its powers and the war power itself.  The 
relative silence of „the Crown‟ in this chapter reflects the fact that as a concept it 
appears to have little direct bearing upon political reality, though closer scrutiny of 
the British constitution reveals it as immensely important to the premiership and its 
war power both culturally, structurally and legally; an initial investigation of this 
concept is therefore necessary. 
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Chapter Two 
The Crown and Prime Minister 
 
 
 
A variety of prerogatives, including the war power, are exercised by the Prime 
Minister.1  At law „the Crown‟ is the source of these prerogative powers.  The powers 
vest in the monarch by virtue of Her being the embodiment of the Crown,2 yet 
Chapter 3 will establish that a network of non-legal conventions alters legal 
appearances by requiring the monarch to exercise those powers according to the 
advice of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.  This places these Crown powers in the de 
facto control of elected ministers. 
 
The Crown is of vital importance to the subject matter of this study in two main 
respects.  First it demonstrates the inherent and continued influence of monarchy in 
the office of Prime Minister and its prerogative powers.  Second an understanding of 
the Crown and its presence at the apex of the legal framework of the British 
constitution is important in order to understand how political practices concerning the 
premier and war power might diverge from the legal model that governs them.  A 
general understanding of the Crown itself is thus necessary at the outset. 
 
The Crown is an arcane concept with a variety of meanings across a range of 
different contexts.  For example, the definition of „the Crown‟ in Halsbury‟s Laws of 
England provides no less than three potential meanings,3 and judgments in the few 
leading cases which have considered the nature of „Crown‟ continue this trend.4  The 
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result is that “while the Crown may be at the heart of the constitution, the nature of 
the Crown and its powers remain shrouded in uncertainty and continue to generate 
controversy.”5  Despite the cumulative contributions of judges and theorists over the 
course of decades, there remains no one definitive understanding of what „the 
Crown‟ within the British constitution actually is.   
 
This chapter considers the role of „the Crown‟ with specific reference to the Prime 
Minister and his prerogatives.  It starts by considering three of the interchangeable 
and overlapping meanings which it is generally afforded: monarchy, government and 
state.   It then considers the role of the Crown within the legal system.  In light of 
these discussions Part 3 makes some preliminary observations regarding the 
relationship between the Crown and premier, before proceeding to analyse the 
potential disparities between law and reality in the area.  This forms an important 
basis for understanding of the prime ministerial office and the exercise of his powers 
in the Iraq affair outlined in Chapter 1, and is also relevant to understanding judicial 
approaches to the war power discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.    
 
 
 
[1] The Three Meanings of ‘The Crown’ 
 
 
Constitutionally, the Crown is a multi-faceted concept that appears to have three 
potential meanings.  All three usages must be understood before investigating the 
relationship between it and the Prime Minister.   
 
 
 
 
 
[1.1] The Crown as Monarch 
 
 
The first and most basic meaning of the term „Crown‟ is that of the monarchy within 
the British constitution.  This use draws upon the symbolic connection between the 
Crown and its royal wearer.  Wade subscribes to this narrow view, stating that “in 
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truth, „the Crown‟ means simply the Queen.”6  In its monarchical sense the Crown is 
viewed as a corporation sole, i.e. “a body politic having perpetual succession 
constituted in a single person” which has a double legal capacity, both corporate and 
individual.7  Nevertheless, the view of „Crown‟ as monarchy does not appear to have 
been widely adopted in caselaw in this area.  Though the monarchy may be seen as 
coming within the ambit of „the Crown‟ or as being just one of many potential 
meanings of the term,8 it has generally not been employed to denote the Queen 
exclusively.  
 
In the earliest period of British constitutional history the individual monarch was 
absolute and the source of all authority: “Historically, the principal source of 
legislative, executive and judicial power was the monarch and it still is the case that 
the exercise of many of these powers is carried out in the name ... of the monarch.”9  
The term „Crown‟ almost certainly developed to differentiate between the king acting 
in his private affairs and his public duties10.  However, at law, no distinction was 
made between his person and the throne he held, as stated in Calvin‟s Case.11  The 
monarch is the Crown personified12 and thus “the concept of the Crown cannot be 
disentangled from the person of the monarch”.13  This is evidenced by the rules of 
succession to the throne.  In legal terms the monarch never dies14 and “in legal 
theory the monarch is regarded as immortal and there is no moment in which the 
throne is vacant.”15  Brazier writes:  
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“A demise of the Crown occurs on the death of the monarch or on … 
abdication.  On either event the Crown passes immediately to the next 
person in line who is qualified to receive it. … There is no interregnum: 
the king never dies”16 
 
So upon the death of a monarch, the Crown passes to His successor, thus clearly 
following rules of inheritance which treat it as a transferable entity.  Viewing the 
Crown in this way has enabled the system of hereditary monarchy to continue at law, 
unchanged for centuries; it has continued largely intact and has not been subject to 
major substantive reform for much of the later twentieth century.17 
 
As monarch, the Queen is ceremonial head of state.  In Bagehot‟s terms she forms 
“the head of the dignified part of the Constitution”,18 forming a convenient window 
dressing for working government.  „The Crown‟, he maintained, is the „fountain of 
honour‟19 suggesting perhaps, that „the Crown‟ is the source of monarchical status 
and dignity as well as the prerogative powers at law.  The common law maxim that 
„the Queen can do no wrong‟20 is consistent with such a view; the Crown bestows 
personal legal immunity upon the monarch, effectively placing Her beyond law. 
 
Vitally, in addition to bestowing prerogative powers, it appears that the Crown 
bestows legal sovereignty; it is the very source of sovereignty.  Constitutionally, the 
term „sovereignty‟ is used in respect of Parliament because it enacts the supreme 
source of law in the country.21  Yet things are not quite as they appear.  The term 
„sovereignty‟ has inherent monarchical associations and historically it was the King 
who enjoyed unbridled sovereignty by virtue of his law-making powers.  Over a 
period of centuries, including the Glorious Revolution in 1688, sovereignty gradually 
transferred to Parliament.  Yet Parliament itself is not technically sovereign; at law it 
is referred to as „the Queen in Parliament‟ (i.e. the Crown in Parliament).  The 
position is set out by Halsbury‟s which states: “the Crown may not exercise primary 
legislative powers except with the consent of Parliament.”22  So the Crown is actually 
the source of these primary legislative powers and Parliament is legally sovereign by 
virtue of the Crown‟s occupation of it.  “The Crown is … a necessary party to primary 
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United Kingdom legislation, and neither House of Parliament … has any power of 
making primary legislation without the Crown.”23  The concept of Crown as monarch 
is therefore the root of both prerogative and statutory power in law, an arrangement 
somewhat reminiscent of the age of Divine Right.  One may question why or how this 
antiquated arrangement which positions „Crown‟ as the source of legislative power 
has persisted.  Gladstone‟s explanation of its endurance is thus: “The „Crown‟ (or 
Queen) in Parliament has survived as a formula because rather than in spite of its 
ultimate meaninglessness: it has not so far been in anybody‟s interest to clarify it. 
There has been no constitutional crisis severe enough to test it.”24 
 
 
[1.2] The Crown as Government 
 
 
In recent decades the term „the Crown‟ has come to be used as a generic term to 
describe government.  Much government activity is conducted on behalf of the 
Crown using its prerogatives and thus the two have become synonymous.  This 
meaning uses „Crown‟ in its widest sense to encompass central government 
(including the monarch).  For example, writing in 1919, Laski used the term in this 
expansive sense to encompass the entire executive limb: 
 
“Crown in fact means government, and government means those 
innumerable officials who collect our taxes and grant us patents and 
inspect our drains.  They are human beings with the money bags of 
the State behind them.”25 
 
This „governmental‟ meaning of Crown entails viewing its status as a corporation 
aggregate rather than sole, that is as a “collection of individuals united into one body 
… having perpetual succession under an artificial form”,26 and able to have only one 
legal capacity; corporate.   
 
In recent years the governmental definition of the Crown has gained some legal 
support.  For example, Halsbury‟s puts forward the concept of „Crown‟ as broadly 
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meaning central government.27  Similarly, this meaning was adopted by certain Law 
Lords in Town Investments,28 a leading case involving a dispute over a lease.29  The 
case required the Law Lords to decide whether „the Crown‟ or the relevant minister 
as „Secretary of State‟ had entered into the agreement.  In their determination of the 
case the Lords considered whether the Crown was a corporation „sole‟ (consistent 
with its monarchical meaning) or „corporation‟ aggregate (consistent with Crown as 
government).30  If the latter view was adopted then „the Crown‟ would be deemed 
tenant and occupier of the premises.  Unfortunately Town Investments, was 
inconclusive in establishing which corporate view of „the Crown‟ should apply.    
There was disagreement between the Law Lords as to which type of corporation, 
sole or aggregate, best represented the Crown and no conclusive judicial decisions 
have subsequently clarified the issue.  The judgment of Lord Simon in Town 
Investments adopted the wider view of Crown as government: 
 
“”The Crown” and “Her Majesty” are terms of art in constitutional law.  
They correspond, though not exactly, with terms of political science 
like “the Executive” or “the Administration” of “the Government”, barely 
known to law, which has retained the historical terminology.” 31 
 
Lord Simon‟s definition indicates that despite the Crown‟s monarchical heritage and 
historical terminology, it represents modern government.  This use of Crown 
arguably reflects the fact that government now effectively runs the country using 
Crown powers and in the name of the Crown.  Lord Simon was firmly of the opinion 
that the Crown is aggregate in nature.  He maintained that domestically “a minister or 
Secretary of State is an aspect or member of the Crown”,32 and that therefore a 
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clear distinction between them could not be maintained.33  A corporation aggregate 
headed by the Queen provided the „best fit‟ for representing the contemporary 
Crown.34  Along with the majority, Lord Simon held „the Crown‟ to be tenant.   
 
Lord Diplock‟s35 consideration of the Crown was arguably the most interesting of the 
Law Lords‟, though it appears prima facie paradoxical.  He maintained that „the 
Crown‟ is legally a corporation sole (i.e. adopting the monarchical meaning), though 
he provided no specific authority for this point.36  Yet Lord Diplock also found that 
„the Crown‟ was tenant through the minister‟s actions, specifically dismissing the 
argument that the minister could have been acting in a corporate capacity as 
„Secretary of State‟ distinct from the Crown.37  These two positions appear 
diametrically opposed; a corporation sole is constituted in a single individual so how 
could the minister‟s actions have bound a „Crown‟ of this nature which did not 
encompass him?  Lord Diplock‟s resolution of this issue will be afforded further 
consideration in Part 4.   
 
The prevailing uncertainty as to the precise nature of the Crown was exacerbated in 
„Re: M‟,38 a later House of Lords case which involved Home Secretary Kenneth 
Baker removing an asylum applicant contrary to an undertaking that had been made 
to court confirming that no removal would be made.  The issue to be decided was 
whether the Home Secretary was in contempt of court and if so, in what capacity. 
 
The dilemma in „M‟ was that if the Lords strictly followed the finding in Town 
Investments (i.e. that the actions of a minister could technically represent the actions 
of „the Crown‟), the legal position would be untenable due to an apparent conflict 
between two irreconcilable legal positions: firstly, the common law maxim that the 
Queen can do no wrong (Crown immunity)39 and secondly, in accordance with the 
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Diceyan rule of law,40 the notion that government ministers should be accountable for 
legal transgressions.41  Yet to find the minister, as part of the wider „Crown‟, in 
contempt would be to undermine an ancient common law maxim.42   
 
Unable to make a finding of contempt against Kenneth Baker personally,43 the 
finding was ultimately made against him in his official capacity as Secretary of 
State.44  In his leading judgment Lord Woolf claimed that „the Crown‟ could be 
described as a corporation sole or aggregate: 
 
“[A]t least for some purposes the Crown has a legal personality.  ... 
The Crown can hold property and enter into contracts. On the other 
hand, even after the [Crown Proceedings] Act of 1947, it cannot 
conduct litigation except in the name of an authorised government 
department or, in the case of judicial review, in the name of a 
minister.”45 
 
Here Lord Woolf seemed to claim that „the Crown‟ can vary in corporate nature 
depending upon the legal contexts in which it operates.  Or, in alternative terms, the 
monarchical corporation sole meaning of Crown would sometimes be appropriate 
and on other occasions the wider aggregate governmental meaning would be 
appropriate.  As a result, the Crown could be afforded its wide governmental 
definition (thus encompassing ministers) in some respects but afforded its narrow 
monarchical meaning (thus excluding government ministers) in others.  No further 
guidance was provided regarding the precise circumstances where each respective 
definition would apply. 
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[1.3] The Crown as ‘State’ 
 
 
The third potential meaning of „the Crown‟ is as a British alternative to the concept of 
„state‟.  This is not formally acknowledged as a free-standing meaning of the term 
though, as discussed in Chapter 4, „the Crown‟ represents the UK state at 
international level and foreign affairs are conducted in its name.46 
 
Unlike its European counterparts the British constitution never adopted or developed 
a concept of „state‟.47  Marshall writes that the “technical status [of „State‟] in the 
actual fabric of English law is notoriously uncertain.  The Crown is known to the law. 
… But the State, on the face of it, seems to be missing.”48  Akin to the notion of 
„state‟, the Crown has persisted as the central unifying component reflecting the 
continuity and endurance of the British constitution.  Instead of the more modern 
concept of „State‟, the Crown remains, and with it the vestige of absolute monarchy. 
 
Of course, the concept of „State‟ is itself vested with numerous meanings,49 but the 
view of „State‟ as “an abstract entity above and distinct from both government and 
governed”50 displays certain characteristics comparable to the British Crown.  The 
latter, with its monarchical associations, has been seen to represent a national ideal, 
the „soul‟ of the state and a source of authority over society which transcends party 
politics.  Nevertheless, Loughlin writes that “the Crown has, in practice, provided a 
poor substitute for the idea of the State.”51  He continues that though the Crown can 
act as a metaphor representing “the power and majesty of the community, … 
thereafter [it]… stubbornly refuses to do much real work”,52 thus questioning the 
efficacy of the Crown as a legal concept. 
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[2] The Crown and Law 
 
 
Despite ambiguities regarding its precise definition, the proposition that the Crown is 
somehow central to law in the British constitution cannot be doubted. Consideration 
of the intimate link between Crown, monarch and law is necessary to inform further 
discussion of the Crown and Prime Minister in Part 3. 
 
 
[2.1] The Apex of Legal Power 
 
 
The Crown represents the point of fusion of the three state limbs; legislative, 
executive and judicial, and “the greater part of the machinery of central government 
is still regarded, historically and substantially, as an emanation from the Crown”.53  
This foundational feature of the Crown means that it is ultimately the source of all 
Cabinet legal authority in two ways: either directly by prerogative or indirectly by 
statute.     
 
First it has been established that the executive prerogative powers to be outlined in 
Chapter 4 emanate from the Crown which, at law, is the fountain of such powers.  It 
has also been explained that these powers, as part of „the Crown‟ title, legally vest in 
the monarch of the day but are exercised upon the advice of ministers according to 
convention.54  So at law the Crown provides the Prime Minister (and his ministers) 
with prerogative powers.  Second Part 1.1 of this Chapter has shown that the 
legislative „sovereignty‟ of Parliament is actually a result of the presence of the 
Crown in Parliament.  A valid Act of Parliament, the supreme source of authority in 
Britain, requires royal assent (i.e. the approval of the Crown) to be legitimate, though 
convention reduces this monarchic power to a mere passive role by requiring Her 
assent to any bill that has been passed by Parliament.55  Because government has 
gradually come to dominate the House of Commons, it has the capacity to instigate 
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and pass legislation and essentially steer the legislative programme of Parliament.  
This is particularly so in times of a strong government majority in the Commons, as 
was the case for Mr Blair‟s first two parliamentary terms.56  So at law the Crown in 
Parliament also provides ministers with statutory powers.  This could lead one to 
question the extent to which reform to the war prerogative57 will alter the position in 
the legal edifice.  Though statutory or other reform of the war power would formally 
shift the power to approve military action into parliamentary hands, it has been 
established that this would still in essence place the power in the control of the 
Crown (in Parliament), thus remaining influenced by the notion of monarch. 
 
In summary, “legally, an unquantifiable amount of power remains in the Crown (as 
part of the Crown in Parliament), together with all the authority that remains legally 
vested personally in the monarch by the royal prerogative.”58  These „unquantifiable‟ 
legal powers of prerogative and statute authorise Cabinet action in a vast range of 
areas and at law they emanate from a single source, the Crown.  So it is evident that 
the legal framework around which government power is organised is structured in an 
autocratic, pyramidal formation with one individual, the monarch, at its centre. 
 
 
[2.2] The Role of Monarch in Law  
 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate the extent to which the premiership and its powers 
are closely entwined with monarchy.  In turn the monarch as personification of the 
Crown is central to and therefore closely interwoven with law.  The link between law 
and monarch can be seen in early cases such as Calvin‟s Case where the court 
referred to “the law itself so inseparably and individually annexed to his Royal 
person”.59  Yet such archaic imagery and obsequiousness continue to the present 
day.  Halsbury‟s states, in somewhat grandiose terms, that “the law of the 
constitution clothes the person of monarch with supreme sovereignty and pre-
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eminence.”60  Elsewhere it propounds similar curiosities such as: “The law clothes 
the monarch‟s person with absolute perfection.”61   
 
„The Crown‟ itself is a free-standing notion, but its material existence depends upon it 
vesting in, and thus bestowing title upon, an individual person; the monarch.  Indeed, 
Halbury‟s states that “in law the monarchy remains legally central to the powers of 
government”.62  It is interesting to note that this integral role is limited to the legal 
plane, reflecting the fact that elected government has replaced the monarch as the 
politically central entity within the British constitution. 
 
Michel Foucault‟s work on law and monarchy offers useful insights that appear to 
resonate with understandings of the Crown in English law.  Foucault sees law and 
monarchy as intrinsically linked.   He argues that the King forms the conceptual basis 
for Western legal systems and indeed continues to retain a legally central position in 
what he terms the „juridicial edifice‟.63  According to Foucault: 
 
“The juridicial edifice was, then, formed around the royal personage, at 
the demand of royal power, and for the benefit of royal power. When in 
later centuries this juridicial edifice escaped from royal control, when it 
was turned against royal power, the issue at stake was always, and 
always would be, the limits of that power, the question of its 
prerogatives.”64 
 
Foucault reiterates elsewhere his claims that law and monarchy are naturally 
connected because the legal system was initially constructed around the monarch.65  
Yet in the extract above he also claims that this legal framework came to be 
controlled or dominated by others and used against the King.66  This is certainly 
correct in England where the Glorious Revolution saw the emergence of 
Parliament‟s ascendancy over the King.67  In Bagehot‟s famed proclamation, “a 
republic has insinuated itself beneath the folds of a monarchy.”68  Indeed Foucault 
does claim that in England “the person of the king … was displaced within the 
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system of political representations, rather than eliminated”,69 i.e. the King‟s legal 
framework remained intact and Parliament supplanted his command of it.  So 
Foucault is not claiming that domination by monarchical will continues in present 
times.  Instead, law once promulgated by monarchs to put their edicts into practical 
effect later came to be used against them (to check or curb their activities) as 
legislative power slipped from their grasp into the hands of parliaments.  But despite 
these developments, law and monarchy remain, for Foucault, indelibly linked.   
 
Foucault‟s claims regarding the integral role of the monarch in our understanding of 
law appear inappropriate in a present context where the monarchical role appears to 
have been relegated to mere ceremony and modern monarchs bear little similarity to 
their more powerful predecessors.  However, it is important to understand that 
Foucault‟s arguments relate to the legal and constitutional framework rather than 
political reality: 
 
“I believe that the King remains the central personage in the whole 
legal edifice of the West.  When it comes to the general organisation 
of the legal system in the West, it is essentially with the King, his 
rights, his power and its eventual limitations, that one is dealing.”70   
 
In England Foucault‟s propositions about monarchy and law appear almost self-
evident.71  There is a clear, uninterrupted lineage between the absolute monarchy of 
centuries past and democratic government of the present which continues to function 
within ancient legal structures based on monarchy, namely the „Crown‟ and „the 
Crown in Parliament‟.  Furthermore, by virtue of a synthesis of prerogative and 
convention to be outlined, there remains a clear symbiosis between Prime Minister 
and monarch on the basis of the former‟s gradual and silent colonisation of the 
latter‟s formal powers. 
 
In England the monarch-based forms or institutions remained intact, though the 
King‟s prerogative and legislative powers were gradually colonised by Cabinet 
ministers and Parliament respectively.  Yet neither the structure nor form of 
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prerogative or statutory powers has changed in nature despite these developments.  
They still bear the essential features of command and prohibition that Foucault 
outlines.72  For Foucault this is outmoded and unsatisfactory, and he makes a 
dramatic call to „cut off the King‟s head‟ in political (and thus by implication legal) 
theory.73  
 
 
 
[3] The Crown and Prime Minister  
 
 
It is constructive to now reflect upon any initial insights into the Prime Minister and 
his prerogatives that the discussion in Parts 1 and 2 of this chapter may afford.  It 
appears that there is no clear consensus among the legal community as to what „the 
Crown‟ actually is, and this ambiguity is likely to remain.  Though the concept 
contains shades of monarchy, government and state, none of these three views can 
provide an adequate account of „Crown‟ when viewed in isolation; the concept is 
multi-faceted in meaning.74  Gladstone questions the overall efficacy of the Crown as 
a result of this, suggesting „reform‟ of the core concept may be necessary: “The 
„Crown‟ is an ambiguous term meaning the monarch, the government, the state or 
the public interest depending on the context.  It harks backwards when what is 
needed is a completely new approach.”75 
 
The Crown enjoys up to three interchangeable meanings and adoption of any of the 
Crown‟s three meanings concerns the Prime Minister in some capacity.  A premier‟s 
exercise of prerogative power in law is closely reliant on the monarch, „the Crown‟ 
personified.  He is political leader of the executive government which is often termed 
„the Crown‟.  Finally he acts on behalf of the Crown (the British „State‟ substitute) 
when conducting foreign affairs with sovereign states at international level.  Yet 
because of the various definitions of „Crown‟, the precise nature of the relationship 
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between it and the Prime Minister inevitably remains somewhat opaque.  Yet two 
general certainties can be stated: first the Crown plays an arcane, unspecified role in 
modern prime ministerial power; second, despite enduring questions regarding the 
meaning of „Crown‟, „monarch‟ is clearly a factor inherent in each of the Crown‟s 
various meanings.  The indeterminacies which permeate the Crown as source of the 
prime ministerial power potentially enable premiers to exercise their powers in a less 
transparent, organised way. 
 
The Influence of ‘Monarch’ on Prime Minister 
 
This study establishes that „monarchy‟ plays an integral role in the Prime Minister 
and his powers.  Legally, structurally and culturally a premier‟s powers are 
inextricably linked to monarch as embodiment of the Crown.  The extent to which 
outmoded features of monarchy taint the office of Prime Minister and his exercise of 
the war prerogative is investigated in subsequent chapters. 
 
The Crown itself seems to operate as an intangible construction with an elusive, 
independent theoretical existence, taking material form by vesting its powers in an 
individual who then becomes monarch.  The appearances of significant monarchical 
power at law are misleading as modern monarchs do not enjoy the unbridled political 
command of their predecessors due to a series of conventions, particularly the 
ministerial advice convention.  In this sense the monarch, in her politically 
constrained position as personification of the Crown, is effectively a conduit between 
Crown powers and the individual politicians who in reality use them.          
 
The monarch appears legally omnipotent but politically impotent, whilst the Prime 
Minister is legally powerless but enjoys a position of political leadership.  Thus the 
premier and monarch need one another; the prerogative powers must be exercised 
by a process of symbiosis.  The relationship is inescapably reciprocal; the Prime 
Minister requires the monarch as a legitimate outlet to exercise Crown powers and 
the monarch is incapacitated without prime ministerial advice and direction.  In this 
sense the premiership remains inherently fused to the monarch.   
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Ultimately it is apparent that at law the Prime Minister‟s position has continued many 
characteristics of the monarchical predecessor it sought to replace and better.76  
Because the office of Prime Minister gradually gleaned its powers away from the 
monarch it never established its own independent foundations and is resultantly 
parasitic on monarchy; the autocratic structure and culture of monarchy thus infiltrate 
it.   
 
The Prime Minister is the sole individual with access to monarchical powers of old.  
This is not to claim that the premier has effectively become the monarch.  
Accusations that he is an „elected monarch‟ are in many respects inaccurate.  
Nevertheless, without wishing to overstate his power, Chapter 4 demonstrates that 
the Prime Minister controls many aspects of the monarch‟s role in the legal edifice; 
he is arguably a proxy monarch of sorts.  Chapter 4 further considers the impact of 
these monarchical connections on the constitutional checks and balances upon the 
war prerogative in the Iraq affair.  Chapter 5 touches upon similar issues in the 
context of Iraq-era prerogative caselaw.  
 
 
 
[4] Disparity: the Crown as a ‘Legal Fiction’ 
 
 
The respective roles of convention and prerogative in the law-reality discrepancies 
concerning the Prime Minister and war prerogative are discussed in subsequent 
chapters.  But it seems that „the Crown‟ plays the fundamental role in these 
disparities because it enables „monarchy‟ to continue to centrally occupy the legal 
framework of the English constitution.  This centrality of the Crown inadvertently 
privileges the parasitic premiership that has evolved on the underside of „the Crown‟ 
and colonised many of its most important powers.  
 
The cleavage between the Crown at law and constitutional practice occurring 
beneath is widely acknowledged in mainstream constitutional thought.  The Crown 
                                                 
76
 “The prime minister is able to use the government to bring forward the policies which he or she 
favours; and to stop those to which he or she is opposed. … To this extent the conduct of government 
business can be said to reflect a personal and autocratic rather than a collective and democratic 
spirit.”  T Benn, Arguments for Democracy (Penguin, London, 1982) p 29. 
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has been termed „a convenient abstraction‟,77 a „legal fiction‟.78  Maitland commented 
that:   
 
“The Crown is a convenient cover for ignorance: it saves us from 
asking difficult questions …  I do not deny that it is a convenient term, 
and you may have to use it; but I do say that you should never be 
content with it.”79 
 
Here Maitland claims that the concept Crown „covers‟ complexities or mysteries of 
which we are „ignorant‟.  He does not say exactly how the Crown covers such 
ignorance, but he sees the concept as one with which we should not be satisfied.  So 
in the view of a leading historian, this British constitutional apex is an area of 
ignorance concealed by a convenient but, by implication, unsatisfactory concept.  
This resonates with Bradley and Ewing‟s general point that “Legal writers on the 
constitution are handicapped by the unreality of many of the terms which they must 
sometimes employ.”80  Interestingly, here one sees leading academics resorting to 
distinctions between law and reality in their attempts to explain the Crown.   
   
Vitally, the acknowledgement of such disparities between law and practice is also 
widespread in Crown-related caselaw.  For example, Lord Diplock‟s Town 
Investments judgment reinforced this view that legal „fictions‟ mask constitutional 
realities.  Closer scrutiny of his judgment indicates that he considered the Crown on 
two different levels; the legal „fiction‟ of „the Crown‟ (a corporation sole at law) and 
the political reality of government.  For Lord Diplock the Crown is merely a legal 
façade for government (a corporation aggregate in practice).81  It represents 
government at law,82 though not very accurately because the term „Crown‟ “remains 
more apt to the constitutional realities of the Tudor or even Norman monarchy than 
                                                 
77
 C Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law (2
nd 
edn, Butterworths, London, 1999), p 255. 
78
 Lord Diplock in Town Investments (n 2) 381.   
79
 F W Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1931) 
p 418. 
80
 A W Bradley & K D Ewing, Constitutional & Administrative Law (14
th 
edn, Pearson, Harlow, 2007), p 
31. 
81
 This is similar to a point made by Maitland as early as 1901.  Referring to confusion caused in cases or 
statutes where use the term „Crown‟ appeared to have been used in relation to State or government 
rather than in the strict sense of monarch he said: “The way out of this mess, for mess it is, lies in a 
perception of the fact, for fact it is, that our [monarch] is not a „corporation sole,‟ but is head of a 
complex and highly organised „corporation aggregate of many‟ – of very many.  I see no great harm in 
calling this corporation a Crown.”  Emphasis added.  F W Maitland, „The Crown as Corporation‟ 
(1901) 17 L.Q.R. 131, p 140. 
82
 “In my opinion, the tenant was the government acting through its appropriate member or, expressed in 
the term of art in public law, the tenant was the Crown.”  Town Investments (n 2) 381. 
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to the constitutional realities of the 20th century.”83  Lord Diplock accused the legal 
vocabulary of „the Crown‟ of failing to keep pace with constitutional evolution and 
suggested that a clear line should be drawn between the Crown and government in 
practice: 
 
“To continue nowadays to speak of “the Crown” as doing legislative or 
executive acts of government, which, in reality as distinct from legal 
fiction, are decided on and done by human beings other than the 
Queen herself, involves risk of confusion.”84 
 
This comment echoes the view of Maitland by claiming the „fiction‟ of „Crown‟ may 
cause „confusion‟.  This confusion hinges upon the fact that in reality elected 
individuals undertake the tasks of legislating and governing.  Elsewhere in Town 
Investments Lord Simon also distinguished between law and practice by stating: 
“The legal concept [of Crown] still does not correspond to the political reality.  The 
legal substratum is overlaid by constitutional convention.”85  Recent cases such as 
Bancoult86 in the Court of Appeal have continued this trend, specifically referring to 
altered relations between ministers and monarchs.  In this case Sir Clarke MR and 
Sedley LJ both cited the following quote by Anson: “The position of affairs has been 
reversed since 1714.  Then the King or Queen governed through Ministers, now 
Ministers govern through the instrumentality of the Crown.”87  Yet according to the 
legal edifice of the British constitution the Queen still does govern through 
ministers.88  Though the arrangement has inverted in political reality, the legal 
position remains intact.  Not only do law and political reality diverge, but they 
specifically oppose one another because the former view sees monarch as directing 
ministers whereas the latter places ministers in the dominant position.  Such 
manifest contradictions require judges to supplement their account of „the Crown‟ at 
law with a corresponding account of the opposite political reality as cases such as 
Town Investments and Bancoult indicate.  The array of academic and judicial views 
considered here suggests a consensus that the Crown and its legal framework not 
                                                 
83
 Ibid 380.  This echoed similar sentiments expressed by Lord Diplock in one of his earlier judgments: 
“To use the expression “the Crown” as personifying the executive government of the country tends to 
conceal the fact that the executive functions of sovereignty are of necessity performed through the 
agency of persons other than the Queen herself.”  Emphasis added.  British Broadcasting Corporation 
v Johns [1965] Ch 32, p 79. 
84
 Emphasis added.  Town Investments, ibid 380-1. 
85
 Ibid 400. 
86
 R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2007] 
EWCA Civ 498, [2008] QB 365 (CA). 
87
 Ibid para 114; Sedley LJ, para 32. 
88
 See also R (on the application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2005] UKHL 57, [2006] 1 AC 529 (HL) discussed in Chapter 3. 
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only greatly diverges from working constitutional reality but also to a certain extent 
misrepresents it. 
 
The original meaning of „Crown as monarch‟ was clearly appropriate when Kings 
exercised their prerogative powers personally.  Yet such Crown powers have over 
centuries trickled down from monarch to ministers.  In short, de jure ownership of the 
Crown power has remained with monarch but de facto ownership has shifted to 
government and this leakage has caused confusion and a lack of clarity regarding 
the concept of „Crown‟.  The concept of „Crown‟ has been reinterpreted to 
encompass government in order to meet these changing constitutional 
developments.89  Yet still one is left with what Loughlin describes as “a gulf between 
substance and form in our institutions of government”.90  Such gulfs need not be 
problematic; indeed identification of constitutional fictions, and acceptance of their 
potential benefits, can be traced back to Bagehot.91  But when such fictions cease to 
effectively function as legal concepts then their future must be questioned.92  From 
the discussion in this chapter and Chapter 3 there is arguably evidence that „the 
Crown‟ as a legal concept is increasingly outmoded or obsolete and can only be 
coherently understood with reference to non-law.  
 
It is clear that the Crown at law and its divergence from constitutional reality plays a 
crucial role in relation to the prime ministerial office and its exercise of war 
prerogative.  Overall, the Prime Minister benefits from this disparity; he appears to be 
subject to the political reality of democratic accountability but closer inspection of the 
diverging legal framework shows that in law his office is parasitic upon and closely 
interwoven with the anti-democratic notion of „Crown‟.  Chapter 4 considers the 
extent to which this may enable the premier to benefit from a cluster of unreformed, 
opaque and extremely useful powers that formerly belonged to monarchs in practice.  
The Prime Minister can tap directly into these immense Crown powers at law, but to 
what extent will political-constitutional reality constrain the extent to which they can 
be utilised?  Subsequent chapters demonstrate that the Crown-based constitutional 
edifice may have enabled Mr Blair (and his predecessors) to exercise Crown powers, 
particularly the war prerogative, without clear legal limitations, transparency or 
                                                 
89
 This reinterpretation of „the Crown‟ holds parallels with, and may be linked to, Dicey‟s re-rendering of 
the definition of prerogative outlined in Chapter 4. 
90
 Loughlin in Sunkin & Payne (n 5) 47. 
91
 He saw reliance on fictions as a strength of the British constitution; Bagehot (n 18) 60-65.  
92
 Tomkins argues that the Crown and its prerogative powers should be abolished; (n 42) p 131-4, 139-
40. 
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thorough parliamentary or judicial oversight.  This is reflected in the criticism of a 
2006 Lords select committee which stated: 
 
“the exercise of the Royal prerogative by the Government to deploy 
armed force overseas is outdated and should not be allowed to 
continue as the basis for legitimate war-making in our 21st century 
democracy.”93 
 
For these reasons it seems that the premier‟s parasitic relationship with the Crown 
potentially benefits the office holder, a proposition which will be considered further in 
Chapters 3-5. 
 
 
 
                                                 
93
 Select Committee on the Constitution, „Waging War: Parliament‟s Role and Responsibility‟, HL 
(2005-06) 236-I, para 103. 
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Chapter Three  
Conventions, the Prime Minister and the 
War Prerogative 
 
 
 
 
The office of Prime Minister and the constitutional apex it occupies is an area where 
specific legal regulation is sparse and convention steps in to regulate.    Conventions 
are thus integral to the functioning of the premiership and its utilisation of prerogative 
powers.  As Benemy states, “The existence of a Prime Minister is purely 
conventional.  He is chosen by the Sovereign in a conventional manner.  He chooses 
and dismisses his Cabinet Ministers and manages his Cabinet according to 
convention.”1  The intricate network of conventions creates an arrangement whereby 
the premier is able to exercise prerogative powers in fact.  In light of this, an 
understanding as to what conventions actually are and how they affect the 
premiership is essential.   
 
This chapter outlines the leading constitutional conventions that regulate the office of 
Prime Minister.  It then attempts to gain a detailed understanding of the nature of 
conventions by considering leading definitions.  Part 3 investigates the operation of 
specific conventions relevant to the premier‟s war prerogative over the course of the 
Iraq affair.  Finally this chapter applies the two analytical devices to this preceding 
discussion.  
 
 
 
[1] Conventions Concerning the Prime Minister 
 
 
Conventions were first identified by AV Dicey, though the cumulative and 
incremental contributions of earlier theorists have also been noted.2  Dicey viewed 
                                                 
1
 F W G Benemy, The Elected Monarch: The Development of the Powers of the Prime Minister (Harrap 
& Co, London, 1965) p 220. 
2
 Such theorists included Blackstone, Bagehot, J S Mill and especially Edward Freeman.  See O Hood 
Phillips, „Constitutional Conventions: Dicey‟s Predecessors‟, MLR (1966) Vol. 29, 137. 
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conventions as a form of „constitutional morality‟3 and much of his groundwork 
continues to set the frame of reference for modern explorations of the subject.   
 
Conventions play an important role in most constitutions, but their role in the British 
constitution is all the more vital due to its uncodified nature.  Despite being non-legal, 
conventions regulate the activities and relations between government and 
Parliament, thus contributing to the overall system of constitutional checks and 
balances.  Their mutable nature and large number mean “it is not practicable either 
to enumerate all the conventions applicable to the working of the British Constitution 
or to define most of them with any great precision.”4  As with other aspects of the 
constitution considered in this study (such as „Crown‟ and „prerogative‟), there does 
not appear to be one single clear understanding of „convention‟.  A review of relevant 
literature indicates that there remains disagreement about various aspects of 
conventions, though a core of consensus is also discernible.  Many of the 
commentaries on conventions are heavily reliant upon practical working examples, 
and much of the work arguably fails to get to the essence of conventions.  It is 
perhaps useful to start by outlining the conventions that are directly relevant to the 
premiership. 
 
Conventions operate across a wide constitutional area, though the most important of 
these regulate the exercise of the royal prerogative and Cabinet workings5 thus 
impacting directly upon the premiership.  First, it must be noted that the creation of 
the office of Prime Minister is actually a result of convention: “His special duties and 
privileges, and his relations with the Crown, the Cabinet and Parliament, are defined 
not by common law or, in general, by statute law but by recognised usage and 
practice.”6  This is also true of the Cabinet the premier is responsible for managing.7  
The conventional status of both institutions is due to their organic emergence over a 
period of centuries in response to changing political climates.8 
 
                                                 
3
 A V Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10
th
 edn, Macmillan, London, 
1985) p 24. 
4
 P Jackson & P Leopold, O Hood Phillips and Jackson, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8
th 
edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001) p 145. 
5
 Ibid.  O Hood & Phillips divide conventions into 3 groups: (1) conventions that regulate the exercise of 
the royal prerogative and Cabinet workings, (2) conventions regulating Parliament, (3) conventions 
regulating relations with UK and former Commonwealth countries.   
6
 Halsbury‟s Laws of England (4th edn, Butterworths, London, 1996) vol 8(2), para 395. 
7
 “The Cabinet does not have its origins in any statute, though it is recognised by statute law, and the 
rules which regulate … [it] depend on the conventional usages which have sprung into existence since 
1688.”  Ibid para 403. 
8
 A brief overview is provided in the Introduction to this study. 
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It is the constitutional role of the monarch to appoint a Prime Minister and 
government by prerogative, and there are no legal restrictions on whom She can 
appoint.9   However, the monarch‟s choice is limited by a „principal‟ convention which 
requires her to appoint a Prime Minister who is leader of largest party in the House of 
Commons, and to appoint government ministers according to the premier‟s 
recommendations.10  Furthermore, according to Halsbury‟s, the „paramount‟ 
convention of the British constitution is that the monarch must exercise prerogatives 
according to the advice of ministers, particularly the Prime Minister.11  This latter 
convention essentially provides the premier with access to the extensive prerogative 
powers of the Crown.  Along with the office of Prime Minister this convention 
inadvertently crystallised over centuries; as a result the modern monarch, when 
exercising prerogative, is essentially a passive conduit directed by government.12  
Recent instances of a monarch defying ministerial advice regarding prerogative are 
non-existent and tend to be discussed by constitutional academics in mere 
hypothetical terms. 
 
A number of other important conventions regulate the Cabinet and Prime Minister.  
For example, the convention of collective Cabinet responsibility requires that “each 
administration is collectively responsible to Parliament for its conduct of government.  
The three elements of this convention are the requirements of unanimity, 
confidentiality and confidence.”13  Related to this, the convention of ministerial 
accountability requires that each individual minister is directly answerable to 
Parliament for his department.14  More detailed guidance on ministerial 
responsibilities is set out in the Ministerial Code15 which is said to have the status of 
convention, though this is doubted in some quarters.16  Vitally, this document can be 
                                                 
9
 “Nominally the monarch is unfettered in the choice of her ministers, and may summon who she pleases 
to fill the office of Prime Minister”.  Halsbury‟s (n 6) para 394. 
10
 Ibid paras 21, 394. 
11
 Ibid para 21. 
12
 R Blackburn, „Monarchy and the Personal Prerogatives‟ [2004] P.L. 546; R Brazier, „„Monarchy and 
the Personal Prerogatives‟: A Personal Response to Professor Blackburn‟ [2005] P.L. 45.   
In 1986 the Queen‟s Private Secretary confirmed select principles that govern monarch-minster 
relations.  First, „the sovereign has the right – indeed a duty – to counsel, encourage and warn her 
Government‟ and second, „she is bound to accept and act upon the advice of her ministers‟ irrespective 
of her own opinions.  G Marshall, „The Queen‟s Press Relations‟ [1986] P.L. 505, p 506. 
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 Halsbury‟s (n 6) para 417. 
14
 Ibid para 416. 
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 Formerly termed Questions of Procedure for Ministers.  Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, July 2005) 
<http://www.Cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/Cabinetoffice/propriety_and_ethics/assets/ministerial_ 
code.pdf> accessed 16
th
 August 2008. 
16
 Sir Robin Butler, former Cabinet Secretary, has stated “I do not regard [QPM] as having a 
constitutional force at all … It would be perfectly possible for an incoming Prime Minister to scrap the 
whole thing and to devise entirely new rules.”  Quoted by P Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring, Unearthing 
 52 
 
amended and redrafted by Prime Ministers who are also responsible for interpreting 
and enforcing the provisions.17  So this conventional power enables a Prime Minister 
to lay down the ground rules by which the ministers he appoints must operate. 
 
A number of other conventions also concern the premiership in one form or another.  
For example, the monarch must not attend Cabinet meetings, a convention 
instigated by George I.18  A further long-standing convention provides that the Prime 
Minister and his government must resign if he loses a vote of confidence in the 
House of Commons.  The rationale for this convention is that a premier who no 
longer commands the support of Parliament occupies an untenable position and 
should not be permitted to continue in office without it.  In such circumstances the 
premier “must either recommend a dissolution of Parliament or tender the 
resignation of himself and the government.”19  Though this resignation convention 
activates only on a very occasional basis due to the party system in Parliament, 
Chapter 1 indicated that this convention actually played a role in relation to the Iraq 
deployment in March 2003; this is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
The conventions outlined here serve a variety of constitutional functions, for 
example, by providing political accountability and regulating relations between 
constitutional actors.  But these conventions also provide a Prime Minister with 
significant powers, as summed up by Benemy, who writes: 
 
“Perhaps this loose, obscure, nebulous system is one of the sources of 
the immense power of the Prime Minister.  He is not hedged about by 
constitutional laws that tie him down tightly, making him conform to a 
legal pattern, and allowing him little scope for his own individual 
interpretation of his office.”20 
 
                                                                                                                                           
the British Constitution (Indigo, London, 1996), pp 32-34.  This view is also held by Former Cabinet 
Secretary, Lord Wilson of Dinton; „The Robustness of Conventions in a Time of Modernisation and 
Change‟ [2004] P.L. 407, p 410.  See also, G Marshall, Constitutional Conventions, The Rules & 
Forms of Political Accountability (Clarendon, Oxford, 1984) pp 54 – 55.  
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 P Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (Penguin, London, 2001), p. 
65-66. 
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 This practice emerged during the reign of George I (as outlined in the Introduction).  Though it has 
questioned whether this is a fully fledged convention, Halsbury‟s does indicate that it is an issue of 
constitutional propriety at the very least: “the monarch‟s presence at any meetings of ministers where 
deliberations or discussions take place is now clearly recognised as being contrary to constitutional 
practice.”  Halsbury‟s (n 6) para 411. 
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 Ibid para 21.  This convention was initiated by Sir Robert Walpole whose premiership ended in 
resignation following a House of Commons defeat on a vote of confidence, a practice that became 
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 Benemy (n 1) 209-10. 
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The web of conventions accumulated over centuries provides a Prime Minister de 
facto access to Crown powers.  Yet whilst enabling the premier and Cabinet to utilise 
such powers, conventions also act to regulate their activities by placing obligations 
and restrictions upon the use of these powers.   
 
So formally the monarch still enjoys the wide legal Crown powers wielded by Her 
predecessors, exercising powers to dissolve Parliament and appoint ministers etc.21  
However, conventions informally modify this position by effectively placing these 
powers in the hands of democratically elected government ministers, particularly the 
premier.  For Marshall, conventions provide a system of political accountability: “the 
major purpose of the domestic conventions is to give effect to the principles of 
government accountability.  … that accountability is allocated in accordance with 
political reality rather than legal form.”22  Interestingly, the latter part of this statement 
makes a distinction between „political reality‟ and „legal form‟.  Marshall‟s statement 
clearly situates conventions in informal political reality as opposed to the concrete 
constitutional structure. 
 
So at this initial stage a potential discrepancy between the constitutional framework 
and reality is immediately apparent.  As a matter of convention an arrangement 
emerged which has essentially enabled the premier (and to a lesser extent Cabinet 
ministers) to effectively colonise the prerogative powers of the King.  Thus the prime 
ministerial office is founded upon the co-existence of strong political leadership with 
a position of formal impotence. 
 
In light of this summary of the main constitutional conventions of importance, 
attention will now focus upon the exact nature of these conventions. 
 
 
 
[2] Conventions Defined 
 
 
It must be noted at the outset that offering a precise definition of conventions is an 
arduous task, particularly as the very existence of certain conventions may be 
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 This will be investigated further in Chapter 4. 
22
 Marshall (n 16) 18. 
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uncertain23 (for example, the parliamentary vote on military action to be discussed in 
Part 3 of this Chapter).  Conventions do not emanate from a common source or 
share a systematic framework.  Unlike laws, their creation cannot be traced back to a 
particular institution or ultimate rule. This is confirmed by Halsbury‟s which states, 
“there can … be no authoritative source to which reference can be made to ascertain 
whether a convention exists or what it is.”24  Thus there is no focal point with which to 
ground and cohere the range of conventions operating in the British constitution.  
Instead, they form disparate and separate strands of varying ages that randomly and 
often gradually come into existence by virtue of political or other circumstance.  The 
existence of a law (particularly from a positivist stance) is a clear yes/no issue.  
However, the existence of a convention may well be a matter of degree.  Morton 
argues that 
 
“[the] conditions necessary for the existence of [non-legal constitutional 
norms] are a set of sociological facts, to be found in ill-defined 
circumstances of acceptance and substantive enforcement.  And these 
are matters which cannot always be easily or conclusively established 
for a variety of reasons”.25 
 
Marshall and Moodie make a similar point, claiming that one cannot solely rely on 
the historical example to ascertain the existence of a convention.26  Instead 
conventions must be viewed in the appropriate political context and in light of the 
prevailing constitutional culture of the day.27   
 
There is little primary legal material that offers detailed accounts or definitions of 
conventions, though many constitutional academics have attempted formulations.  
Marshall and Moodie suggest that one way of answering the question „what are the 
conventions of the British constitution?‟ is to list them.28  In addition to the examples 
outlined above, there are many other conventions including those relating to civil 
service neutrality, judicial independence and relations between members of the 
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 Though, as Halsbury‟s states, “the existence of some conventions is certain and they can be defined 
accurately, the nature and existence of others are subject to varying degrees of doubt.”  Halsbury‟s (n 
6) para 20. 
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 Emphasis added.  P A Morton, „Conventions of the British Constitution‟ (1991) Hold.L.R., 114-180, p 
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 55 
 
Commonwealth.29  However, drawing up a definitive list is impossible because 
conventions are vast in number, disparate in nature and subject to change.  As a 
result this approach is of limited use and reveals little about the nature of 
conventions.   
 
 
[2.1] Common Definitions 
 
 
It is arguable that many of the definitions exposited by leading theorists in this area 
are also in some respects deficient and this part identifies and discusses 
shortcomings.  The initial striking feature common to all the definitions is that they 
are rendered in very wide terms.  A sensible starting point is the definition offered by 
Dicey who defines conventions as “rules consist[ing] of conventions, understanding, 
habits or practices which, though they may regulate the conduct of … [various] 
officials, are not in reality laws at all since they are not enforced by the courts.”30  
This definition consists of three main elements: firstly, conventions are „rules‟, though 
these may take various forms such as habits or practices; secondly, they regulate 
the behaviour of officials; and thirdly, conventions are distinct from laws.  This 
formulation has proved influential, and though it has been modified by subsequent 
theorists, it has not been subject to substantial overhaul.   
 
Another early definition of convention was put forward by Jennings who set out three 
requirements for a convention to exist: “first, what are the precedents; secondly, did 
the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is 
there a reason for the [conventional] rule?”31  In this definition, a number of issues 
emerge.  First, to ascertain a convention one must look for „precedents‟ which 
indicates that conventions are rooted in past events.  Furthermore, Jennings 
introduces a new normative or ethical element to conventions in that there must be 
an underlying justification or reason for the rule.  Interestingly, the second aspect of 
Jennings‟ definition introduces a subjective element into „convention‟ by referring to 
the views of individual officials; this has since been subject to criticism.32   
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 Halsbury‟s (n 6) para 21. 
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 Dicey (n 3) 24.  
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 I Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5
th
 edn, University of London Press, London, 1959) p 136. 
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 See Part 2.1.2 of this chapter. 
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An authoritative and more current definition can be found in Halsbury‟s which defines 
conventions as “rules and practices that are not to be found in the formal sources of 
law but which are nevertheless habitually obeyed and generally regarded as 
binding.”33  This definition largely corresponds to the Diceyan model and four 
elements emerge from it.  First, it describes conventions as „rules and practices‟.  
This appears to be wider than the other Diceyan definition that defines them as rules 
„which consist of‟ practices etc.  Second, the definition makes the commonly 
accepted distinction between conventions and law as the former have no legal basis.  
The third element of this definition is that a convention, to exist, must be „habitually 
obeyed‟, i.e. it must be generally (though not necessarily always) followed.  Finally, 
conventions must be „regarded as binding‟, though the definition does not specify by 
whom.34  
  
An array of modern definitions are also offered by constitutional commentators.  
Marsall and Moodie define conventions as “certain rules of constitutional behaviour 
which are considered to be binding by and upon those who operate the Constitution, 
but which are not enforced by the law courts (although the courts may recognise 
their existence), nor by the presiding officers in the Houses of Parliament.”35  Again, 
this definition does not stray too far from the dominant Diceyan model.  It views 
conventions as „rules‟, sees them as binding upon constitutional operators (or 
officials) and states that they are not legally enforced (though acknowledging they 
may be judicially recognised nontheless).  It elaborates slightly on the Diceyan 
definition by distinguishing conventions from rules of parliamentary practice (as the 
former will not be recognised by presiding parliamentary officers). 
 
Phillips‟ definition of conventions continues the traditional view, stating that they are 
“rules of political practice which are regarded as binding by those to whom they 
apply but which are not laws as they are not enforced by the courts or by the Houses 
of Parliament.”36 Again, the three features in this definition have already been 
identified in the preceding ones, namely that conventions are (1) „rules of practice‟ 
that are (2) „binding‟ upon the constitutional actors to whom they apply, and (3) are 
„not laws‟.  Like Marshall and Moodie, Phillips further distinguishes conventions from 
parliamentary procedures. 
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Jaconelli argues that our understanding of conventions „must be more narrowly 
drawn than has hitherto been common in literature.‟37 He sets out 2 fundamental 
features of conventions: first, they are rules that have a normative quality and 
second, they are not enforced in the courts.38  As with the Diceyan model, the 
conventions are unenforceable non-legal rules.  Like Jennings‟ rendering of 
conventions, this definition includes a normative or moral dimension.  Jaconelli 
explains that this ethical aspect must have a constitutional quality rather than a 
political one.39  
 
Briefer definitions have been put forward by academics who are also concerned with 
the normative aspect of conventions.  Morton defines conventions very broadly as 
“unenacted norms whose breach will raise questions of principle.”40  Instead of using 
the common term „rule‟, Morton refers to the much wider term „norm‟ which can be 
taken to mean “a rule; a pattern; an authoritative standard; a type; the ordinary or 
most frequent value of state; an accepted standard of behaviour within a society”.41  
However, his definition does appear to make the common distinction between 
statutory law and conventions; conventions are „unenacted„.  Finally, Morton 
indicates that ethical or moral considerations are an essential part of convention in 
that breaches will raise potential issues of principle.  Allan also includes this aspect 
in his account of conventions, describing them as “a rule of practice that is grounded 
in political principle”.42 
 
There are a number of superficial similarities between the above definitions. It is 
possible to isolate certain features upon which there appears to be a broad 
consensus among constitutional observers.  The following four essential features of 
„convention‟ recur across the range of definitions covered: (1) it is a constitutional 
rule or practice, (2) it is distinct from a law and is not enforced in courts, (3) it has a 
binding quality, nevertheless, (4) it has an ethical, normative or moral dimension.  
Each of these elements will now be briefly considered in turn and the potential 
deficiencies within these standard definitions will be exposed.   
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[2.1.1] A convention is a constitutional rule or practice  
 
From the definitions above it appears that there is a broad acceptance that 
conventions are a type of rule.  However, many of these definitions are blurred or 
stretched to indicate that conventions may also take the form of a „practice‟.  For 
example, the Halsbury‟s definition indicates a convention could be either a rule or a 
practice.  Others, such as Phillips and Dicey see conventions as rules, but rules 
about practices or that include practices (or a host of other non-legal norms).  
Despite initially defining them collectively as rules, Dicey later describes conventions 
as “customs, practices, maxims or precepts”.43  This latter type of definition arguably 
causes confusion because it attempts to include a variety of wider terms (such as 
practice) within the narrower ambit of „rule‟ and uses „rule‟ to embrace things that are 
clearly not rules.  This creates uncertainty as it is evident that a „rule‟ and a „practice‟ 
(for example) are two very different things.  For a clear understanding as to what a 
convention actually is it must be possible to pinpoint which of these terms is 
applicable and this is not always possible. 
 
The narrow view: conventions as rules 
 
A number of commentators view conventions as a form of rule.  Jennings viewed 
them in this way44 and Brazier has made similar claims that conventions should be 
distinguished from constitutional practices which are lower in the constitutional 
hierarchy.45   
 
Jaconelli also claims that a distinction between rules and practices is of vital 
importance as conventions only take the form of rules, not practices.  He uses the 
positivist models of Hart46 to distinguish between a „habit (or practice, or usage)‟ and 
a rule.47  He argues that the integral point about a rule is that is goes beyond “merely 
… an observed uniformity in the past; the notion includes the expectation that the 
uniformity will continue in the future.  It is not simply a description, it is a prescription.  
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It has a compulsive force.”48  Jaconelli goes on to claim that, unlike prescriptive 
conventions, “mere constitutional habit [or practice], … for however long a period, 
does not have normative consequences.”49  Jaconelli‟s distinction raises a number of 
points.  First, rules, unlike practices, are not just backward-looking or a continuation 
of historical habits.  Instead, rules go further than this and prescribe modes of 
desirable future behaviour.  Second, practices have no normative or ethical 
consequences whereas rules do.  Finally, unlike practices, rules have a binding 
quality (a „compulsive force‟), perhaps because they are prescriptive and normative.  
These features appear to be related but it is unclear exactly how.   
 
In any event, Jaconelli claims that the ingredients of bindingness, prescriptiveness 
and normativity are necessary for a conventional „rule‟ to exist.  He also denies that 
practices (which are looser and encompass many forms regularised behaviour) 
could be prescriptive or have normative consequences. 
 
There is an essential problem with this first element in the definition of a convention 
(i.e. whether it a rule or practice) in that it is basically reliant upon other elements 
within the definition (e.g. the bindingness and normative force of conventions).  To 
determine clearly whether a convention is a rule or a practice one must have a 
relatively clear and certain understanding as to what those other elements mean.  As 
will be demonstrated in Parts 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, this is not necessarily possible. 
 
The broader view: conventions as rules, practices and other phenomena 
 
An alternative view is that conventions cannot and should not be narrowly viewed as 
merely non-legal rules.  Morton subscribes to this view, stating that it is „seriously 
and systematically misleading to present … conventions generally as rules‟.50  He 
accuses constitutional lawyers of viewing conventions in law-like terms, trying to fit 
conventions into legal frameworks and imbuing them with legal characteristics.51  For 
Morton, conventions should not be viewed as non-legal rules; they are different in 
nature52 and should not be forced into legal categories with which they do not fit.  
This is why he uses the wider term of „norm‟ in his definition of conventions.  This 
approach avoids problems inherent in a „rule-based‟ view of conventions, namely 
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that it becomes reliant on other factors within the definition.  Indeed, such difficulties 
arguably demonstrate Morton‟s point that conventions and rigid legal forms are 
perhaps incongruous.   
 
However, a broader approach causes problems of its own because an array of other 
non-legal forms of constitutional regulation co-exist with conventions. As Marshall 
states, “a concise enumeration of such rules is not easy to make since they shade 
off into what might be called „traditions‟, „principles‟ and „doctrines‟.”53  Conventional 
rules „shade off‟ so that no clear line exists between conventions and non-
conventions even if a broader approach is taken.   
    
So confusion and doubt occur at the very outset over the basic elements of 
conventions.  It is agreed that conventions are of vital importance to the constitution 
yet it cannot be properly decided whether they are just rules, or can extend to 
include practices or other matters.  Uncertainties arise if either approach is adopted.  
It is arguable that this dilemma arises from two important and related characteristics 
of conventions: firstly, many are unwritten and secondly, they can be uncertain in 
scope. 
 
 
[2.1.2] A convention has a binding quality 
 
A convention „must be regarded as binding‟.54  In other words, conventions impose 
obligations upon political actors to behave in accordance with them and “the notion 
of conventional conduct does include a strong element of what is customarily 
expected, in the sense of ordinary or regular behaviour.”55  Such obligations will be 
“morally and politically, but not legally, binding.”56  Nevertheless, Dicey claimed that 
“the conventional rules of the constitution, though not laws, are, … nearly if not quite 
as binding as laws.  They are, or appear to be, respected quite as much as most 
statutory enactments, and more than many.”57  Though this is certainly true of 
„strong‟ or „core‟ conventions (such as the convention that the monarch must provide 
royal assent to acts passed by Parliament), Dicey perhaps overstated the case and it 
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is questionable whether such a statement applies to all conventions.  For example, 
the convention of collective Cabinet responsibility is generally seen as wider and 
potentially more flexible;58 it is not clearly binding in the same concrete terms as the 
„royal assent‟ convention.  So, as with many other aspects of conventions, their 
bindingness appears variable.  Jaconelli writes that “Laws are either binding … or 
not.  Conventions, by contrast, would appear … to be characterised by various 
possible degrees of „bindingness‟.”59  The measure of conventions comes down to a 
matter of degree, with narrower more binding conventions shading off into the looser, 
less binding variety.  The factor of „bindingness‟ is too crude to take account of such 
subtle degrees of variation, thus undermining the efficacy of standard definitions.   
 
Questions also surround whether conventions are subjectively binding (i.e. from the 
viewpoint of officials themselves) or objectively binding (i.e. an external standard by 
which they ought to feel bound).  The former proposition is clearly problematic 
because it involves judging the existence of a convention according to the views of 
individuals whose conduct they regulate.  Jaconelli states that this appears to be “an 
extremely flimsy basis for the existence of constitutional conventions.”60  Marshall61 
and former Cabinet Secretary Lord Wilson62 have also claimed a subjective 
approach is unhelpful.  Yet it is also difficult to obtain a clear understanding of how 
an objectively binding standard applies.  How is it to be determined what conduct 
objectively „ought‟ to be carried out?  In the end, bindingness does seem to largely 
rest to some extent on shared views of officials within the system.63  This may prove 
problematic in respect of imprecise conventions such as joint Cabinet responsibility.  
Though there is essential agreement about its core tenets, uncertainty has often 
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arisen as to its wider application.  The range of opinions as to the scope of this 
convention created difficulties for Lord Widgery in A.G. v Jonathan Cape64 who 
admitted „it is not surprising that different views on this subject are contained in the 
evidence before me.‟65  The case involved an action brought by the Attorney General 
to prevent publication of the diaries of a deceased former Cabinet minister 
approximately 10 years after he had last held office.  The action was based upon 
breach of confidence but inevitably raised issues relating to collective Cabinet 
responsibility.  As part of their arguments, the claimants and defendants adduced 
opposing evidence as to the proper ambit of collective Cabinet responsibility.  The 
Attorney General sought to rely on the opinions of former ministers, including Lord 
Hailsham who took the view that Cabinet confidentiality should be viewed in wide 
and inflexible terms: “He [the Cabinet minister] is sworn to keep secret all matters 
committed and revealed unto him or that shall be treated secretly in [the Privy] 
Council.”66  But, as Lord Widgery stated, „the defendants … also called distinguished 
former Cabinet ministers who do not support this view of Lord Hailsham‟67 though 
unfortunately his judgment does not provide further details.  Yet ambiguities 
regarding bindingness extend to more concrete conventions.  For example Waldron, 
considering the „strong‟ convention of monarchical appointment of a Prime Minister 
writes “the procedure … is expressed in phrases „It is generally agreed that…‟ and „It 
is understood that…‟ and „Everyone agrees…‟.”68  Jennings also supports this claim, 
stating “opinions about constitutionality are as important as facts.”69   
 
 
[2.1.3] A convention has an ethical, normative or moral dimension  
 
That a moral or ethical element is part of conventions has been accepted since their 
initial identification when Dicey viewed them as the „constitutional morality of the 
day‟,70 thus accepting that, like social morality,71 their moral basis may be subject to 
change rather than being unalterable.  For Dicey this morality was based on the 
overall purpose of conventions “to secure that Parliament, or the Cabinet which is 
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indirectly appointed by Parliament, shall in the long run give effect to the will of …  
the true political sovereign of the State- the majority of the electors or … the 
nation.”72 So Dicey saw a vague democratic ideal underlying conventions; that the 
will of the nation (in the form of majority of voters) should be given effect.  
 
Despite being viewed as an important part of conventions, the normative aspect is 
often overlooked; it tends not to be explored in any great depth and so remains yet 
another obscure element of conventions.  This marginalisation is perhaps due to the 
cautious and narrow approach of theorists who primarily utilise prevailing positivist 
models,73 preferring to focus on the procedural, describable aspects of conventions.  
But when looking at conventions, merely observing raw, factual data is insufficient; 
“there must exist in addition, some „point‟ or „reason‟ that furnishes a rationale to the 
empirical data in question.”74   
 
The view of conventions as having some form of moral facet has endured and is 
shared by numerous academics in the field. Jennings claimed that one must always 
consider the purpose of a convention; a convention must have an underlying 
reason.75  More recently, Jaconelli also considered the normative dimension of 
conventions writing that “many constitutional conventions … are permeated by 
values – democracy, the separation of powers, responsible government – which are 
generally regarded as possessing independent and permanent worth.”76  The values 
he describes cover a wider sphere than Dicey‟s „democratic will‟, though all are 
arguably reducible to and compatible with this core value.  The latter part of 
Jaconelli‟s statement implies that these underlying political values are constant, that 
they are not subject to change and that they remain impervious to constitutional 
developments.  It suggests they are the foundations of conventions and will prevail 
irrespective of the modifications that may occur in the form or scope of conventions.  
Jaconelli continues: “The „reasons‟ which animate many a constitutional convention 
are among the highest values of political theory.”77  So Jaconelli creates a value-
laden, distinctly political element to conventions.  Similarly, Jennings identifies four 
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main principles underlying all conventions.  These are: “[1] The British Constitution is 
democratic; [2] it is parliamentary; [3] it is monarchical; and [4] it is a Cabinet 
system.”78  Like Dicey, Jennings claims that the most „fundamental‟ of these is the 
principle of democracy.  As with other accounts, these principles are inevitably 
somewhat vague in nature.  It is also arguable that the final three principles are not 
values as such, but merely statements as to the features of the British constitution 
(i.e. descriptive).  Finally, Morton places prime emphasis on the normative dimension 
of conventions, stating that this must be fully appreciated to have a proper 
understanding of law and the constitution.79 He criticises the approach of legal 
academics who gloss over and afford insufficient weight80 to the normative aspect of 
conventions.  He argues that “fundamental values of liberal constitutionalism .. find 
their expression in .. conventions”81  For Morton, conventions are tied up with British 
constitutional tradition (which is made up of political ideals, ethical standards and 
ceremony).82  “A failure to tie conventions securely to this tradition is to grossly 
misrepresent them.”83   
 
The ethical dimension appears to be an essential component of a convention, in 
many circumstances forming part of its very definition.  Because of this and the vital 
role that conventions play in regulating the constitutional apex, normative elements 
inevitably infiltrate the study and description of the constitution, yet positivist 
approaches are not equipped to deal with this as Part 2.1.4 demonstrates. 
 
 
[2.1.4] A convention is distinct from a law and is not enforced in courts  
 
The final feature of conventions, their distinction from law, is a vital feature that 
requires more detailed consideration.  Conventions‟ distinction from laws is perhaps 
the only aspect of conventions upon which there is almost unanimous agreement, 
though it has been questioned in the past, most famously by Jennings.84 It is widely 
accepted that there is a clear distinction between laws and conventions in that the 
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former are enforceable by courts whereas the latter are not.  Brazier writes “to 
distinguish conventions from laws properly so called is easy and uncontroversial.”85 
 
Conventions are not enforceable in courts of law; their consequences are not legal 
but political.  Munro terms „the court-enforcement criterion … an adequate litmus test 
to distinguish‟ between law and convention.86  The case of Adegbenro87 confirms the 
distinction.  It concerned a Nigerian constitutional provision which allowed the 
Governor to dismiss a premier if the latter no longer commanded majority support in 
the legislative assembly (a provision influenced by the British convention).  The 
plaintiff premier had been dismissed from office but challenged his removal on the 
basis that there had not been a formal vote in the assembly.  Instead, a letter signed 
by a majority of assembly members had been drawn up.  The Privy Council held that 
the Nigerian premier‟s dismissal had been conducted within the scope of the 
constitutional provision and was therefore lawful.  In its judgment the court 
distinguished between legal and political (or „conventional‟) restrictions on the 
Governor‟s power to remove the premier.  Viscount Radcliffe stated that there are 
“considerations of policy and propriety which it is for [the Governor] to weigh on each 
particular occasion: they are not legal restrictions which a court of law, interpreting 
the relevant provisions of the Constitution, can import into a written document and 
make it his legal duty to observe.”88 The implication of this was that legal restrictions 
would be enforced but wider matters of principle or propriety, the realm of 
conventions, would not.  The recent case of Hemming v Prime Minister89 displays 
broad parallels with Adegbenro.  The MP applicant had encountered difficulties in 
obtaining ministerial answers to questions and sought a judicial review of the Prime 
Minister‟s failure.  In a very brief judgment Mr Justice Bennett in the High Court 
deemed the applicant‟s case „simply unarguable‟ because „there is no legal duty‟ on 
ministers to respond to MPs‟ questions.90  Instead Bennett J found that „the 
Ministerial Code is a matter for enforcement in Parliament and is not amenable to 
judicial review.‟91  This provides confirmation that the ministerial accountability 
convention is clearly beyond the ambit of the courts.  Yet despite being legally 
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unenforceable, conventions are recognised by courts as cases like Carltona92 and 
Liversidge93 indicate.   
 
In Carltona, Lord Greene‟s judgment referred in passing to the existence of the 
convention of ministerial accountability.94  The convention formed part of his 
explanation as to why it was not the role of the courts to intervene with ministerial 
decisions in this case.   A similar approach was taken in the wartime House of Lords 
case Liversidge v Anderson.  This case concerned the meaning of a provision which 
allowed a suspect to be detained if the Secretary of State „had reasonable cause to 
believe‟ the individual to have „hostile associations‟.  In his judgment Viscount 
Maugham recognised the convention of ministerial accountability, noting that a 
Secretary of State was „answerable to Parliament for a proper discharge of his 
duties‟.95  He listed this as the fourth of „a number of circumstances which tend[ed] to 
support‟ his preferred interpretation of the provision to require a subjective 
reasonable belief, thus favouring the minister.96  The convention of ministerial 
accountability thus formed one indirect factor behind Maugham‟s interpretive 
approach.  Furthermore, in AG v Cape97 the convention of collective Cabinet 
responsibility was afforded consideration and acted as a background influence in the 
case.  However, this was relevant to determining breach of confidence, rather than 
as a free-standing category. 
 
A Clear Distinction? 
 
Its distinction from law is arguably the most clear and certain characteristic of a 
convention.  The above cases demonstrate that conventions are not legally 
enforceable but may be recognised by the courts.  These cases also establish that 
though conventions are not directly enforceable, they do play an important part in 
legal discourse.  They inform and assist the judicial interpretation of laws so arguably 
do have a degree of legal influence.  Indeed Marshall and Moodie claim that 
conventions can be viewed as “non-legal rules regulating the way in which legal 
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rules shall be applied.”98  So conventions can influence judgments by virtue of the 
assistance they can afford to legal interpretation.99   
 
Positivist models are highly influential in the distinction between conventions and 
laws and mainstream literature in this area is predicated on positivism.  In a general 
sense positivism is concerned with defining a legal rule based on its observable 
features.  This approach involves eliminating other elements such as morality, 
sociology and politics.  Because of its clarity and methodical, structured approach to 
distinguishing law from non-law, positivist theories, especially the work of HLA 
Hart,100 are often referred to in studies of constitutional convention101 and they 
influence judicial approaches in the area. 
 
Yet the distinction between convention and law can be questioned.  Despite the 
general agreement that laws and conventions are distinct entities, some have 
contended that laws and conventions are not entirely unrelated or even completely 
separate.102  For example, Wilson claimed that by imposing a distinction between law 
and convention “it is impossible to present constitutional law as a coherent subject or 
relate it in a meaningful way to the functions it has to fulfil or the social and political 
context in which it has to operate”103  In other words, conventions play such an 
integral role in regulating the constitution and bedding law in its political context that 
considering law in isolation is impoverished and deficient.  Barber has also recently 
questioned the nature and extent of the law/convention distinction by claiming that 
„the differences between them are a matter of degree‟ and that the distinction is 
„soft‟.104  Finally, Elliott puts forward a novel argument that conventions can indirectly 
acquire legal force via judicial use of principle.105  First, he argues that the normative, 
ethical dimension of conventions should be properly acknowledged.  He then refers 
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to caselaw where the principles underlying convention (as opposed to the convention 
itself) have acquired legal recognition and shaped legal content.  “Given [the] 
relationship between constitutional principle and law, and given that constitutional 
conventions (properly so-called) are underpinned by constitutional norms, there is no 
reason why the constitutional principles which underlie conventions should not also, 
in appropriate circumstances, operate to influence the evolution of constitutional 
law.”106  This argument, Dworkinian in nature,107 inevitably blurs the distinction 
between laws and conventions.  Though it accepts that they may be different 
creatures, they are connected by constitutional ethics that infiltrate and underlie both; 
the law/convention distinction is thus not as obvious as first appears.  Munro would 
dismiss such arguments and maintain that law and conventions are distinct, claiming 
that “The courts may, under the head of judicial notice, recognise the existence of all 
manner of things, but this does not ipso facto give them the status of being laws.”108 
This is correct, but just because conventions are not directly enforceable does not 
mean that they have no legal effect, as Bancoult109 and Liversidge demonstrate.  
Elliot‟s arguments do not propose that conventions are the same as laws, merely 
that there is a common ethical basis that links the two, and this aspect of 
conventions may thus acquire legal force. 
 
 
[2.2] The Flexibility of Conventions 
 
 
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that conventions defy a definitive 
definition and this is arguably due to their inherently flexible nature.  There is a broad 
spectrum of conventions, ranging from precise to vague, from strong to pliable, 
though more tend towards the latter end of the spectrum.  It has been shown that 
many conventions are fluid and capable of evolving; even a „core‟ or „strong‟ 
convention (such as royal assent to acts of Parliament) will have been subject to 
evolution in its earliest stages, emerging in response to constitutional and political 
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realities.110  This is why, as Wilson states, “it is important to analyse conventions in 
the context of dynamic political events.”111  
 
The flexibility of conventions is intrinsically linked to their non-legal nature and the 
multitude of uncertainties regarding them; indeed it has been said that so much 
uncertainty surrounds conventions that the usefulness of the term is affected.112  
Three reasons for such difficulties can be identified.  Firstly, conventions are 
frequently unwritten in nature.113  As Viscount Radcliffe has stated, “the British 
Constitution works by a body of understandings which no writer can formulate.”114  
This is a source of uncertainty because a written formulation enables one to identify 
with certainty whether and in what circumstances a convention will apply.  Without 
this there is no fixed anchor-point or definitive statement of the convention so 
individuals cannot clearly ascertain its scope or even its existence.  This is further 
exacerbated by the fact that there is no authoritative body capable of settling 
disputes as to the precise meaning or scope of conventions.115  Secondly, related to 
their unwritten nature, conventions may be vague in ambit, though some are more 
precise. This is acknowledged by Dicey who said conventions are “multifarious, 
differing, as it might at first sight appear, from each other not only in importance but 
in general character and scope.”116  As a result „many questions of constitutional 
propriety remain unsettled‟.117  Finally, as Jaconelli states, “constitutional 
conventions can, and do, change over time.”118  It is no surprise that due to their fluid 
nature, many conventions, particularly the more indeterminate variety, are prone to 
evolve according to constitutional and other developments.  This fluidity was first 
noted by Dicey who wrote that conventions or understandings “vary from generation 
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to generation, almost from year to year.”119  So even in Dicey‟s day, there was 
recognition that conventions could alter rapidly and be shaped by current attitudes.  
It is therefore to be expected that some conventions will be affected or even shaped 
by political, technological and other developments in any given era. 
 
The Enduring Fluidity of Conventions  
 
The fluid nature of many conventions is primarily attributable to the fact that they are 
often not recorded in a definitive document.  It is the case that some conventions are 
indeed fixed in writing, one such example being the Ministerial Code.120  But, as 
Jaconelli states, “when they are [written], the formula records, rather than creates, 
the convention.”121  Furthermore, as Bradley and Ewing have claimed, though some 
conventions have been fixed to writing, overall codification of all conventions would 
entail two practical difficulties.  Firstly, “they cover so diverse an area that they could 
not be included within a single code.”122  This would result in the need for multiple 
codes to co-exist alongside one another.  Secondly, if all-encompassing codification 
occurred “it would be impossible to stop the process by which formal rules are 
gradually modified by informal rules, principles and practices from starting over 
again.”123  This is a very interesting statement because it implies that reducing 
conventions to written rules would not ultimately settle the position because 
constitutional activity continues to change over time so such rules would in time 
become inadequate and in need of further elaboration; conventions would continue 
to develop afresh.  The implication is that political-constitutional practice remains 
fluid so that written conventional rules would ultimately require supplementation.   
 
So by their very nature, it seems that conventions are incompatible with reduction to 
a written code; they evade permanent fixation.  The fluid nature of conventions is 
thus enduring.  No amount of codification will secure them because, as an inevitable 
consequence of political change, new conventions will always organically arise to 
                                                 
119
 He continues thus: “The opinions … which prevail to-day differ (it is said) from the opinions or 
understandings which prevailed thirty years back, and are possibly different from the opinions or 
understandings which may prevail ten years hence.”  Dicey (n 3) 30.  
120
 Ministerial Code (n 15). 
121
 Jaconelli (n 38) 169. 
122
 A W Bradley & K D Ewing, Constitutional & Administrative Law (13
th
 edn, Longman, Harlow, 2003) 
p 27.   
123
 Ibid.  Morton makes a similar claim:  “[W]hatever the intended scope, no matter how extensive the 
[written] code, the informal process of growth (in response to changing circumstances) goes on.” (n 
25) 159.  
 
 71 
 
supplement the written arrangements.  Conventions are changing on the underside 
of the fixed, formal, legal-constitutional framework.  New modes of activity occur 
beneath and around the legal edifice, developing beneath and around the rules.  So 
it is arguable that conventions facilitate constitutional advancement by enabling 
wider political developments and changes in political practices to be factored into the 
constitution without the need for formal, legal changes.   
 
 
 
[3] Conventions throughout the Iraq Affair 
 
 
Having outlined the conventions relevant to the prime ministerial office and explored 
key characteristics of conventions, this chapter will now consider select examples of 
conventions over the course of Mr Blair‟s premiership.  As stated earlier, the main 
conventions relevant to the premier‟s war prerogative are two-fold: firstly, that the 
monarch must act upon the advice of ministers and secondly, collective Cabinet 
responsibility.  This part will consider these two conventions over the course of the 
Iraq affair.  Additionally, it will consider a potential convention which gained 
prominence in the Iraq affair as Chapter 1 indicated, namely parliamentary approval 
of warfare. 
 
Important primary source material here is ministerial memoir, particularly as official 
Cabinet documentation relating to the Iraq affair will not be available for a thirty-year 
period.124  This is as a result of the recent ministerial overriding125 of rulings by both 
the Information Commissioner126 and Information Tribunal127 which ordered the 
disclosure of Cabinet minutes from the March 2003 meetings.  A number of ex-
ministers have produced diaries of their time in office, including Clare Short,128 Robin 
Cook129 and David Blunkett.130  These diaries provide some revealing insights into 
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the operation of premiership-related conventions during the Blair years.  
Nevetheless, such diaries are primarily available due to the disagreements or 
controversies that caused the individuals to leave office; such memoirs must 
therefore be considered against the background of potentially subjective agendas. 
 
 
[3.1] The Monarch Must Act Upon Ministerial Advice 
 
 
Of all conventions within the British constitution, the requirement that the monarch 
exercises prerogative powers upon ministerial advice is „paramount‟, playing a 
central role in the conduct of government.  The „ministerial advice‟ convention is a 
narrow, concrete convention which limits the monarch‟s political role and transfers 
substantive decisions to democratically elected ministers.  It is therefore a clear 
example of a strongly binding conventional rule underpinned by democratic ideals.  
The convention itself has been stable and consistently adhered to since the early 
twentieth century.  Because disputes rarely arise regarding this convention it remains 
a significant but background presence within the constitution.  In light of this and of 
the limited material available it might appear that little can be said of the „ministerial 
advice‟ convention over the broad Iraq era.  However, buried within select cases are 
interesting remarks about the convention which call into question the proposition that 
conventions are not legally enforced.  Three highly relevant cases in this respect are 
GCHQ131 (from 1985) which concerned a prime ministerial decision under 
prerogative, and the more recent cases of Bancoult132 and Quark.133 
 
In GCHQ the Prime Minister used prerogative powers to abolish the trade union 
rights of civil servants based at Government Communication Headquarters without 
prior notification.  In their rulings, three out of five Law Lords agreed that the 
government‟s manner of exercising prerogative was judicially reviewable.  Lord 
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Roskill‟s judgment contains important and insightful comments upon conventions 
and the legal edifice.  Consider for example the following passage: 
 
“To speak today of the acts of sovereign as “irresistible and absolute” 
when modern constitutional convention requires that all such acts 
are done by the sovereign on the advice of and will be carried out by 
the sovereign‟s ministers currently in power is surely to hamper the 
constitutional development … by harking back to … „the clanking 
medieval chains of the ghosts of the past.‟”134 
 
His Lordship referred to „modern constitutional convention‟.  To consider the legal 
view of an absolute sovereign without taking account of this integral convention 
would hinder constitutional caselaw by tying the judiciary to outmoded legal outlooks 
which had been superseded by political evolution.  The legal view of „sovereign acts‟ 
in isolation was archaic135 and by implication, inadequate. 
 
GCHQ appears to offer a vital counter-example to the prevailing view that 
conventions are legally unenforceable; it appears that the ministerial advice 
convention was enforced or recognised in this case.  The GCHQ judgment and 
headnotes are clear that the premier in fact made the decision to remove union 
rights and viewing this decision as the sovereign‟s at law would be retrograde and 
„inaccurate‟.  This surely assumes the operation of the ministerial advice convention.  
If such an assumption had not been made, and the case had been viewed in purely 
legal terms, then the decision to remove union rights would have been the Queen‟s 
rather than the premier‟s because it is She who exercises the prerogative at law.  Yet 
Lord Diplock specifically rejected such an archaic approach.  So though the 
convention was not expressly enforced, judicial assumption of its operation enabled 
the court to make a finding that the prime ministerial manner of exercising 
prerogative power could be reviewable. 
 
The Bancoult Litigation 
 
Bancoult required the courts to consider the legality of a prerogative Order in 
Council.136  Such Orders are made by the Queen at law, though their content is 
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decided by ministers (in this case the Foreign Secretary) who advise her as a matter 
of convention.  In Bancoult the government defence initially argued that legally the 
Order was that of the Queen and thus, by implication, not subject to judicial 
review.137  Bancoult ultimately came before the House of Lords where the Law Lords 
affirmed the Divisional and Appeal courts‟ rulings that orders in council were capable 
of being judicially reviewed.  However, a narrow majority of the Lords departed from 
the earlier courts‟ decisions and disappointingly found in the government‟s favour, 
concluding that the Order exiling the islanders was not unlawful.138  Despite this 
outcome, the courts at every level rejected defence arguments and found that the 
Order was „in reality‟ that of the Foreign Secretary139  thus implicitly acknowledging 
the existence and operation of the ministerial advice convention.  Illuminating 
insights relevant to the ministerial advice convention were made across the Lords, 
Court of Appeal and Divisional Court judgments.  
 
Bancoult in the House of Lords [2008]140 
 
In the House of Lords the monarch-based argument was not afforded detailed 
attention because by this time the defence arguments had moved away from claims 
that the orders in council were immune from judicial review because they were made 
by the monarch at law.141  Nevertheless, this point was briefly touched upon but 
dismissed by Lords Rodger and Mance.  The former Law Lord claimed to be 
unimpressed by this argument, dismissing it as „little more than makeweight‟ and 
stating “[it] is nothing more than a rule of English procedural law: it does not reach 
the substance of the challenge.”142  Here Lord Rodger drew a distinction between 
the „substance‟ of this case, namely that government ministers are responsible for 
drafting orders in council and their actions via prerogative are generally capable of 
review, and the „procedure‟ (or form) that courts cannot make findings against the 
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Crown.  Lord Rodger indicated that the substance (or reality) of the case was of 
primary importance and must be afforded precedence over „procedure‟ in the 
resolution of this case.  He was unwilling to accept the defence argument that rested 
on mere procedure, or in alternative terms, a skeletal view of the law in isolation.  
Similarly, Lord Mance stated: 
 
“A recognition that a legislative order in council is invalid by a judgment 
given … against the Minister responsible for the making of the order no 
more involves the making of an impermissible order against the 
Sovereign than a successful challenge to any other prerogative act 
undertaken in Her name.”143 
 
In this passage Lord Mance argued that the exercise of prerogative by order in 
council must logically be reviewable in the same way as any other decision taken via 
prerogative; reviewing either form of prerogative need not involve ruling against the 
monarch who exercises the prerogative at law.  Yet it does not necessarily entail this 
outcome because, as in GCHQ and the earlier Bancoult judgments to be discussed, 
the courts premise their judgments upon the factual reality that ministers, not the 
monarch, make such decisions in the first place.  This approach surely involves a 
form of silent recognition of the ministerial advice convention.   
 
Bancoult in the Court of Appeal [2007]144 
 
The Court of Appeal also considered the disputed issue of whether a prerogative 
order in council was a ministerial act or a sovereign (and therefore legally immune)145 
act of the Crown.  The court reiterated the earlier Divisional Court ruling that an order 
in council was an executive act susceptible to judicial review and that the 2004 
Orders were unlawful.146 
 
Each judge referred to constitutional reality or practice (as distinct from the legal 
framework) in this area.  Lord Diplock‟s GCHQ claim that prerogative power „in 
constitutional practice is generally exercised by those holding ministerial rank‟ was 
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quoted and approved by both Sedley LJ147 and Sir Clarke MR148  Similarly Waller LJ 
stated: 
 
“Matters have gradually developed over the years so that now, 
constitutionally, the Crown never acts other than on the advice of her 
ministers, and the decision to exercise the „royal prerogative‟ is 
actually taken ... by the government or by ministers individually.”149 
 
According to Sedley LJ the government “submits that constitutionally and legally it is 
the Monarch and not the minister who makes a colonial Order in Council, and – what 
does not necessarily follow – that this places the process outside the jurisdiction of 
the courts.”150  Yet the primary reason that this did not necessarily follow was 
because the courts in cases such as Bancoult and GCHQ have viewed the legal 
arrangements here in their real political context with discreet reference to working 
constitutional convention rather than in narrow legal terms. 
 
Bancoult in the Divisional Court [2006]151  
 
The Divisional Court also initially rejected defence arguments that the disputed Order 
was made by the Monarch in law.152  The latter part of its judgment was heavily 
influenced by Lord Roskill‟s GCHQ terminology.  For example, reference was made 
to the „medieval unreality‟ of legal forms in this area153 and Hooper LJ stated:  
 
“In our view the [government‟s] approach to this case involves much 
clanking of the „chains of ghosts of the past‟.  [The defence advocate‟s] 
persistent references to „the Queen in Council‟ during the course of 
argument cannot hide the fact that „the act in question [was] the act of 
the executive‟.‟”154 
 
Here the court claimed the defence arguments based on the premise that the 
disputed Order was the Queen‟s were outdated; again, the implication was that this 
view, which relied on seeing the legal position in isolation from convention, was 
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erroneous.  Interestingly, Hooper LJ declared that the defendant‟s narrow legal 
arguments were unable to „hide‟ (i.e. conceal) the „facts‟ (i.e. the political reality that 
the Foreign Secretary had made the Order).  The Order was the act of the executive 
and thus amenable to judicial review.  In Bancoult Hooper LJ refused to place legal 
form over substance.  He specifically rejected government counsel‟s arguments 
which relied heavily on legal appearance of an absolute and legally immune 
monarch.  If the Order was actually that of the Queen, it would not be reviewable and 
this is why the defence presented its arguments based on ancient constitutional 
arrangements without reference to conventional changes.   
 
So it appears that an undeclared recognition of the ministerial advice convention 
impacted upon the judicial decisions in Bancoult.  The convention had legal effect, 
albeit silently.  This convention had to be recognised in order to frustrate 
government‟s attempts to clothe its actions in the monarchical immunity of old.  This 
indicates that in relation to ministerial prerogative decisions, it is potentially no longer 
viable to make judicial verdicts solely on a narrow view of the law in isolation without 
wider reference to this convention.  
 
Quark Fishing Ltd. [2005]155   
 
Quark provides further support for the proposition that courts deciding caselaw 
concerning Crown and ministers must include wider reference to the ministerial 
advice convention in order to retain constitutional coherence.  The case provides an 
interesting contrast to the approach in Bancoult.  It involved a dispute regarding the 
Commonwealth territory South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands156 („the 
Islands‟).  The territory had its own constitution created by British statutory 
instrument157 which created a Commissioner based on the nearby Falklands.  This 
Commissioner enjoyed such „powers and duties as Her Majesty may from time to 
time be pleased to assign him‟ and he was to conduct his office „according to such 
instructions, if any, as Her Majesty may from time to time see fit to give him through 
a Secretary of State.‟158  The British Foreign Secretary instructed the Commissioner 
to restrict the allocation of fishing licenses.  The claimant, a fishing company, had 
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obtained ongoing licenses over a number of years but found its license refused as a 
result of the decision.  The claimant challenged the lawfulness of the Foreign 
Secretary‟s decision and sought damages for the infringement of his property rights 
under the Human Rights Act 1998.  Quark reached the House of Lords on appeal.  
The court had to consider whether the instruction given to the Commissioner came 
from the Queen in her capacity as Head of State to the UK or as Head of State to the 
Islands.   
 
The government argued that the Queen was Head of State and source of authority in 
the Islands.  In issuing the order the Foreign Secretary was merely acting as her 
„mouthpiece or medium‟, simply „passing on her instructions‟.159  The Claimant put 
forward an alternative view that the case could not merely be resolved by looking at 
constitutional arrangements alone; „an evaluation of facts underlying the exercise of 
power‟ (such as the „political and diplomatic motivation of the Secretary of State‟) 
was also needed.  Taking this approach would “suggest that this was, in truth, an 
exercise of power on behalf of Her Majesty‟s Government of the United Kingdom, not 
Her Majesty‟s Government of [the Islands].”160  The decision was therefore 
concerned with UK interests rather than those of the territory.  Disguised within this 
argument is a request that the court acknowledge the ministerial advice convention. 
 
The Lords ruled in the Secretary of State‟s favour, with Lord Nichols and Baroness 
Hale dissenting.  The majority found that the instruction had been given by the 
Queen, through the Foreign Secretary, in her capacity as Head of State to the 
Islands.  The Islands‟ constitution provided authority to Her Majesty; it did not provide 
the Foreign Secretary any power to instruct the Commissioner.  Instead, the Foreign 
Secretary had merely acted as a medium for Her Majesty‟s instructions, and had not 
acted independently as UK Foreign Secretary.  The Lords oddly concluded that the 
Foreign Secretary was a medium or conduit for the monarch‟s powers, a view which 
clearly reverses the arrangements in political reality.  This conclusion, which clearly 
defies the universally acknowledged working political realities of the British 
government, highlights the problems and absurdities of slavishly following 
constitutional theory and legal form divorced from the political context that the 
claimant argued should be considered.    
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Lords Bingham and Hope rejected the claimant‟s arguments to consider the 
underlying political realities in their judgments.  In contrast to Bancoult the court 
limited itself to a solely legal view and deemed the Queen Head of State of the 
territory as per the statutory instrument.  Lords Bingham and Hope both drew a line 
here and would not entertain factual, diplomatic and political factors (i.e. non-legal 
considerations) that occurred prior to the monarch‟s instructions.161   
 
Lord Bingham found that the instruction was passed to the Commissioner by Foreign 
Secretary but “Such power and authority can only be exercised by the Queen, who in 
this context is (and is only) the Queen of [the Islands].  It is in my view correct in 
constitutional theory to regard the Secretary of State as her mouthpiece and 
medium.”162  In resolving this issue Lord Bingham resorted to constitutional theory as 
distinct from the alternative reality.  The judgment of Lord Hope followed a similar 
mode of reasoning to Lord Bingham‟s, also accepting the Foreign Secretary‟s 
arguments that he was merely a medium: “The Secretary of State is not acting … on 
behalf of Her Majesty as Head of State of the United Kingdom.  What he is doing is 
providing the vehicle by which, according to the constitution of [the Islands], 
instructions were given … by Her Majesty as Head of State.”163  This begs the 
question; who gave Her Majesty the instructions in the first place? an issue both Law 
Lords studiously avoided.   
 
These approaches excluded the ministerial advice convention which, if taken into 
consideration, would have shown that the Foreign Secretary was the substantive 
decision-maker advising the Queen, who in turn instructed him regarding the 
territory.164  This is clearly an idiosyncratic constitutional arrangement, but the true 
position nevertheless.  Instead Lords Bingham and Hope fenced off a solely legal 
view and disregarded the ministerial advice convention.  This led to an incomplete 
picture of the constitutional arrangements in which monarch appeared in law as 
ultimate decision-maker and the Foreign Secretary her mouthpiece. The logical 
absurdity of this view is clear. 
 
So the courts accept that the Prime Minister or ministers make policy decisions 
rather than the monarch; legal judgments are predicated on this factual reality and 
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the alternative legal view is correspondingly sidelined.  The ministerial advice 
convention must be assumed in order to reach a coherent, realistic decision thus 
casting further doubt upon the certainty of the law-convention distinction.  
Furthermore Bancoult and GCHQ specifically demonstrate two vital points regarding 
the significance of the ministerial advice convention to prime ministerial power 
(including the war power).   First, the concrete quality and silent legal effect of this 
convention provides cogent evidence of the importance of the link between monarch 
and premier in this area.  Though the convention is not explicitly recognised, its 
strength clearly enables a Prime Minister and ministers to freely and directly access 
the monarch‟s legal prerogative powers (including the war power) with ease.  
Second, subtle recognition of the ministerial advice convention has been necessary 
in order to enable the courts to potentially check ministerial power by judicially 
reviewing their actions despite the legal framework which places the monarch as 
decision-maker. 
 
 
[3.2] Collective Cabinet Responsibility 
 
 
Chapter 1 established that in the lead-up to the Iraq war collective Cabinet 
responsibility was weakened or marginalised; this issue will now be investigated in 
further detail.  Paragraph 2(2) of the current Ministerial Code states that Cabinet 
business primarily consists of questions of government which „raise major issues of 
policy or are of critical importance to the public‟;165 this clearly encompasses any 
decision to undertake military action.  Implicit in this provision is that important 
decisions like commencing war will be made by Cabinet (i.e. collectively) in 
confidence.  The convention of collective Cabinet responsibility applies to such 
decisions, requiring Cabinet to act unanimously and maintain the confidentiality of 
business discussed therein.166 
 
Cabinet decisions are binding on all members of the Government167 and thus to 
preserve the appearance of unanimity, ministers must either publicly agree with 
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policy or resign.168  Yet despite provisions of the Ministerial Code which clarify 
certain issues, collective responsibility remains a convention so malleable in nature 
that it is extremely difficult to ascertain its degree of bindingness, whether it is a rule 
or practice etc.  This part will investigate the operation of the convention during the 
lead up to the Iraq decision. 
 
The collectivity of Cabinet decision-making has often spanned the spectrum from 
autocratic to collegiate depending upon a range of factors, for example the political 
support for and individual style of the Prime Minister of the day.  Current evidence 
suggests that the collegiate form of Cabinet was often marginalised over the course 
of the Blair premiership.  An early instance of the marginalisation of this convention 
can be seen at the very outset of Mr Blair‟s premiership when the power to 
determine interest rates was granted to the Bank of England prior to the first Cabinet 
meeting.169  Cabinet ministers were thus afforded no opportunity to discuss or 
evaluate a central policy of the government of which they were a part.  In May 2007 
loyal minister David Blunkett wrote that this method of decision-making would not be 
restricted to isolated incidents: “It is quite clear that not a great deal is going to be 
discussed at Cabinet.  Instead, business is going to be done informally, one to one 
with Tony, or through Cabinet Committees.”170   Blunkett‟s diaries refer to a number 
of subsequent instances where there was a lack of prior consultation with Cabinet, 
sometimes in advance of important decisions.171 
 
More relevant examples occurred in the field of foreign affairs and defence.  In 
keeping with constitutional custom, Mr Blair created War Cabinets prior to Iraq 1998, 
Kosovo in 1999 and the Afghan war in October 2001. This latter War Cabinet 
(officially titled the „Committee on Overseas Policy and Defence‟) was charged with 
the conduct of operations in relation to Afghanistan and Iraq. However, rather than 
these formal bodies, Blair relied on a small circle of close aides to make decisions.172  
Seldon writes that Blair found both full Cabinet and the War Cabinet “‟too formal‟ and 
„insignificantly focussed‟ and so he secretly established a smaller formal meeting 
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before each OPD [War Cabinet]. …. It was this group that was the real decision-
making body.”173  This appears consistent with the account of ex-minister Claire 
Short who has written of Cabinet in the lead-up to Iraq: 
 
“There were frequent informal discussions at Cabinet after the summer 
of 2002 but there were never any papers or proper analysis of the 
underlying dangers and the political, diplomatic and military options.  
The whole crisis was handled by Tony Blair and his entourage with 
considerable informality.”174 
 
Short argues that „no decisions were made in Cabinet‟,175 though this claim has been 
doubted by Seldon176 and was rejected by then Cabinet Secretary Sir Andrew 
Turnbull177 and then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.178  Nevertheless, in its report, 
The Decision to go to War in Iraq, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee expressed concern about the degree of Cabinet and Committee 
engagement in this policy area.179  Further evidence of the sidelining of Cabinet in 
relation to Iraq is present in David Blunkett‟s diaries.  Though Blunkett refers to 
numerous Cabinet discussions regarding Iraq over 2002-3,180 he also claims that in 
March 2003, the month of deployment, he was obtaining information from the media 
rather than Cabinet briefings despite being a member of the War Cabinet.181 
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Additional highly illuminating insights into Cabinet responsibility are included in the 
findings of the July 2004 Butler report.182  It found that Iraq policy was discussed 
frequently in Cabinet the year before the war.  But from April 2002 this shifted to 
small group discussions and decisions made outside of Cabinet,183 which effectively 
limited Cabinet discussion and replaced it with frequent oral briefings;184 such 
briefings are surely qualitatively different to the substantive probing and debate 
which convention indicates should occur in Cabinet.  The Butler Report concluded 
“we are concerned that the informality and circumscribed character of the 
Government‟s procedures which we saw in the context of policy-making towards Iraq 
risks reducing the scope for informed collective political judgement.”185  Implicit in this 
statement is the down-grading and indirect circumvention of Cabinet.  Hennessy 
goes further, claiming that Butler‟s „trenchant and fundamental criticism‟ of the 
serving Blair government was unprecedented.186 
 
The Butler Report is integral because it underscored the potential dangers of 
informal processes and failure to effectively share information in Cabinet.  Such 
failures undermined collective Cabinet responsibility during Iraq in two ways.  First, 
they negatively impacted upon accountability187 and secondly critical appraisal of 
vital decision-making was impaired so that Cabinet became a „rubber-stamping‟ 
forum rather than a hub of informed, substantive policy-creation.  Former Cabinet 
Secretary Lord Wilson elaborates on the implications thus: “the risk is that informality 
can slide into something more fluid and unstructured, where advice and dissent may 
either not always be offered or else may not be heard.  This is certainly a matter 
which engages collective responsibility.”188  Lord Wilson‟s remarks appear to be 
supported by Robin Cook who confirmed that there was plenty of time to discuss Iraq 
in Cabinet „but most in Cabinet had lost the habit of dissent.‟189  Nevetheless, the link 
between informal processes and the marginalisation of collective Cabinet 
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responsibility is challenged by Blunkett who has defended the Blair Cabinet against 
Butler‟s accusations.  He disputes the report‟s claims that more formality would have 
led to a „correct‟ decision, claiming that such procedural rigidity would have impeded 
the efficiency and progress of government.190 
 
Overall it is clear that Blair‟s preference was often for tight-knit, informal group 
decision-making outside of Cabinet; this is viewed by Seldon as one key feature of 
his premiership,191 a feature that facilitated what Foley has called „prime ministerial 
detachment from Cabinet‟192 and arguably led to a „systems failure‟ of Cabinet 
government in relation to Iraq as Chapter 1 outlined.193  Vitally the available evidence 
suggests that major decisions regarding Iraq were also detached from Cabinet along 
with the premier.  It seems that this characteristic inevitably impacted upon the 
convention of collective responsibility during the Iraq affair in the ways discussed 
above.  However it had another significant consequence identified by ex-minister 
Clare Short:  
 
“The term collective responsibility is now being used to demand loyalty 
to decisions on which Cabinet members were not consulted, let alone 
that were reached collectively.”194   
 
This statement indicates that the convention has the capacity to morph from a 
constitutional check which ensures vital decisions are made collectively, into a 
potential source of prime ministerial strength vis-à-vis his ministerial colleagues.  It is 
a view not merely held by aggrieved former ministers; Sir Christopher Foster has 
similarly claimed that because of the informality of the Cabinet system “the 
convention of collective responsibility has altered from an agreement not to disagree 
publicly after there had been Cabinet discussion, or the opportunity for one, into a 
binding discipline to accept the prime minister‟s decisions, even where there had 
been no opportunity for serious discussion.”195  So the unanimity requirement may 
act to bind ministers to decisions that they may have had little opportunity to discuss 
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or properly judge.  The flexibility and inchoate nature of the convention enables this 
distortion and its non-legal status ensures that the courts are unconcerned with such 
developments.  However it must be noted that collective Cabinet responsibility was 
not entirely ineffectual during the Iraq affair; the deployment still led to three 
ministerial-level resignations.196  With more comprehensive information and 
discussion in Cabinet would there have been more?  Would affording Cabinet the 
opportunity to act as an „informed‟ forum for discussion have enabled it to act as a 
more effective political brake upon Mr Blair‟s exercise of the war prerogative?  Earl 
Atlee suggests so; in a 2008 Lords debate on the war power he argued that failures 
in Cabinet government were the important issue in Iraq and proposed reforms to the 
war prerogative „do not ... deal with the mischief.‟197  The Iraq-era Cabinet Secretary 
has claimed otherwise, arguing that the failures lay in intelligence, not Cabinet.198 
 
Chapter 4 will investigate Mr Blair‟s exercise of the prime ministerial Cabinet 
chairmanship powers that facilitated the subversion of collective Cabinet 
responsibility.   
 
 
[3.3] Parliamentary Approval of War 
 
 
Chapter 4 will establish that the declaration of war is a decision taken by the 
executive, specifically the Prime Minister, using prerogative power.  The 
endorsement of Parliament in such matters is not legally required, though its support 
is politically essential and it must approve the financial funding of military action.199 
 
Prior to the Blair premiership it had been questioned whether a parliamentary vote 
prior to the deployment of troops was required as a matter of constitutional 
convention.  As Chapter 1 indicated, this became a live issue over the Iraq affair and 
subsequent period and is covered in some detail in the diary of Robin Cook who held 
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the Cabinet position of Leader of the House between June 2001 and March 2003.  
Cook‟s diaries detail his efforts to ensure that Parliament approved the deployment 
of troops in Iraq on a substantive Commons vote (rather than a lesser „adjournment‟ 
vote).200  He claimed the existing position that the decision to deploy troops could be 
taken independently of Parliament was inconsistent with the political reality which 
made parliamentary approval of war imperative for any government.201  Cook reveals 
that he and Blair initially had differing views as to whether a substantive vote was 
appropriate.  Regarding one private discussion about the issue between both men, 
Cook wrote: “I mildly demurred [with Blair], pointing out that the precedents were 
more mixed, and that there was adequate historical precedent for the House getting 
a vote on a substantive motion before the commitment of troops.”202  This incident 
highlights ambiguities that may arise concerning the bindingness of a convention (or 
a potentially emerging one).  Part 2 confirmed that conventions are binding, albeit to 
varying degrees, and it outlined difficulties with this feature.  Two such issues are 
illustrated by Cook‟s account.  First it indicates that the bindingness of the 
„parliamentary approval‟ convention (or quasi-convention) was determined 
subjectively by the relevant politicians whose conduct it potentially regulated, surely 
supporting Hough‟s claim that „conventions are at the kernel of an „insider‟s 
constitution‟‟.203  Uncertainties arose when opinions diverged and individuals viewed 
the precedents differently.  It seems that here the subjective views of bindingness 
held by politicians were of central importance, despite Jaconelli‟s concerns regarding 
the fragility of such foundations.204  A second issue raised by this example is the 
indeterminate scope of the (potential) convention‟s bindingness.  If convention 
required parliamentary approval for military action, what form must that approval 
take?  Could approval be expressed by debate or a vote?  If the latter applied, 
should the vote be procedural or substantive?  So Cook‟s example shows that the 
weight and scope of the convention‟s bindingness appears to vary depending on the 
political context.  Ultimately these matters in relation to the Iraq deployment were 
indeed resolved politically.  Yet interestingly Mr Blair‟s initially preferred view of 
limited parliamentary approval was not the one that prevailed. 
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Cook‟s diaries detail his ongoing behind-the-scenes attempts to secure a Commons 
substantive vote on the deployment of troops.  At a press conference in September 
2002 he publicly stated his view that it would be „inconceivable‟ that Britain could go 
to war without parliamentary consent and cited the vote on the 1991 Gulf War as a 
supporting precedent.205  He reiterated his views to the Commons in early March 
2003.206  Cook‟s tactics succeeded and a Commons vote on the deployment of 
troops in Iraq took place on 18th March 2003.  The vote approved military action,207 
yet Cook wrote:   
 
“Irrespective of the outcome, the very fact that a vote took place at all 
was a major advance.  For the first time in the history of Parliament, 
the Commons formally took the decision to commit Britain to conflict.  
Now that the Commons has established its right to vote on the 
commitment of British troops to action, no future government will find it 
easy to take away again.”208 
 
Is Cook‟s claim correct?  Was the Iraq vote a pyrrhic victory of sorts?  Did the Iraq 
affair witness the strengthening of a practice into a convention?209   
 
Did a convention emerge? 
 
In order to ascertain the status of the parliamentary approval requirement the 
available evidence must be considered.  As one may expect in this area, such 
evidence consists of the subjective views of relevant political players.  Numerous 
individuals have expressed opinions on the matter, including Mr Blair himself.  In 
2005, speaking of the Iraq vote, he told a House of Commons Liaison Committee:  
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“if the urgency of the situation does not demand otherwise, then I 
suspect that [a substantive vote] is what will happen in future conflicts, 
but I do not think that is setting a constitutional precedent strictly.”210 
 
This was a cautious and noncommittal view and indicated that (in Blair‟s opinion) the 
Iraq vote did not represent a significant or permanent constitutional development 
towards increased parliamentary involvement in war decisions.  Upon being pressed 
further Blair revealed the reasons for his view:  
 
“I am slightly reluctant to go and bind whatever future governments 
may do ... I suspect, for political rather than constitutional reasons, that 
will be more like the norm in the future”211 
 
There are two interesting aspects to this statement.  First, it denotes an 
understanding on Blair‟s part that his opinion of the vote may have future 
constitutional consequences for exercise of the war prerogative and may be used as 
a basis for arguments should a dispute regarding a parliamentary vote arise in the 
future.  Second, Mr Blair carefully distinguishes between political and constitutional 
justifications, claiming the former are more significant factors determining whether a 
substantive parliamentary vote will be held on a given occasion.  Again, this is 
arguably an attempt to effectively minimise the potential long-term constitutional 
implications of the Iraq vote.  However, in light of the close interconnection between 
convention and politics, particularly the fact that conventions are moulded by political 
context and mores, it is arguable that the distinction drawn is tenuous and of limited 
practical effect.  Mr Blair‟s view that a convention governing parliamentary approval 
of war does not exist is supported by Lord Falconer.  In his evidence to a House of 
Lords Select Committee in late 2005 the latter stated that “The idea of a convention 
[since the Iraq vote] seems to me to be neither necessary nor supported by history at 
the moment.”212  Lord Falconer therefore conceded that though his view was that a 
convention did not exist, there was a possibility that future constitutional events may 
change this.  His statement emphasises the importance of an accretion of 
precedents upon which to found a convention.  Overall it reflects the fluid and 
inchoate nature of a potentially emerging convention. 
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The alternative views of some leading ministers in the Blair Cabinet indicate that the 
constitutional significance of the Iraq vote was more decisive.  In 2006 Jack Straw 
claimed that the vote „set a clear precedent for the future‟.213  Blair‟s successor, Mr 
Gordon Brown, has also been more receptive to parliamentary involvement in the 
war power and has introduced proposed reforms to be discussed in Chapter 4.  Yet 
even in 2005 during Blair‟s tenure, Mr Brown stated of Iraq: “Now that there has 
been a vote on these issues so clearly and in such controversial circumstances, I 
think it is unlikely, except in the most exceptional circumstances a government would 
choose not to have a vote in Parliament.”214  Though Mr Brown did not make express 
reference to constitutional convention in this passage, he stressed the importance of 
a parliamentary vote (bar exceptional circumstances) in unequivocal terms.  The 
divergence in the views of politicians regarding the status and scope of the 
parliamentary approval „convention‟ demonstrates that subsequent interpretations of 
the Iraq vote are inconclusive, impacting upon the „convention‟ itself.  Nevertheless 
the views of Straw and Brown were corroborated by a decisive development towards 
the end of the Blair era; on 15th May 2007 the House of Commons debated and 
passed a resolution, supported by government, that “This House welcomes the 
precedents set by the Government in 2002 and 2003 in seeking and obtaining the 
approval of the House for its decisions in respect of military action against Iraq; is of 
the view that it is inconceivable that any Government would in practice depart from 
this precedent.”215  It furthermore „call[ed] upon government ... to come forward with 
more detailed [reform] proposals for parliament to consider.‟  This resolution 
represents the most explicit Blair-era recognition that parliamentary approval is a 
pre-requisite to military action.   It was the culmination of ongoing debate and select 
committee investigation.216  Thus the post-Iraq period of Mr Blair‟s premiership 
witnessed an occurrence of parliamentary scrutiny and a crystallisation of the view 
that the war prerogative needed reform.  
 
It is not possible to conclusively establish whether a formal convention existed at the 
end of the Blair premiership.  Though the evidence up until this date is mixed, it does 
seem to tilt in favour of the presence of a consensus that a convention requiring 
parliamentary approval for deployment existed by the time Blair left office.  In any 
event it is clear that most views saw the Iraq vote as „binding‟ in some way, whether 
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politically or constitutionally.  Yet drawing a distinction between the two is artificial; 
ultimately there was a shift towards more concrete parliamentary involvement, 
whether or not the term „convention‟ is used to describe this shift.  Parliamentary 
approval of war has always been a political necessity.  However, by moving towards 
more express statements of the position and potentially extending approval to 
require a substantive vote, the nature of parliamentary involvement arguably 
changed.  This trend constituted a key development concerning the prime ministerial 
war prerogative over the broad Iraq period by emerging as a new, stronger potential 
check on the power.  Of course, whether it forms a practice or convention, 
parliamentary approval of military action in March 2003 was ultimately given, which 
perhaps also indicates the limitations of such a convention as a constitutional check 
on the war prerogative and the extent to which its effectiveness may have been 
undermined by countervailing constitutional features. 
 
Post-Blair reforms 
 
The emerging convention question is vital to the broad Iraq period which is this 
study‟s concern.  However the debate has to an extent been superceded by, and 
should be viewed in light of, post-Blair reform proposals.   Proposed reforms, to be 
discussed in Chapter 4, suggest formalising parliamentary approval of military action 
by written convention,217 though the extent to which conventions can be created by a 
single explicit declaration has been subject to question.218  Furthermore, the inherent 
flexibility of constitutional conventions is one reason why some individuals favour 
placing parliamentary involvement on a statutory footing.219  These reforms will be 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
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[4] Analysis 
 
 
Parts 1-3 of this chapter have explored the nature of conventions in detail and 
provided an account of the three vital conventions that played a role in prime 
ministerial exercise of the war prerogative over the course of the Iraq affair.  The two 
analytical devices outlined in the introduction will now be applied to the preceding 
discussion in order to obtain deeper insight into the operation of conventions in 
relation to the premier‟s war power.  
 
 
[4.1] Conventions and the Discrepancy Between the 
Constitutional Framework and Reality 
 
 
[4.1.1] The Distinctions Identified 
 
This chapter has identified and investigated two vital disparities between law and 
constitutional reality of the war prerogative: first the monarch exercises the war 
prerogative at law though in reality it is exercised by the Prime Minister, and second 
war can lawfully be declared without parliamentary involvement though in political 
practice its countenance is integral.  Conventions occupy the gap between law and 
practice in both of these examples, namely the „ministerial advice‟ and „parliamentary 
approval‟ conventions respectively. 
 
The Ministerial Advice Convention   
 
The Prime Minister is impotent in law but enjoys de facto access to the monarch‟s 
prerogatives (including war power) by virtue of the ministerial advice convention.  
This convention thus ensures that such decisions are in effect diverted from the 
hereditary monarch to elected politicians.  So a contradiction between law and reality 
here is clearly present; a different individual exercises the power depending on 
whether the position is viewed at law or in practice.  This contradiction extends to the 
normative basis of each position; the political-conventional view reflects the 
democratic reality of government, yet the legal outlook remains rooted in traditions of 
monarchy, an issue that was considered in Chapter 2.  Judges in a number of cases 
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have struggled with this disparity.  Blair-era cases such as Bancoult (based on 
GCHQ) demonstrate that though the courts do not expressly state they are applying 
the ministerial advice convention, it has on occasion been afforded silent legal effect 
of sorts.  The non-legal ministerial advice convention has legal effect even though 
legal appearances suggest otherwise.  For example, the judgment of Hooper LJ in 
Bancoult [2006]220 refused to resort to  narrow legal fictions which would have led 
him to conclude that the offending Order in Council was that of the Queen herself: 
“To talk of [an executive] act as the act of the sovereign savours the archaism of past 
centuries.”221  Yet if the law had been viewed strictly in isolation, the Order was the 
Queen‟s.  So in order to effectively and coherently resolve the case the court was 
required to take account of wider non-legal political developments or convention.   
Furthermore, when courts have refused to take silent account of the ministerial 
advice convention, as in Quark, it has led to the clearly absurd and factually incorrect 
view that the monarch is ultimate decision-maker.  When implicitly recognised, the 
ministerial advice convention comes to act as a constitutional check on ministers, 
including the Prime Minister, by enabling the court to hold them to account.  Perhaps 
such cases reflect Feldman‟s claim that “the constitution … seems ... to flourish in 
the gaps between appearance and reality: that which is not is made to appear to be, 
and the processes producing that which is will often be disguised by showmanship 
and magic incantations.”222  These constitutional gaps, the realm of conventions, are 
for Feldman an area of great constitutional significance.  The ministerial advice 
convention enables „what is not‟ (a legally powerful Prime Minister) to „appear to be‟ 
and disguises this with „showmanship‟ or ceremony, surely a reference to the ritual 
and spectacle of monarchy.   
 
The Parliamentary Approval Convention  
 
The parliamentary approval „convention‟ acts as a non-legal check upon the legally 
unrestrained monarchical exercise of the war power according to ministerial advice.  
The convention does this by requiring parliamentary support for military action 
notwithstanding the dearth of formal legal provisions to this effect.  The convention 
thus mirrors the political reality that parliamentary support for warfare is imperative.   
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Part 3 established that in the period following the Iraq vote the requirement for 
parliamentary approval of warfare strengthened and arguably achieved the status of 
„convention‟.  Though more formal measures have been proposed in the post-Blair 
era, the trend over the broad Iraq period perhaps reflected a shift in constitutional 
culture towards the ethos that Parliament should act as a stronger potential check by 
playing a greater role in relation to the war prerogative.  In this sense it supports 
Dicey‟s claim that conventions represent an evolving „constitutional morality‟ and will 
be forged by political developments of the time.  The parliamentary approval 
convention thus allowed a change in constitutional mores and practice to be factored 
into the constitution without the need for formal changes to the legal framework 
(though these were later proposed).  Thus by the end of the Blair premiership the 
disparity between law and political reality had ruptured further. 
 
The significance of the „parliamentary approval‟ example is its corroboration of Pierre 
Schlagg‟s claims that what happens in the „gaps‟ between legal rules can be of 
greater significance than rules themselves.  He identifies this area as the „shadow 
law‟, “a huge, constantly rearranging assembly of ties, loyalties, debts and 
obligations … [I]t is the secret economy of the law operating in the interstital spaces 
left by the rational structure of explicit doctrinal law.”223  So the behaviour and 
informal agreements between individuals working within a legal framework is vital, 
and formal rules will have a more limited role to play.  In a constitutional context this 
point is supported by Jennings224 and also Ewing and Bradley who claim “textbooks 
on constitutional law often exaggerate the extent to which rules govern political 
life.”225  The circumvention and distortion of collective Cabinet responsibility during 
the Blair premiership provides another supporting example of such claims; the 
operation of the convention was formed by the action (or inaction) of individual 
ministers, particularly Mr Blair himself.   
 
The parliamentary approval convention provides a second example of a direct 
contradiction between legal framework and political reality.  The former places power 
in an individual hereditary monarch and the latter in a parliament of elected 
representatives.  The contradiction extends to their respective ideological bases, 
namely of hereditary right on the one hand and democracy on the other.  Ultimately 
the legal view of war decisions can only be viewed as coherent and accurate when 
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the parliamentary approval „convention‟ is also taken into account, providing further 
evidence of conventions‟ vital role in enmeshing law in its political context and 
occupying the gulf between law and reality. 
 
 
[4.1.2] The Role of ‘Convention’ in the Disparity 
 
It seems that conventions arguably act to mitigate the cleavage between static legal 
models rooted in earlier centuries and modern developments which have seen 
political practice shift further away from such frameworks.  The view that conventions 
act to bridge the gap between legal form and political reality is shared by a number 
of leading constitutional lawyers.  Feldman subscribes to this view, claiming 
“Conventions of the constitution are means of holding in check the tension between 
the formal, legal appearance of the constitution and the current practice.”226  Here 
Feldman accepts that tensions between the law and practice may exist and that 
conventions have a role (albeit unspecified) in reconciling them.  Similarly Marshall 
makes the distinction between law and reality, writing that conventions „give effect to 
the principles of government accountability‟ and ensure that “accountability is 
allocated in accordance with political reality rather than legal form.”227  A broadly 
consistent view was expressed by Lord Simon in Town Investments228 who stated of 
the Crown: “The legal concept still does not correspond to the political reality.  The 
legal substratum is overlaid by constitutional convention.”229  So conventions create 
and sustain a sub-legal network of arrangements that operate beyond the relatively 
stable legal framework of Crown, a framework that has remained intact across 
centuries.   
 
Yet if it is accepted that conventions operate in constitutional gaps between law and 
reality, it is unclear precisely how they do this.  Preceding discussion indicates that 
perhaps constitutional academics have inadvertently adopted the term „convention‟ 
to explain the discrepancies between constitutional form and practice.  Conventions 
in this sense are best understood as the constitutional terminology that lawyers use 
to explain real-life deviations from the legal framework (such as why the Prime 
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Minister and not the legal holder of the prerogative always makes such decisions in 
reality).  The very nature of conventions tends to support this proposition in that they 
vary greatly from one another across a variety of features and differences are often a 
matter of degree.  Leading understandings are deficient and it is difficult to force all 
conventions into any meaningful, definitive all-encompassing lawyerly definition.  As 
a result, the same definition is applied to conventions such as ministerial advice and 
collective Cabinet responsibility despite their clearly disparate natures.   
 
The proposition that „convention‟ is a term utilised to explain or reconcile disparities 
between law and political reality has important implications for constitutional 
understanding of the premier and war power.  It must be questioned whether the 
concept of „convention‟ is viable per se or whether it merely thinly veils an 
inconvenient, chaotic „multiplicity of facts‟.230  If the latter is correct, this may result in 
potentially greater room for manoeuvre for Prime Ministers in two ways; first by 
glossing over important distinctions between vastly different conventions, and 
second by concealing the subtle political dynamics that may allow some less rigid 
conventions (such as collective Cabinet responsibility) to be emasculated by the 
actions of individuals whose conduct they are meant to regulate.  However, more 
positively the use of „convention‟ as a generic term ensures that the mismatch 
between legal labels and reality is by no means fatal.  „Convention‟ offers a 
convenient means to make sense of the divergence between constitutional law and 
political reality of central government and prevents the former from being 
misrepresentative, incoherent and removed from reality.  So conventions provide an 
explanation of how the premier actually exercises war and related prerogative but 
beyond this their utility is difficult to ascertain. 
 
 
[4.2] The Role of Boundaries in Relation to Conventions 
 
 
Boundaries between law and non-law play an important role in prevailing 
understandings of constitutional conventions.  Part 2.1.4 established that the courts 
are keen to maintain a clear distinction between law and non-legal conventions 
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(notwithstanding their inadvertent acceptance of the ministerial advice convention 
discussed at Part 3.1) 
 
Conventions are clearly not equivalent to laws, but perhaps the sharp distinction 
using positivist models is misleading in this area.  The rigid positivist approach 
creates formal distinctions that may in limited cases be of practical use to lawyers in 
courts who are solely concerned with identifying a valid law. However, such formal 
distinctions are perhaps unduly narrow when attempting to obtain an accurate and 
realistic picture of the constitution itself.  The positivist model explicitly and artificially 
eliminates normative features from consideration, yet these are arguably a central 
feature of conventions and the context of law.  The positivist model acts to exclude 
and marginalise conventions, yet these bear more resemblance to constitutional 
reality and are the primary method of regulation at the constitutional apex.  By 
claiming to exclude conventions from their sphere the courts are effectively excluding 
themselves from becoming engaged in the maintenance, clarification, development 
and enforcement of conventions and therefore the activities of central government.  
The predominance of positivist models in judicial views of convention therefore tacitly 
protects the Prime Minister and central government from greater scrutiny and 
enables conventions to be bypassed or moulded to political preferences or 
necessities.231  But if dominant positivist models are left aside then the position is 
arguably more blurred than many theorists assume.  Munro warns against overrating 
the strength of conventions or blurring the distinction with laws; this could be 
dangerous.232  He states that maintaining a distinction need not involve overlooking 
conventions.233  This is arguably correct, yet the consequence of the positivist model 
is that for lawyers concerned with law, deeming conventions „non-law‟ inevitably 
marginalises them.234  The absurd implication of this was seen in Quark where law 
maintained its „internal purity‟235 at the cost of coherence.  
 
So maintaining of the law/convention distinction relies on what Margaret Davies calls 
the „oppressive purity of legal thought‟236 and forms an example of law‟s concern with 
eliminating non-law from its ambit.  Davies claims that “the iniquitous thing about law 
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at the present time is the myths of its purity, closure and fixity: the blind insistence 
that „proper‟ law is separate from the other sorts of norms which order society.”237  
Mainstream academic and judicial views of conventions clearly demonstrate this 
approach in action and further illustration of this ethos is provided by the war 
prerogative caselaw discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
It is not suggested that prevailing views of the law-convention distinction are always 
erroneous.  Indeed laws and conventions are clearly different in nature in that 
conventions are not directly or expressly enforced in courts.  However, it is arguable 
that conventions do have the capacity for indirect or silent legal effect which blurs the 
distinction, particularly if the dominant positivist models that prevail in this area are 
departed from.  Ultimately, the distinction between law and convention must be 
viewed in light of their symbiotic relationship: “The laws of the constitution could 
stand alone, although the constitution would then be antiquated and static; but the 
conventions would be meaningless without their legal context.  Every constitutional 
convention is closely related to some law or laws, which it implies.”238  This does not 
necessarily involve the claim that the positivist approach is obsolete.  But it does 
indicate that the dominant positivist method of viewing the constitution (and 
conventions) is not the only analytical method available. If the area is considered 
from alternative (but equally valuable) jurisprudential perspectives it may lead to the 
conclusion that some mainstream assumptions about conventions are not set in 
stone.  By adopting (for example) an alternative Dworkinian view it seems that in 
some respects the difference between law and convention is not so apparent.  So 
the clarity and extent of the distinction between law and convention is actually 
dependent upon the jurisprudential model that is adopted.  Yet even the adoption of 
an apparently neutral, apolitical positivist model is not a value-neutral decision as it 
involves preferencing one outlook above others. In Chapter 5 it will be seen that rigid 
adherence to positivist ideals separating law from non-law is itself a political stance 
of sorts which has political consequences.  As Phillips, summarising the work of 
Freeman, states “mischief [is] done, not only to our understanding of history but to 
the course of history itself, by lawyers‟ interpretations and lawyers‟ ways of looking at 
things … [particularly] the natural tendency of the legal mind towards conservatism 
and deference to authority.”239  Ultimately, it seems at the very least appropriate to 
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view any distinction between law and convention in light of their inherently reciprocal 
relationship. 
99 
 
Chapter Four 
Prerogative and Prime Minister 
 
 
 
The focus of this study is the war prerogative, just one of a range of prerogative 
powers which are exercisable by the Prime Minister.  In order to fully understand the 
war prerogative it is necessary to understand the various individual powers 
prerogative affords the premier as well as the nature of that power itself.  The office 
of Prime Minister entitles its holder to what has been called a „formidable battery‟1 of 
personal powers, nearly all of which are exercised by virtue of the ancient 
„prerogative‟ which emanates from the Crown.  The prerogative, or „royal 
prerogative‟, „with its roots in the age of divine right‟2 is in essence what remains of 
the absolute monarchical authority that once ruled Great Britain, though now 
relatively diminished from these once omnipotent proportions.  It is comprised of 
customary powers which have remained intact despite centuries of constitutional 
whittling by events such as Glorious Revolution and the Bill of Rights in the 
seventeenth century3 and statutory and judicial developments in the twentieth.  
Despite such changes, “Prerogative remains central to the way Britain is governed 
today, both symbolically and practically”,4 leading a 2004 Select Committee to 
suggest that „the case for reform [of the significant prerogative powers] is 
unanswerable.‟5 
 
Prerogative is exercised in two forms, though the legal status of each is identical.6  
Firstly, prerogative power can be exercised directly in the name of the Crown, 
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usually in the form of a decision or command by a premier or government minister.  
Alternatively, prerogative power can be exercised by an „Order in Council‟.  This 
second mode is effected with the additional procedural formality of being approved 
by a meeting of the Privy Council, though this is essentially a „rubber stamping‟ 
exercise.7  In the words of Sedley LJ, “The recital [on Orders in Council] that ... [they] 
are made by Her Majesty „by and with the advice of her Privy Council‟ is purely 
formal: in reality the Privy Council play no role beyond the placing by one of its 
members, a minister, of the instrument before the Monarch, who is called upon by 
constitutional convention to approve it.”8  Prerogatives relating to matters such as 
regulation of the armed forces tend to be exercised by way of Order in Council. 
 
Prerogative, then, is the collection of powers vested in the Crown that are recognised 
by common law as constitutional custom.  In keeping with their monarchical origins, 
many of these Crown powers continue to be exercised by the monarch at law.  
However, in constitutional reality their use is now directed by Prime Minister and 
Cabinet by virtue of a web of conventions that effectively ensures de facto ministerial 
control.  As outlined in Chapter 3, the „paramount‟ convention of the British 
constitution requires the monarch to exercise her prerogatives according to the 
advice of Cabinet ministers, especially the Prime Minister,9 thus ensuring political 
leadership is undertaken by democratically elected individuals.  Nevertheless, the 
inherently monarch-based character of prerogative powers requires a degree of 
interaction between the Queen and Her ministers.  
 
This chapter first briefly considers the nature of prerogative power itself by detailing 
the two alternative views of prerogative among leading constitutional theorists; the 
first depicting it in narrow terms, and the second ascribing it a more expansive ambit.  
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It then outlines the prerogative powers specifically enjoyed by the Prime Minister with 
particular attention to the war prerogative.  Discussion of these prerogatives draws 
upon caselaw and salient examples of Mr Blair‟s exercise of such powers in relation 
to his use of the war power as outlined in Chapter 1.  Finally this chapter considers 
the divergences between law and practice and the role of boundaries that have 
become apparent from the preceding discussion.  The account of prerogative at 
common law discussed here forms an important grounding for Chapter 5 which 
investigates the war and related prerogatives over the broad period of the Iraq affair. 
 
 
 
[1] Legal Views of Prerogative  
 
 
An initial account of the nature of the prerogative and its status at law is required in 
order to establish a detailed understanding of its nature.  Generally, two conflicting 
views of prerogative exist.10  Debate surrounds which of these accounts most 
accurately depicts prerogative powers.  Definitions remain „far from clear cut‟11  and 
uncertainty exists because, like the conventions that regulate them, the nature and 
scope of prerogative powers are largely unrecorded. 
 
 
[1.1] Narrow Prerogative   
 
 
The „narrow‟ view of prerogative originates from the writings of William Blackstone in 
the eighteenth Century who viewed prerogative in strict terms as:  
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102 
 
“That special pre-eminence, which the king hath, over and above all 
other persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in 
right of his regal dignity.”12 
 
A vital characteristic of Blackstone‟s prerogative was that it only encompassed 
“those rights and capacities which the king enjoys alone, in contradistinction to 
others, and not to those which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects”.13  The 
essence of this definition is that prerogatives are unique powers particular to the 
monarch by virtue of his position and exercisable by him only.  It distinguishes the 
monarch from „others‟ and prerogative powers from „ordinary‟ powers that other 
subjects may also enjoy.  This would obviously include prerogative powers such as 
dissolving Parliament and bestowing honours which regular individuals do not 
possess.  By implication, this is a tight rendering of prerogative. 
 
The leading modern adherent of Blackstone‟s thesis is Wade who also advocates 
prerogative in its „narrow sense‟.  Wade defines prerogative as “a bundle of 
miscellaneous powers and rights which are inherent in the Crown and no-one else”.14  
He subscribes to Blackstone‟s proposal that such powers are “unique to the Crown 
and are possessed by no subject”,15 and puts forward a two stage test for 
determining a genuine prerogative power: 
 
“(a)does it produce effects at common law, and (b) is it unique to the 
Crown and not shared with other persons?”16 
 
True prerogative therefore emanates from the Crown and is restricted to specific 
immunities and privileges of political or constitutional importance.  For Wade 
prerogative represents a precise set of powers.  Yet one problem with Wade‟s 
definition is that it is tight to the point of being unduly restrictive.  For example, the 
first requirement of his two stage test, namely that a prerogative must produce 
effects at common law, rules out many widely accepted Crown prerogatives.  Wade 
admits this, and states that entering into international treaties and selection of 
Cabinet personnel are commonly misclassified as prerogatives when they are not.17  
But these powers are inexorably entwined with the Crown and synonymous with 
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executive activity making such a claim highly questionable.  Wade nevertheless 
claims that his definition does encompass the war prerogative because its exercise 
impacts upon the common law.  Thus in any event the war power is universally 
categorised as a prerogative power. 
 
 
[1.2] Wider Diceyan Prerogative 
 
 
The second „wider‟ view of prerogative encompasses the narrow prerogatives (as 
defined by Blackstone and Wade) and a vast area beyond these.  A V Dicey, sage of 
the British constitution, is the leading adherent of this view.  In characteristically 
positivist terms, he claimed:  
 
“The prerogative appears to be both historically and as a matter of fact 
nothing else than the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, 
which at any time is legally left in the hands of the Crown.”18 
 
Dicey‟s definition is couched in negative terms; he views prerogative as all 
government authority that remains free from the legal encroachments of statute and 
common law.  This is epitomised by his use of the word „residue‟, a term that has 
since been widely adopted by generations of constitutional lawyers to describe the 
character of prerogative.  It could be argued, however, that though the word „residue‟ 
is technically correct, its connotations of insignificance or sparsity are misleading.  
On this Diceyan definition, prerogative can be viewed in Millsian terms as a vast 
sphere of action, within which the government enjoys the ability to exercise its 
authority or use its discretion as it sees fit (albeit within legal boundaries).  This is 
supported by another of Dicey‟s statements: 
 
“Every act which the executive government can lawfully do without the 
authority of the Act of Parliament is done in virtue of this prerogative.”19 
 
Again Dicey‟s statement about prerogative begins in expansive, all encompassing 
terms by taking „every government act‟ as his starting point.  However, there are two 
restrictions applied to limit the scope of prerogative.  Firstly, any government power 
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which emanates from statute is excluded.  Statute provides an alternative and 
superior source of authority for government action, namely parliamentary 
sovereignty.  Prerogative power is extra-statutory.  The second, and perhaps more 
subtle, of Dicey‟s requirements is the element of lawfulness.  At all times government 
must adhere to the ordinary laws of the land.20  Prerogative cannot ever empower 
ministers to exercise authority beyond this domain.  Reflected in this second 
limitation is the rule of law; the procedural ideal that Dicey propounded as a guiding 
light and fundamental tenet of the British constitution.21  This second requirement in 
Dicey‟s formulation is very interesting.  It is in keeping with the spirit of the British 
constitution, which had traditionally viewed individual liberty in negative terms.  There 
existed a thread of common law reasoning that the individual was entitled to do 
anything that was not prevented by the law: “England, it may be said, is not a country 
where everything is forbidden except what is expressly permitted: it is a country 
where everything is permitted except what expressly forbidden”.22  By viewing 
prerogative as residual, this principle is extended to government.  
 
It is clear that according to Dicey‟s definition prerogative is a highly flexible form of 
power.  Dicey casts the prerogative as a fluid entity operating between two core 
constitutional pillars: the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty.  He does this by 
viewing prerogative as providing authority for any government activity except where 
a statutory power already exists (because parliamentary law is sovereign) or where 
an act is already forbidden by law (because the rule of law applies to government 
officials as well as individuals).  So prerogative is what remains after these two 
fundamental constitutional pillars have been accounted for.  As Sedley has perhaps 
optimistically commented: “Once … the prerogative is grasped in its modern form as 
being not a historic residue of extra legal power held by the executive government, 
but the power, within the law, to fill constitutional spaces and exercise governmental 
choice, it takes place within and not beyond the rule of law.”23 
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So the prerogative, when viewed residually, allows government to undertake a vast 
range of extra-statutory activities including all of the premier‟s powers to be detailed 
in Parts 2 and 3 of this chapter.  Additionally, all other extra-statutory, lawful activities 
that government shares with its citizens, such as the ability to enter into binding 
contracts or to employ personnel (essentially, the ability to do anything the law does 
not forbid) are also included within Dicey‟s residual „prerogative‟.  Unlike the narrow 
definitions which focus on what prerogative is, Dicey‟s conception of prerogative is 
defined by what it is not, or what it cannot be; it is not statutory and it cannot 
authorise unlawful actions.  It will always be possible to determine with relative 
certainty whether executive activity is authorised by a statute, and whether such 
activities are unlawful.   By being able to claim with certainty what the law is, one can 
state with similar certainty the prerogative is not.  This is perhaps why the Diceyan 
view is the more widely accepted of the two views.  Within these wide boundaries, 
prerogative can authorise any government act.24  This can be contrasted with the 
narrow view of prerogative which cannot account for the extra-statutory no-man‟s-
land of arbitrary authority that exists between „core‟ prerogative and unlawfulness.25  
 
The extraordinary scope for government action that Diceyan prerogative authorises 
is evident, and has been subject to criticism.  Zellick, for example, claims that   
 
“If the official and the citizen are treated alike, it follows that he is not 
only constrained when the citizen is constrained but that he is 
unrestrained where the citizen is unrestrained.  Herein lies the mischief 
of this doctrine.”26 
 
Such problems were highlighted by the case of Malone,27 at which much of Zellick‟s 
criticism was directed.  Here the court was required to determine whether the Home 
Secretary had acted ultra vires when he authorised the telephone tap of a suspected 
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criminal using prerogative power.  At the time, such activity was not prevented by 
any specific legislation or privacy right, leading Megarry VC to the following 
conclusion:  
 
“If the tapping of telephones by the Post Office at the request of the 
police can be carried out without any breach of the law, it does not 
require any statutory or common law power to justify it: it can be done 
simply because there is nothing to make it unlawful.”28 
 
Despite a subsequent contrary European Court of Human Rights judgment29 Malone 
highlights shortcomings in the Diceyan formulation of prerogative in that it enabled 
prerogative to authorise and legitimise surreptitious government activity merely 
because no legislation expressly prohibited the conduct. 
 
The Diceyan view has been subject to additional criticisms.  For example, Lord 
Lester has accused it of “fail[ing] to have regard not only to the United Kingdom‟s 
obligations under the European Convention [of Human Rights] but also to the 
modern constitutional position of public authorities, including ministers and their 
departments.”30  More relevant in the context of this study is Cohn‟s criticism that a 
Diceyan-based view of prerogative makes formal regulation of government power 
more difficult: “Arbitrariness and covert practices are more likely to flourish in an 
informal climate, rendering review and other accountability channels less effective.”31 
The extent to which this is the case in relation to the war and related prerogatives 
has been discussed in preceding chapters and will be considered further in Chapter 
5. 
 
Despite such shortcomings, Dicey‟s influence can be detected running through 
numerous influential judgments.  It was unanimous approval by the Law Lords in 
Burmah,32 despite Lord Reid stating “The definition of Dicey ... always quoted with 
approval ... does not take us very far.  It is extremely difficult to be precise”.33  
Dicey‟s view has also been cited in the leading cases on prerogative, De Keyser‟s 
                                                 
28
 Ibid, Megarry VC 367. 
29
 Malone v United Kingdom [1984] 7 EHRR 14.  Here the European Court of Human Rights found that 
UK law had violated the applicant‟s Article 8 right to respect for his private life.  This was because the 
law did not clearly set out the scope and nature of the power and failed to protect against arbitrary 
interferences with private life 
30
 A Lester & M Weait, „The Use of Ministerial Powers without Parliamentary Authority: the Ram 
Doctrine‟ [2003] P.L. 415, p 421. 
31
 Cohn (n 10) 116.  
32
 Burmah Oil Company v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 (HL).  See judgments of Lord Reid, p75; 
Viscount Radcliffe, p117; Lord Hodson, p137; Lord Pearce, p148; Lord Upjohn, p165. 
33
 Ibid Lord Reid, p 75.  Approved by Waller LJ in Bancoult, CA (n 8) para 82. 
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Royal Hotel34 and GCHQ,35 and continues to impact upon more recent cases of Fire 
Brigades Union,36 Northumbria Police Authority,37 Hooper38 and Bancoult [2008].39  
This is indicative of what Wade terms the judicial addiction to the „free and easy‟ 
Diceyan conception of prerogative.40  
 
The influence of Diceyan prerogative extends beyond the courts.  For example it was 
adopted by a 2004 House of Commons Select Committee.41  More significantly the 
recently publicised long-standing Civil Service „Ram Doctrine‟ which set out the 
position regarding ministerial powers states that a “Minister of the Crown ... may ... 
exercise any powers that the Crown has power to exercise, except so far as he is 
precluded from doing so by statute.  In other words, in the case of a Government 
Department, one must look at the statutes to see what it may not do ... the governing 
principle is that an express statutory provision is not necessary to enable a Minister 
to exercise functions.”42  This statement of government executive powers is 
consistent with the Diceyan view.43   
 
 
                                                 
34
 Attorney General v De Keyser‟s Royal Hotel Limited [1920] AC 508, Lord Dunedin p 526.  But 
contrast this view with the judgment of Lord Parmoor who subscribes to the „narrower‟ view, pp 571-
2.  
35
 Council of Civil Service Unions & Others v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374, HL.  Hereinafter 
referred to as GCHQ. 
36
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union & Others [1995] 2 AC 
513, HL, Lord Birkenhead at p 573. 
37
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1989] QB 26, 
CA.  Nourse LJ: “It is important to remember that the Royal prerogative was never regarded as a 
collection of mere powers to be exercised or not at the will of the sovereign.”  p 56.  
38
 R (on the application of Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 29, All 
ER(D) 60 (May) HL, specifically Lord Hoffman, para 46.  Though see Laws LJ in R v Somerset 
County Council, ex parte Fewings [1995] 1 All ER 513 which provides a counter-example where the 
court held that government must point to positive laws to justify its actions. 
39
 Bancoult, HL (n 8).  Here the Diceyan definition was adopted by Lord Bingham (para 69) and Lord 
Mance (para 141).  But see Carnwath LJ in Shrewsbury v Secretary of State (n 25). 
40
 Wade (n 14) 194. 
41
 Taming the Prerogative (n 4) para 3. 
42
 Lester & Weait (n 30). 
43
 For a discussion and analysis of the Ram doctrine see ibid.   
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[2] Significant Prerogative Powers of the Prime 
Minister in the Iraq Affair 
 
 
Despite their ancient roots prerogative powers continue to be integral to the modern 
office of Prime Minister.  Such is their importance to government that in 1993 Prime 
Minister John Major in parliamentary questions claimed “it would be impracticable, 
and would lead to disproportionate cost, to list all the occasions when action was 
taken under the prerogative.”44  Furthermore, it is testament to their importance that 
many controversies regarding the Blair premiership have involved prerogative 
powers in some capacity.45  As with constitutional conventions, a definitive list of 
„core‟ prerogatives is unattainable.  Radcliffe in Laker Airlines46 claimed that “in our 
history the prerogatives of the Crown have been many and various, and it would not 
be possible to embrace them under a single description”,47  a view later reiterated by 
the Lord Privy Seal.48  Nevertheless a 2004 Commons Select Committee did attempt 
to list the main prerogative powers and called for a definitive inventory of government 
prerogatives to be produced.49  The government later commenced a cross-
departmental review of prerogative powers.50  Though, according to Lord Reid, “It is 
not easy to discover and decide the law regarding the royal prerogative and the 
consequences of its exercise”,51 the following prerogative powers exercisable 
according to the advice of the premier can be identified with relative certainty: 
 
 
                                                 
44
 Quoted by B Hadfield, „Judicial Review and the Prerogative Powers of the Crown‟ in Sunkin & Payne 
(n 11) 204.  For a similar statement by Tony Blair see Taming the Prerogative (n 4) para 43. 
45
 See Introduction. 
46
 Laker Airways Limited v Department of Trade and Industry [1977] QB 643. 
47
 Ibid 114.  See also the comments of Nourse LJ: “It has not at any stage in our history been practicable 
to identify all the prerogative powers of the Crown.  It is only by a process of piecemeal decision over 
a period of centuries that particular powers are seen to exist or not to exist, as the case may be.”   
Northumbria Police Authority (n 37) 56.   
48
 “The government shares the view of Wade and Bradley, in their work on constitutional law, that it is 
not possible to give a comprehensive catalogue of prerogative powers.”  Quoted in Halsbury‟s (n 9) 
para 367 footnote.   
49
 Taming the Prerogative (n 4) paras 59-60 and written evidence Ev 13-14. 
50
 “The Government is conducting an internal scoping exercise of the executive prerogative powers – 
those which remain in use and those which have been superseded  in whole or in part by statute ... The 
Government will consider the outcome of this work and will, in the coming months, launch a 
consultation on the next steps.”  Lord Chancellor & Secretary of State for Justice, „The Governance of 
Britain – Constitutional Renewal‟ (Cm 7342-I, II & III 2008) vol I, para 246. 
51
 Burmah Oil (n 32) 99. 
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[2.1] Power to Appoint Cabinet Ministers  
 
 
[2.1.1] The Appointment Power: General Points 
 
Constitutionally, it is the monarch‟s proper role to appoint ministers, yet convention 
dictates that She must exercise this prerogative according to the Prime Minister‟s 
recommendations.52  Therefore, indirectly, prerogative allows a Prime Minister 
almost complete control over the personnel of his Cabinet.  It allows the office holder 
the technical capacity to appoint and dismiss Cabinet ministers at will, reflecting “the 
legal position that Ministers are appointed and hold office at the pleasure of the 
Crown.”53    In a wider context, the power of government appointments ensures the 
Prime Minister solid House of Commons support of at least 95 of his ministers54 who 
are obliged to support government policy by virtue of the convention of collective 
responsibility.  
 
Nevertheless, there remain practical and political restraints on a premier‟s use of the 
prerogative to appoint and dismiss ministers.  The exercise will frequently involve a 
political balancing act taking into account factors such as the need to reconcile 
diverging opinions within party, the need to maintain political alliances and to avoid 
opposing counter-alliances.55   Ultimately, the premier‟s advice to the monarch will 
rest largely upon the political climates of the day and the behaviour of politicians.  
Kier sums up the position by claiming “How far … [the Prime Minister] is effectively in 
a position to impose his own choice is of course dependent on circumstances, 
personal and otherwise, which hardly lend themselves to constitutional analysis.”56  
Despite such limitations, the premier‟s power to appoint and dismiss Cabinet 
ministers is clearly a political asset, affording a position of relative predominance vis-
a-vis his party in Parliament and individual Cabinet ministers.   
 
                                                 
52
 Halsbury‟s (n 9) paras 21, 394. 
53
 R Brazier, Ministers of the Crown (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) p 205. 
54
 The House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975, Section 2(1)-(2) indirectly prevents the 
appointment of more than 95 ministers by providing that if the number of ministers exceeds this 
threshold the excess shall not be entitled to vote in the Commons. 
55
 A H Brown, „Prime Ministerial Power (Part 1)‟ [1968] P.L. 28, p. 37; H Laski, Reflections on the 
Constitution (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1997) p 98; R Brazier, Constitutional Practice 
(3
rd
 edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) p 63. 
56
 D L Kier, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain since 1485 (9
th
 edn, Adam & Charles Black, 
London, 1975) p 499. 
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Examples of Mr Blair‟s exercise of the „Cabinet personnel‟ prerogative over the 
course of his premiership are extensive and a definitive account is beyond the scope 
of this study.  Instead this Part will consider the potential significance of this 
prerogative to Mr Blair‟s exercise of the war prerogative in Iraq.  In matters of war, 
the premier will work with the Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and the Attorney 
General, all of whom are ministers that he has appointed and who play significant 
roles in decisions to undertake military action.  Chapters 1 explained how the 
ministerial role of the Attorney-General in particular was a significant factor in the 
Iraq decision. 
 
 
[2.1.2] Prime Ministerial Appointment of the Attorney General 
 
Mr Blair appointed Lord Goldsmith to the post of Attorney General in 2001.  By virtue 
of his appointment power a premier will inevitably occupy a position of relative 
hegemony in relation to the Attorney General, though the strength of this 
predominance will vary according to political climates and alliances.  
 
The Attorney General is a government minister,57 though his role can be divided into 
two categories of duty: legal and ministerial.58  The office has „traditionally been at 
the junction of law and politics in England and Wales‟59 and a recent Commons 
select committee identified resulting „tensions‟ in this dual role.60  One of the 
Attorney‟s primary official duties is legal adviser to the Crown61 and this was his 
formal role in the Iraq affair.  This responsibility is „non-ministerial‟, is „not subject to 
collective responsibility‟ and requires the A-G to „act independently of the 
Government.‟62  However in evidence to a recent House of Lords committee, 
                                                 
57
 Select Committee on the Constitution, „Reform of the Office of Attorney General‟, HL (2007-8) 93, 
paras 8-9. 
58
 Ibid para 22. 
59
 Ibid para 1. 
60
 Ibid para. 55. 
61
 Ibid paras 4-5.  See also Constitutional Affairs Committee, „Constitutional Role of the Attorney 
General‟, HC (2006-7) 306, paras 11, 68. 
62
 Reform of the Office of Attorney General, ibid para 9.  The sequence of events set out in here and in 
Chapter 1, Part 1.5 appears prima facie at odds with Lord Goldsmith‟s comments on the A-G role to a 
2006 Lords committee: “it is not the Attorney-General‟s job to construct a legal case for a policy 
which in fact does not have a proper legal base ... It is the job of the Attorney-General to give his best 
and honest opinion of whether or not the course of action which he is being asked to advise on is 
lawful or not.” Waging War: Parliament‟s Role and Responsibility (n 3) para 34. 
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Professor Jowell questioned whether such independence on the part of an Attorney 
is possible when his role as a member of government is at least partly political.63 
 
Full information about discussions between the Prime Minister and Lord Goldsmith in 
the crucial February to March 2003 period is not currently available.  However two 
facts can be stated with relative certainty.  First the Attorney did change the nature 
and tone of his legal advice within a brief timeframe, and second, as leader of the 
government of which the A-G was a member, the Prime Minister was in a position to 
exert influence upon him (whether this was done or not).64  It cannot be conclusively 
established whether or not Mr Blair did place political pressure on Lord Goldsmith.  
However, as Jowell states, „the appearance of [the Attorney‟s] lack of independence 
is what matters.‟65  Jowell goes on to argue that the A-G‟s dual role „induces an 
appearance of partisanship‟ and potentially offends the rule of law and the 
separation of powers.66  The transgression of these principles was demonstrated in 
the Iraq affair where the Attorney ultimately declared the actions of the government 
(of which he was a member) internationally lawful.  It is therefore arguable that the 
Prime Minister‟s de facto prerogative power to appoint the Attorney General as a 
minister of his government may have played a discernible role in enabling him to 
secure the deployment of troops (which was entirely reliant upon a clear statement of 
legality).67  Mr Blair may have been able to exert influence or persuasion to ensure 
that Lord Goldsmith produced legal advice in support of his preferred exercise of the 
war prerogative.  Vitally it was Lord Goldsmith‟s amended advice upon which 
Parliament voted to approve war on 18th March 2003.  This advice also proved 
significant in the context of prerogative caselaw and is discussed further in Chapter 
5. 
 
                                                 
63
 Reform of the Office of Attorney General, ibid paras 32-33.  See also the comments of Professor 
Bradley at ibid para 36.  Elsewhere, Jowell expresses support for an independent, non-party Attorney 
General; Public Administration Select Committee, „Constitutional Renewal: Draft Bill and White 
Paper‟, HC (2007-08) 499, para 83.   
64
 As Chapter 1, Part 1.5 confirmed, a 2008 House of Lords Select Committee report stated: “The 
differences between the original advice and [that] ... disclosed at the time gave rise to speculation that 
the Attorney General had been placed under political pressure to temper his opinion and align it with 
the government‟s intentions.”  Reform of the Office of Attorney General (n 57) para 14.  See also P 
Sands QC, Lawless World (Penguin, London, 2006) ch 12. 
65
 Jowell states of the A-G‟s advice in the Iraq war: “however scrupulously impartial it was in practice, 
his dual role gave rise to a widespread view that the advice was tailored to political convenience.”  
Ibid, appendix 3, paras 9-10.   
66
 Ibid. 
67
 See Chapter 1, Part 1.5. 
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The controversy surrounding the Attorney General‟s advice in the Iraq decision has 
been cited as one event68 which has highlighted inadequacies in the post.  Reforms 
to the office were proposed in the post-Blair era,69 a process which is ongoing.  
Proposed reforms to the war prerogative (to be discussed in Part 3.2.3) have also 
entailed discussion of changes to the A-G role70 and whether his legal advice 
regarding warfare should be routinely published.71  That such attention has focussed 
upon reform of this area perhaps supports the proposition that these were material 
factors influencing the Iraq decision. 
 
 
[2.2] Cabinet Chairmanship Powers 
 
 
Chapter 1 indicated that in the lead up to the Iraq deployment Cabinet was 
marginalised as a substantive decision-making body.  Chapter 3 considered the 
operation of the collective Cabinet responsibility convention during the Iraq affair.  As 
these chapters also confirm, Mr Blair‟s use of the prime ministerial Cabinet 
chairmanship powers were relevant to this sidelining of Cabinet.  These prerogative 
powers that the Prime Minister enjoys in relation to Cabinet derive from his status as 
its chairman.72  The chairmanship of Cabinet is necessary to ensure Cabinet 
efficiency.73  As Cabinet chairman a Prime Minister inevitably has a greater 
                                                 
68
 Constitutional Role of the Attorney General (n 61) outlines another two incidents commonly cited as 
reasons for proposed reforms of the Attorney General office: (1) the „cash for honours‟ affair (paras 
38-42); (2) the Serious Fraud Office investigations into the BAE systems affair (paras 43-46). 
69
 For example, in July 2007 a Commons select committee suggested that the Attorney General role be 
split and that the legal advice function be vested in a non-party official: “We have concluded that legal 
decisions in prosecutions and the provision of legal advice should rest with someone who is appointed 
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 The Governance of Britain – Constitutional Renewal (n 50).  The Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, 
Part I, covered legislative changes regarding the office of Attorney General.  It sets out limited reforms 
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the war prerogative to be discussed in Part 3.2.3 should also include a provision to ensure publication 
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War: Parliament‟s Role and Responsibility (n 3) paras 29, 71.  See also Constitutional Renewal: Draft 
Bill and White Paper (n 63) para 85. 
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 P Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (Penguin, London, 2001) pp 
58-9. 
73
 Mackintosh has stated that “a body the size of the Cabinet, loaded with business, will simply fail to 
operate unless it is subordinated to a chairman who can guide, summarise and close the discussions.”  
J Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (3
rd
 edn, Stevens & Sons, London, 1977), p 428. 
113 
 
opportunity to dominate discussions and express his views.74  It is he who decides 
when and how often Cabinet meetings will occur.  Following a Cabinet discussion it 
is the Prime Minister‟s task as chairman to sum up and confirm the decision of 
Cabinet.75  Because it is rare that a Cabinet vote will be taken on any issue,76 this 
permits the Prime Minister scope to decide or exert a directing influence upon the 
Cabinet position on a particular issue. 
 
The position of Cabinet chairman also allows the Prime Minister a large degree of 
control over the Cabinet agenda,77 i.e. matters which are to come before Cabinet for 
discussion.  The Prime Minister‟s control of the Cabinet agenda extends to personal 
authority over wider policy generally.  For example, “as head of the Government the 
Prime Minister has the right to interfere in any department at any time”.78   
 
Some distinct features of Mr Blair‟s use of prime ministerial chairmanship powers 
can be ascertained.  As Chapter 3 outlined, under Blair there was a move towards 
greater informality and flexibility within Cabinet79 which was confirmed by the findings 
of the 2004 Butler Report.80  Reports indicate that Cabinet discussions were often 
brief.81  Vitally, there were often few advance papers, and there was no detailed 
agenda.82  Though evidence in some quarters indicates that minutes of meetings 
were rarely taken,83 it is clear from recent Freedom of Information requests that 
minutes relating to vital Cabinet meetings in March 2003 do exist.84  Ex-minister 
Clare Short has written of Cabinet meetings:  
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 Brown (n 55) 49. 
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 Brazier (n 55) 89. 
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 Halsbury‟s (n 9) para 407. 
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 Ibid para 398. 
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 Brazier (n 53) 155. 
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 C Foster, „Cabinet Government in the Twentieth Century‟, MLR (2004) 67(5) 753-771, pp 765-6. 
80
 Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (chair: Lord Butler), „Review of Intelligence on Weapons 
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 Hennessy (n 72) 481; C Short, An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of Power 
(Free Press, London, 2005) p 70.  
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 Hennessy, ibid 481-2.  
83
 Foster (n 79) 769.  See also Robin Cook: “High spot of the day is my long-promised meeting on the 
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detailed minuting in The Blunkett Tapes, My Life in the Bear Pit (Bloomsbury, London, 2006) pp 22-3. 
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 Information Commissioner Decision Notice FS50165372 (19/2/09) para 4.  Two Cabinet meetings 
which considered the Attorney General‟s advice on 13th and 17th March 2003 have been the subject of 
FOI requests. 
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“There were no papers other than the legislative programme.  The 
agenda was the same for almost every meeting and simply listed 
home affairs and foreign affairs and then Tony would bring up 
whatever he had in mind.”85 
 
Robin Cook wrote of Blair‟s chairmanship style: 
 
“I am told … that in the old days Prime Ministers would sum up the 
balance of view in the discussion. … However, Tony does not regard 
the Cabinet as a place for decisions.  Normally he avoids having 
discussions in Cabinet until decisions are taken and announced to it.”86 
 
Additionally, Blair had a preference for „bilaterals‟, private one-to-one meetings with 
individual ministers.87 The cumulative effect of these characteristics of Blair‟s 
chairmanship style was the apparent marginalisation of collective Cabinet 
responsibility, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Vitally, the accounts of ex-ministers and political commentators are corroborated by 
the Butler Report which highlighted and expressed concerns about informalities in 
the running of Cabinet in the lead up to and conduct of the Iraq war.  Regarding the 
papers and information provided to ministers the report stated:  
 
“Without papers circulated in advance, it remains possible but is 
obviously much more difficult for members of the Cabinet outside the 
small circle directly involved to bring their political judgement and 
experience to bear on the major decisions for which the Cabinet as a 
whole must carry responsibility.”88 
 
It appears that Mr Blair‟s exercise of the chairmanship powers was a novel and 
distinguishing feature of his premiership.  Certain moves towards greater Cabinet 
informality had the (possibly inadvertent) result of facilitating prime ministerial „room 
for manoeuvre‟ and indirectly fostering a subtle autocracy of sorts.  Yet it is difficult to 
claim that Mr Blair acted in breach of or beyond his powers because no concrete 
benchmarks or boundaries apply in this area; the chairmanship powers and 
conventions that regulated it are inchoate and resultingly did not prohibit such 
practices.  If one is left dissatisfied with the situation it is perhaps because the 
                                                 
85
 Short (n 81) 70. 
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 Cook (n 83) 115. 
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 A Rawnsley, Servants of the People, The Inside Story of New Labour (Penguin, London, 2001) p 53; 
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conduct of the Iraq Cabinet appears to demonstrate the relative ease with which the 
utilisation of simple and seemingly minor adjustments such as changes to 
chairmanship practices can have significant and wide-ranging effects, upon 
decisions of war for example.  It demonstrates that other lesser prerogative powers 
available to a Prime Minister may afford him the opportunity to manage or influence 
the exercise of a more significant prerogative, such as the war prerogative, 
according to his preference.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the actions outlined above 
achieved this by limiting collective Cabinet responsibility as a potential check on Mr 
Blair‟s preferred exercise of war prerogative in the lead-up to the Iraq decision.   
 
 
[2.3] Power to Request a Dissolution of Parliament 
 
 
The prerogative to dissolve Parliament acts as a constitutional check by preventing 
Parliament from sitting indefinitely.  Through his power to advise the monarch to 
dissolve Parliament, a Prime Minister is able to determine the date of general 
elections.  The power is only subject to the statutory requirement that the maximum 
duration of Parliament is five years.89  The power to advise a dissolution under 
prerogative formerly lay with the Cabinet, though since 1918 it has been established 
that the power to dissolve belongs to the Prime Minister solely.90  The chief 
advantage of this power is that it allows a Prime Minister to instigate an election at a 
time most advantageous to his party.  The dissolution decision is thus inevitably 
made predominantly on party political grounds.  Aided by increasingly sophisticated 
polling systems a Prime Minister can now more precisely gauge public opinion, 
allowing him to maximise the tactical benefit that the power to request dissolution 
bestows.91   
 
Interestingly, the prerogative power to advise a dissolution has also come to act as a 
method of prime ministerial restraint over his own parliamentary party.  Its function 
as a disciplinary mechanism stems from its interaction with the constitutional 
convention, outlined in Chapter 3, that a Prime Minister will resign if he loses a vote 
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 Parliament Act 1911, section 7. 
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 Depicted by I Jennings, Cabinet Government (3
rd
 edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965), 
pp 418-9; Mackintosh (n 73) 453; H Laski, Reflections on the Constitution (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1997) p 102. 
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 Brown (n 55) 42; R K Alderman & J A Cross, „The Prime Minister and the Decision to Dissolve‟ 
(1974-5) Parl. Aff. vol 28, p 386, p 394-5. 
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of confidence in the Commons thus triggering a general election.  The power can be 
used as a potential last-resort sanction against party dissent because the threat of 
dissolution at an inopportune moment with the resulting potential to lose their 
parliamentary seats will often compel backbenchers to follow the government line.  
Labour Prime Minister Clement Atlee stated that though the power was rarely 
resorted to, it was „essential‟ to party discipline.92  However, the threat of its use also 
entails an inherent risk for the premier who chooses to resort to it. 
 
In light of the Blair government‟s large Commons majorities, particularly in the first 
two terms, there was little recourse to the dissolution power other than for scheduled 
general elections.  This was because government could draw upon support from a 
large pool of Labour MPs to pass its legislative programme.  One significant instance 
where the power to advise a dissolution was used highly effectively by Mr Blair to 
discipline Labour MPs was in January 2004 when the government sought to pass the 
Higher Education Bill 2004 which introduced top-up fees for university students in 
England and Wales.93  The Bill was passed by the slenderest of majorities; a mere 
five votes.94  However, Mr Blair‟s most vital threat to use the dissolution power was in 
relation to the Commons debate regarding Iraq in March 2003.95  As a result, MPs 
voting on whether to approve military action in Iraq did so in the knowledge that 
failure to provide such approval would result in the resignation of Mr Blair and his 
government and the calling of a general election whilst the Labour Party was in 
disarray.  Evidence from the 18th March debate indicates that the potentially 
damaging effects of a general election was arguably a factor influencing the debate 
and vote, though its effects should not be overstated. 
 
The 18th March debate was not conducted along strict party lines and the Iraq 
deployment was supported by many Conservative MPs.  A number of Labour 
members including Malcolm Savidge,96 John McDonnell97, Barry Gardiner98 and 
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Lindsay Hoyle99 made speeches emphasising that the deployment vote should 
transcend party and career interests.  Neverththeless, Chapter 1 confirmed that the 
Blair government conducted extensive background negotiations to build up 
Commons support prior to the vote100 and references to its utilisation of the Whip 
system were made by Malcolm Savidge101 and John McDonnell, the latter of whom 
stated:  
 
“The Prime Minister said that he wants people to vote not out of loyalty 
but on the basis of understanding and supporting the argument.  I 
respect him for that.  I would respect him even more if he gave us a 
free vote instead of a three-line Whip, and if the Whips were called off 
from trying to persuade people in their normal manner.”102 
 
Other references to the impact of the Iraq vote on the future of the Labour 
government were made in the debate.  Labour MP Bill Tynan (voting against 
government) acknowledged that this was an issue upon which the Prime Minister 
could be „displaced‟.103  Similarly Labour MP Peter Pike (abstaining) expressed 
concern that a vote against deployment would damage the Prime Minister, 
government and party.104  Elsewhere Conservative MP Sir Patrick Cormack 
(supporting deployment) asked Labour MP Tony Banks (voting against) the following 
question: “Does he accept that the logical consequence of his vote this evening, 
whether or not he regards it as a rebel vote, would be the defeat of his Prime 
Minister?”105 
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Evidence from the Iraq debate indicates that express references to the potentially 
fatal impact upon the Labour Party of failure to approve warfare were made at 
various points.  Additionally, Cowley and Stuart claim this issue was laboured in 
background negotiations with Labour MPs prior to the vote.106  This suggests that the 
dissolution threat was present as an influencing factor, though it did not occupy a 
major explicit role in the debate.  Nevertheless the silent, underlying role of the 
dissolution device upon the voting Labour MPs cannot be discounted or indeed 
quantified.  It remains arguable that Mr Blair‟s threat to advise exercise of the 
dissolution prerogative constituted a further cumulative factor in favour of his 
preferred exercise of the war power.  By enabling the Prime Minister to mobilise 
support for war, it acted as another device which curtailed the vigour of 
countervailing parliamentary checks upon the power. 
   
Interestingly the Iraq example demonstrates how two constitutional checks (namely 
the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament and conventional requirement that a 
premier who cannot command a Commons majority resign) have paradoxically 
combined over time to create a prime ministerial leverage device.  Dissolution is a 
power that the premier can threaten to use in order to unite party interests in 
extraordinary circumstances and thus it assists him to obtain approval for 
controversial or politically unpopular measures.  Despite the ongoing disagreements 
within the Labour party regarding military action in Iraq, the threat of an impending 
general election increased the stakes and was influential in bringing dissenting or 
reluctant factions into line.  Importantly the war prerogative reforms to be discussed 
in Part 3.2.3 do not investigate the potential impact of the confidence vote/dissolution 
device on a parliamentary warfare decision.  Though there may be important 
reasons for keeping this device intact (e.g. ensuring a government discredited on a 
vital issue does not remain in power) the executive-favoured inclination of the device 
in matters of warfare should be acknowledged and warrants further attention.  
 
The Blair-era dissolution prerogative should be viewed in light of recent 
developments.  When Gordon Brown took over the premiership in July 2007 he gave 
a speech on constitutional reform which indicated that the power to request the 
dissolution of Parliament would be subject to reform107 and the green paper that 
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accompanied his speech, The Governance of Britain, proposed that advance 
commons approval for dissolution should be sought.108 
 
 
[2.4] Additional Wider Prerogative Powers 
 
 
There are further areas in which the prerogative is a significant source of prime 
ministerial power.  These prerogative powers are less specific than those already 
discussed.  They cover broader areas of government activity which makes their 
effects potentially wide-ranging.  For example the premier has broad prerogatives 
regarding patronage, organising Cabinet and central government and general 
authority over the civil service and wider executive.  A full exploration of these 
powers is beyond the scope of this study.  However two prerogatives are highly 
relevant to this study and must be afforded further consideration; the prerogatives to 
conduct foreign affairs and to defend the realm.  The premier enjoys a high degree of 
involvement in these fields and caselaw concerning these prerogatives over the 
broad Iraq era will be investigated in further detail in Chapter 5.   
 
 
[2.4.1] The Foreign Affairs Prerogative at Law 
 
„Foreign affairs‟ is generally a vast and vital area of prime ministerial involvement.  
The Introduction to this study confirmed that since 1945 foreign policy and defence 
have formed an essential part of the British premier‟s role.109  It also confirmed that 
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (the Foreign 
Secretary) also plays a central role in foreign affairs.  Yet despite the inevitably close 
working relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary acknowledged 
by Robin Cook,110 the former occupies a position of relative predominance in the field 
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attributable in part to his leadership role and prerogative to appoint and dismiss 
Cabinet ministers (discussed at part 2.1).   
 
The foreign affairs prerogative enables the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to 
undertake a variety of activities necessary to conduct business with other sovereign 
states on behalf of the country.  The two most vital activities authorised by this 
prerogative are entering international treaties and declaring war and peace.111 
Nevertheless it also authorises activities such as recognising foreign governments, 
sending and receiving ambassadors, agreeing territories as well as undertaking 
general negotiations and diplomatic relations with other states, thus enabling the 
nation‟s foreign affairs to be conducted.112  The influence of the Diceyan view upon 
the foreign affairs prerogative is evident.  For example, Halsbury‟s states it is not 
possible to provide an exhaustive list of all foreign affairs functions.113  Significantly, it 
states that a definitive list is not possible because „such categories are never 
closed‟.114  This appears consistent with the wider Diceyan view of prerogative as a 
wide area of non-statutory authority subject to the ordinary laws.  Because 
prerogative is viewed in this manner rather than as a specific set of narrow, definable 
functions, the tasks that the foreign affairs prerogative has the capacity to 
encompass can never be closed.  This enables government to adapt and undertake 
new activities that may be required by changing developments in international 
relations.   
 
Historically, the foreign affairs power was once exercised by monarchs and retains 
monarchical associations.  Halsbury‟s states: 
 
“The Crown is the representative of the nation in the conduct of foreign 
affairs, and what is done in such matters by the royal authority is the 
act of the whole nation, and binding, in general, upon the nation 
without further sanction.”115 
 
Halsbury‟s continues, “By English law, for external purposes, the Crown represents 
the community”.116  Decisions taken by government in conduct of foreign affairs are 
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categorised as „acts of state‟ defined as “a prerogative act of policy in the field of 
foreign affairs performed by the Crown in the course of its relationship with another 
state or its subjects.”117  Because prerogative is an executive power flowing from the 
Crown through monarch, the involvement of Parliament is limited.  Parliament does 
not have prior approval of the exercise of the foreign affairs prerogative but can 
subject it to later scrutiny.  The scrutiny of courts is also limited in this area because, 
as Halsbury‟s states, “an act of state is essentially an exercise of sovereign power 
and hence cannot be challenged, controlled or interfered with by municipal courts.”118 
However a degree of laissez faire is arguably necessary due to the nature of foreign 
affairs; government must be able to conduct business with foreign governments 
efficiently and free from domestic encumbrances.  This was acknowledged in the late 
seventeenth century by John Locke who wrote that the federative power (which 
included the power of war, peace and conducting foreign affairs)119 should not be 
separated from the executive; to do so would cause „disorder and ruine‟.120 
 
The specific prerogative to enter international treaties enables the Prime Minister 
and his Foreign Secretary to agree treaties at their discretion on behalf of the 
country.  Such decisions are generally not challengeable in English courts121 and the 
power is subject to only three legal or constitutional limits.  First, the treaty making 
prerogative could be fettered by an express act of Parliament.122  Second, though a 
treaty entered into by a Prime Minister (or Foreign Secretary) binds the country, it 
does require implementation by statute if it is to become domestic law.123  Finally, 
Parliament plays a supervisory role by scrutinising the terms of treaties that have 
been entered into by government.124  Though such scrutiny was a matter of 
convention and not a legal requirement, the treaty-making prerogative has been an 
area of recent debate and proposed reform.  A government white paper and draft 
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bill125 in March 2008 proposed putting „the present arrangements for parliamentary 
scrutiny of treaties ... on a statutory footing‟.126  Additional developments at EU level 
are also likely to impact upon the treaty-making prerogative generally127 but a 
detailed discussion of this prerogative is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
One significant aspect of the foreign affairs prerogative, declaring war and 
conducting related military action, is the focus of this study and will be afforded 
further specific consideration in Part 3 of this chapter.  
 
 
[2.4.2] The Defence Prerogative at Law  
 
The war prerogative inevitably involves a degree of overlap between foreign affairs 
and defence matters, both of which are conducted according to prerogative.  
Nevertheless the power to initially declare war, undertake military action or deploy 
troops under the foreign affairs prerogative can be distinguished from the actual day-
to-day conduct of military action which is governed by statute and the general 
prerogative to defend the realm.128  The categorisation of the war power as falling 
within the ambit of the foreign affairs prerogative rather than defence is confirmed 
elsewhere.  For example the Iraq decision and surrounding events were viewed as 
within the particular remit of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee which produced a report in 2003 entitled „The Decision to go to War in 
Iraq‟.129  
 
The prerogative to defend the Queen‟s realm, frequently cited as the Crown's 
foremost duty,130 puts the Prime Minister and his Defence Secretary in control of the 
nation‟s military forces.131  Halsbury‟s states that: 
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“The supreme government and command of all forces by sea, land and air, 
and of all defence establishments is vested in the Crown by prerogative right 
at common law and by statute.”132 
 
The prerogative authorises decisions about military appointments, the grouping and 
disposal of military units and matters regarding the organisation, personnel and 
maintenance of military forces.133  However, decisions regarding the conduct of 
warfare operations are not the concern of this study; the initial decision to commit to 
warfare is its sole focus and, as confirmed above, this technically falls within the 
ambit of the foreign affairs prerogative.   
 
Though new prerogatives cannot be created,134 in keeping with its common law 
heritage prerogative has the potential capacity to adapt to new situations.  Re 
Petition of Right135 effectively illustrates this point in relation to the defence of the 
realm prerogative.  Here, the Court of Appeal unanimously rejected arguments from 
the suppliants that this prerogative power was, according to previous ancient 
authorities, only effective upon the actual landing of an enemy upon British shores.  
The court explained that regard must be given to modern developments in warfare 
such as „the invention of gunpowder and the use of aeroplanes‟136 which meant that 
threats to the country could now come without the need for physical invasion.  
Warrington LJ commented:  
 
“So to limit the prerogative would in these days be to render it 
practically useless for the purpose for which it is entrusted to the King.  
The circumstances under which the power may be exercised and the 
particular acts which may be done in the exercise thereof must of 
necessity vary with the times and the advance of military science.”137 
 
So here one sees the legal updating of the defence prerogative.  This power, which 
at one time involved merely reacting to an enemy landing, had now changed.  The 
formal power itself remained unaltered; a general prerogative to defend the realm 
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continued.  Yet in practical or real terms the power had expanded to take account of 
new technologies and changing methods of warfare.  Despite its subtlety, this is a 
vital principle with far-reaching implications; it suggests the defence prerogative can 
authorise pre-emptive defence policies of the kind initially advanced by the 
government to justify military action in Iraq. 
 
The area of defence is somewhat opaque and subject to little external supervision 
due to „national security‟ issues associated with the exercise of this prerogative.  The 
courts in particular have traditionally been receptive to government arguments 
involving „national security‟ or related issues.138  Generally, operational decisions 
taken according to the defence prerogative are not judicially reviewable.  This was 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal which held in Marchiori [2002]139 that the „merits or 
demerits‟ of government defence policy are not subject to judicial scrutiny.  Marchiori 
involved a challenge to the Environment Agency which had granted permission to 
Ministry of Defence installations to discharge nuclear waste.  In his judgment Laws 
LJ summarised the position thus: “it seems to me ... to be plain that the law of 
England will not contemplate what may be called a merits review of any honest 
decision of government upon matters of national defence policy.”140  Laws LJ 
proceeded to outline two primary reasons for this: first the courts are „unequipped‟ to 
effectively evaluate such defence-related decisions, and second, the appropriate 
balance of power and responsibility between constitutional limbs requires that these 
decisions be made by democratically elected and accountable government.141  
Marchiori reasoning continued longstanding justifications underlying judicial caution 
in this area and the utilisation of these reasons in the Iraq caselaw will be discussed 
in Chapter 5.  Parliamentary limitations on the defence prerogative are more 
substantial and include the annual approval of defence budgets by Armed Forces 
Acts as well as the general scrutiny of a parliamentary select committee.142   
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The preceding discussion demonstrates that the prerogative to defend the realm is 
viewed as a separate power to the war prerogative.  However, Chapter 5 establishes 
that prerogatives in this area are not self-contained and tend to be blurred.  Though 
the specific power to declare war is categorised firmly within the foreign affairs 
prerogative, it may often be the case that such military action also serves to defend 
the nation.  As a result, a deployment decision may frequently fall within the overlap 
of foreign affairs and defence prerogatives.   
 
The Significance of the Defence Prerogative in Iraq 
 
Chapter 1 confirmed that at the time of the parliamentary vote to approve military 
action in Iraq British troops had already been deployed and were waiting for the 
order to enter the country.  This divides the initial conduct of military action into two 
distinct stages: first the preparatory action of deploying troops in readiness for 
potential combat, and secondly the order to actively engage in combat.  The second 
stage, the order to commence warfare, is the prerogative power with which this study 
is concerned.  However, the former preparatory action would be authorised by the 
defence prerogative which covers operational matters.143 
 
The prior deployment of UK troops in the Iraq affair was by no means an unusual or 
unlawful use of prerogative.  This exercise of the defence prerogative to deploy 
troops in advance may have been undertaken for cogent operational reasons, for 
example to avoid delay between a parliamentary vote and the grouping of forces 
which may have proved advantageous to the Iraqi regime.  Parliamentary approval 
was not required for the initial preparatory deployment.  Yet vitally it is arguable that 
this exercise of the defence prerogative to arrange troops at the Iraqi border 
(combined with the timing of the vote)144 had a discernible impact upon the 
parliamentary debate because it increased pressure on MPs to approve military 
action.  Evidence from the 18th March debate indicates support for this proposition. 
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In the debate Liberal Democrat MP Michael Moore argued that the troops waiting on 
the Iraqi border should not influence a vote in favour of war.145  Yet other members‟ 
statements suggest that this was indeed a factor and references to the fact that the 
army was awaiting orders were made by a number of MPs over the course of the 
debate.146  The speeches of four MPs who supported the war particularly 
demonstrate the influence of the prior deployment of troops.  Conservative MP Sir 
Patrick Cormack specifically raised the impact on servicemen and women of the 
failure to obtain a yes vote.147  Labour MP Hugh Bayley also mentioned this as a 
reason favouring war.148  The preparatory deployment featured more prominently in 
the speech of Labour MP Donald Anderson who encapsulated the heightened stakes 
in the following terms:  
 
“We are faced with this problem as we seek to come to a decision: 
should we now stand down our troops, and should we fundamentally 
change our strategy?  In theory, we could indeed fold our tents and 
glide away, forgetting about the fact that there are men and women 
representing our country on the borders of Kuwait and Iraq. ... To 
withdraw at this stage would be unthinkable. ... We cannot easily turn 
back without undermining our own credibility and the authority of the 
United Nations.”149 
 
A final example is provided by Conservative MP John Maples who in similar terms 
summarised the consequences of a no-vote thus: 
 
“If on the verge of battle, ... [our troops] were withdrawn, that would 
destroy the credibility of British foreign and security policy for a 
generation. ... We would damage immensely, if not terminally, our 
alliance with the United States.”150 
 
On the basis of this evidence it appears that an influential factor in the debate was 
the potential international damage to the UK‟s reputation and interests if troops on 
the Iraqi border were incapacitated by a negative parliamentary vote and forced to 
return to their bases.  In this sense it appears that ministerial exercise of the defence 
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prerogative to arrange troops in readiness for action did facilitate the premier‟s 
preferred exercise of the war prerogative to engage in warfare (whether this was 
intentional or not).  Exercising the defence prerogative in this way, combined with the 
timing of the vote, constituted a further factor pressurising MPs to vote in favour of 
war.151  Even though this factor may have been arguably minor or unquantifiable in 
nature, it was one of a number which undermined the potential strength of the 
parliamentary vote to act as an effective check on Mr Blair‟s war power. 
 
 
 
[3] The War Prerogative 
 
 
The suite of prerogative powers available to a Prime Minister in relation to his 
Cabinet, party and the wider conduct of government has been outlined.  Against that 
background this part will now focus upon the specific prerogative power to declare 
war, a power which lies in fact with the Prime Minister.152 
 
Any formal declaration of war or peace will be made by the government of the day 
via prerogative.  Halsbury‟s confirms that the format of such a declaration is not 
prescribed; “war may be initiated by proclamation, by an Order in Council … or 
informally without any declaration.”153  Interestingly, despite appearances to the 
contrary, Britain has not been in a state of war in law since World War II.  This was 
confirmed in the recent case of Amin154 which involved a property dispute.  One of 
the legal arguments raised in this case required the court to consider whether there 
was a legal state of war in relation to Iraq.  The court held not, following government 
guidance which it regarded as definitive on the issue.  Collins J stated that “”War” 
was a technical concept, which began either by declaration of war, or by an act of 
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force which the attacked state treated as creating a state of war”155  Referring to the 
Iraq „war‟ he continued: “The fact that the conflict was widely referred to in the media 
as a “war” does not mean that it was a state of war in law.”156  This disregards the 
fact that references to the „war‟ extended beyond the media, and can be confusingly 
found in parliamentary debates157 caselaw158 and government rhetoric.  Collins J 
continued:   
 
“The traditional concept of war has virtually disappeared from state 
practices since the Second World War.  Unhappily, armed conflict has 
continued to be an instrument of state policy.  But it is almost never 
necessary to invoke the traditional legal concept of war.”159   
 
So the term „war‟ „has both popular and legal connotations‟;160 a legal state of war 
does not formally exist in relation to events in Iraq and previous conflicts in the 
Falklands and Kosovo were not wars at law either.  Indeed a recent House of Lords 
committee confirmed that a formal declaration of war by the UK has not been made 
since 1942161 and furthermore stated „it is unlikely there will ever be another‟ due to 
developments in international law.162 
 
The meaning of the prerogative power to declare war must therefore be taken to 
include its modern equivalent; the power to engage in military operations despite the 
fact that they may not be legally classified as „war‟.  This understanding has been 
widely adopted by select committees163 and parliamentary debates.164  In summary, 
military action may take various forms or degrees of severity but it will always be 
authorised by the foreign affairs „war‟ prerogative, despite lacking the legal status of 
„war‟.165   
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As discussed in Part 1 the widely accepted Diceyan view of prerogative entails 
viewing the executive power as subject to the control of the other two limbs of the 
constitutional scales, the legislature (parliamentary sovereignty) and the judiciary (via 
the rule of law).  It is therefore useful to outline the main legal and constitutional 
checks and balances that govern the war prerogative, particularly as a basis for 
further discussion in Chapter 5.  Despite the presence of select constitutional checks 
on the war prerogative a 2006 House of Lords Select Committee stated “the 
deployment power‟s status as a prerogative power means that there are few 
restrictions to its use, other than those that have arisen from precedent or 
convention.”166 
 
 
[3.1] Judicial Involvement with the War Prerogative 
 
 
[3.1.1] Judicial Review of Prerogative: General Principles 
 
Judicial review acts as a significant potential limit to governmental exercise of 
prerogative.  For many centuries prerogative remained the exclusive and undisputed 
domain of executive government.  However some nineteen years after 
Wednesbury,167 where the doctrine of judicial review was born, came the turning 
point of Lain.168  Lain “explicitly swept into the judicial sphere of control the last 
disputed prize of the constitutional conflicts of the seventeenth century, the royal 
prerogative.”169    Lain did this by deciding that that actions of the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board [CICB] that had been set up under prerogative, and thus 
derived its ultimate power from that source, could be subject to judicial review.  Lord 
Diplock summarised the position in the following terms:  
 
“I see no reason in principle why the fact that no authority from 
Parliament is required by the executive … should exempt the [CICB] 
board from supervisory control by the High Court.”170   
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Lain was later viewed by the House of Lords in GCHQ171 as a landmark case.172 As 
Chapter 3 confirmed, in GCHQ the applicants sought to challenge the prime 
ministerial decision to abolish trade union rights for civil servants.  The Law Lords in 
this case were logically able to extend the principles of justiciability set out in Lain to 
the manner in which actual decisions taken under prerogative were exercised by 
ministers.  Lord Diplock, in language bearing striking resemblance to that which he 
had employed in Lain, claimed:  
 
“I see no reason why simply because a decision-making power is 
derived from a common law and not a statutory source, it should for 
that reason only be immune from judicial review.”173 
 
Lord Roskill concurred, adding that “in either case the act in question is the act of the 
executive.”174  In GCHQ three out of five Law Lords agreed that the government‟s 
exercise of prerogative was judicially reviewable.  Prerogative was again given its 
broad residual meaning; Lord Roskill cited the formula in his judgment,175 and Lord 
Diplock‟s own definition was decidedly Diceyan.176  Because Dicey‟s extensive 
definition was used, a wider sphere of executive activity could now potentially be 
subject to the supervision of the courts.  However, GCHQ also confirmed that, unlike 
statutory checks, judicial supervision would not extend to all prerogative powers; 
instead the scope of judicially reviewable prerogative would be limited.  Though the 
range of government action authorised by prerogative extended to all lawful 
activities, their Lordships segregated certain powers within this expansive range as 
impervious to judicial scrutiny.  The approach is epitomised in the judgment of Lord 
Roskill, who claimed that the right to challenge governmental exercise of prerogative 
by judicial review must depend upon the subject matter of the power, and he recited 
the following list of „excluded categories‟: 
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“Prerogative powers such as those relating to the making of treaties, 
the defence of the realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant of 
honours, the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of 
ministers as well as others are not, I think, susceptible to judicial 
review because their nature and subject matter are such as not to be 
amenable to the judicial process.”177  
 
Note that entering treaties and defence matters are listed by Lord Roskill first, 
arguably because they are the most evident examples of prerogative areas that are 
non-justiciable.  The Law Lords thus indicated that courts would steer clear of 
applying their judgements to more political or traditional prerogatives.  These areas 
would be termed „non-justiciable‟, i.e. beyond the competence of the courts.178  
These self-imposed limitations were arguably influenced by separation of powers 
reasoning; they demonstrate the judiciary choosing not to stray beyond its respective 
sphere into the realm of „high politics‟.  Approaching prerogative according to subject 
matter thus ensured that the domain of judicially unchecked executive activity, such 
as defence and foreign affairs, would remain so.  According to Allan, under the 
doctrine of justiciability as set out in GCHQ, “The courts abandon their ordinary 
function of ensuring legality, within the relevant [ring-fenced] fields, leaving protection 
of the rights of those affected to the operations of the political process, which may or 
may not in time provide a remedy.”179  This doctrine will be explored further in the 
context of the Iraq decision in Chapter 5.  
 
Interestingly, in GCHQ neither Lords Roskill or Scarman elaborated upon the exact 
reasons why the subject matter of the above-listed „excluded categories‟ should be 
beyond judicial reach, though it will be seen in Chapter 5 that the courts have 
attempted to give more extensive reasons in recent caselaw.  The GCHQ ruling 
ensured that many of the Prime Minister‟s prerogative powers would be left intact 
and immune from judicial scrutiny.  However this must be viewed in light of 
subsequent cases such as Bentley,180 Everett181 and the Iraq caselaw to be 
discussed. 
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[3.1.2] The Judiciary and the War Prerogative 
 
Until the recent Iraq caselaw there had not been a legal challenge which requested 
that the judiciary assess a specific decision to declare war.  However, a number of 
cases had considered closely-related matters involving the conduct of war and 
national security generally.  Traditionally, the exercise of prerogative power to 
declare war or deploy troops has not been judicially reviewable.  In Chandler182 it 
was held that the Crown alone was entitled to make decisions regarding the 
operation of the armed forces and that such decisions would not be questioned in 
the courts.  The court deemed such conduct a matter of high policy beyond the 
judicial ambit,183 a rationale epitomised in the judgment of Viscount Radcliffe who 
stated: 
 
“The question whether it is in the true interests of this country to éclair, 
retain or house nuclear armaments depends upon an infinity of 
considerations, military and diplomatic, technical, psychological and 
moral, and of decisions, tentative or final, which are themselves part 
assessments of fact and part expectations and hopes.  I do not think 
there in anything amiss with a legal ruling that does not make this 
issue a matter for judge or jury.”184  
 
Underlying Viscount Radcliffe‟s comments are two related propositions.  The first is 
that military-related decisions are highly complex, nuanced and politically-charged.  
The second is that such decisions are not appropriate for judicial determination.  The 
comments of Lord Parker in The Zamora follow a similar rationale: 
 
“Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole 
judges of what the national security requires. It would be obviously 
undesirable that such matters should be made the subject of evidence 
in a Court of law or otherwise discussed in public.”185 
 
Lord Parker‟s comments display a strong reluctance to engage with defence-related 
issues.  He claims that government must be the sole body responsible for such 
decisions, implying that no external or open scrutiny is appropriate.  The influence of 
Montesquieu‟s separation of powers is evident across this area.  The doctrine 
propounds that the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a state should remain 
                                                                                                                                           
181
 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte Everett [1989] QB 811.  This case concerned the 
prerogative to issue passports. 
182
 Chandler and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] A.C. 763. 
183
 Ibid, Lord Hodson pp 800-1; Lord Devlin p 803.  
184
 Ibid, Viscount Radcliffe pp 798-9;  Lord Reid, pp 790-791.   
185
 The Zamora [1916] 2 A.C. 77, p 107. 
133 
 
independent from one another.186  This separation of functions maintains balance 
within a constitution and avoids concentrations of power that could prove fatal to 
individual freedoms.187  The separation of powers drives judicial desires to remain 
politically neutral and reluctance to become drawn into the quagmire of policy.  This 
rationale has proved particularly enduring and its influence in recent caselaw will be 
considered further in Chapter 5.  
 
Internationally, the prerogative to deploy troops is subject to international law.  
However international law is not enforced in English courts unless such law has 
been expressly enacted.188   
 
 
[3.2] Parliamentary Involvement with the War Prerogative 
 
 
[3.2.1] Parliament and Prerogative: General Principles 
 
Prerogative is regulated by Parliament in two vital respects.  The first sense in which 
Parliament controls prerogative, albeit indirectly, is via the constitutional convention 
of ministerial accountability outlined in Chapter 3.  According to the ideal, Parliament 
is able to hold the executive government to account by questioning and discussing 
ministerial activity, including ministerial use of prerogative.  In practice, the efficacy of 
this constitutional check may often be diluted for a number of reasons: first, it will 
inevitably be exercised retrospectively, second, the full and accurate information 
regarding government activity required for effective scrutiny may not always be 
available, and finally the ministerial accountability convention is nebulous in 
nature.189  The cumulative effect of these factors means that “the political 
accountability of ministers and civil servants to Parliament when they exercise 
[prerogative] powers without parliamentary authority is weak.”190 
 
                                                 
186
 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) p 157.    
187
 Ibid 155. 
188
 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Rees Mogg [1994] QB 552; R 
v Lyons (n 123) Lord Hoffman, para 27. 
189
 Lord Wilson concedes that the ministerial accountability convention “has never really been as clear-
cut as one would like for as long as anyone can remember.”  Lord Wilson of Dinton, „The Robustness 
of Conventions in a Time of Modernisation and Change‟ [2004] P.L. 407, p 419. 
190
 Lester & Weait (n 30) 426. 
134 
 
The primary parliamentary check on prerogative power is therefore the enactment of 
legislation which is superior to prerogative.  In the words of Lord Mustill, 
 
“Once the superior power of Parliament has occupied the territory the 
prerogative must quit the field … Until [then] … there is a legislative 
void, and the prerogative exists untouched.”191   
 
As supreme source of law in Britain, statute can overrule any area of prerogative in 
its narrow192 or wider Diceyan sense.193  Statute acts to abolish or curtail prerogative 
powers by placing them on a statutory footing, thus replacing these formerly informal 
arrangements with an act of Parliament that sets forth and regulates government 
activity.  But statute can limit prerogative in a second way because it can act to 
reduce prerogative by legally protecting individual rights, the Human Rights Act 1998 
being an obvious example.  Acts such as the HRA render certain activities unlawful, 
thus technically restricting the arena of lawful activity available to the executive 
government.  For example, the HRA allows government to act according to 
prerogative only if it does not impinge upon certain individual rights without 
appropriate justification.  The ability of the HRA to potentially restrict the exercise of 
the war and related prerogatives in this fashion will be discussed in select Iraq cases 
in Chapter 5. 
 
 
[3.2.2] Parliament and the War Prerogative 
 
In light of the general points outlined above, this Part will briefly explain four ways in 
which Parliament acts as a check upon the war prerogative specifically.  As a 
prerogative power, the war power is subject to the two methods of parliamentary 
check outlined in Part 3.2.1 above, i.e. ministerial accountability for the exercise of 
prerogative power and the enactment of statutes that curb, restrict or replace 
prerogatives.  So, for example, if Parliament were to pass proposed legislation to 
reform the war power and place it on a statutory footing this would overrule the 
existing prerogative arrangements.  Until such a reform takes effect the power 
remains intact.  Parliament acts as political check on the premier‟s war power in a 
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third sense because it must approve the financing of any military action on an annual 
basis.194 However the strength of this check is undercut by the reality that a 
government which enjoys a parliamentary majority will rarely, if ever, encounter 
problems passing such a bill, particularly once military action is underway.  
Parliament acts as a fourth and final check by virtue of the „emerging convention‟ 
that it must approve military action.  Chapter 3 explained that though Parliament‟s 
support for proposed military action is politically indispensable, no express 
parliamentary approval is legally required to commence hostilities.195  It also 
discussed the possibility that the approval of Parliament to deploy troops may have 
ossified into a constitutional convention, even if a combination of other constitutional 
features may act to undermine the effectiveness of this check.  For example, it must 
be acknowledged that at the time of the Iraq vote in March 2003 the Labour 
government enjoyed a comfortable majority of around 165196 and thus a higher 
degree of de facto control over Parliament; Parliament‟s function as a check was 
resultantly inhibited.  A 2006 Lords Select Committee highlighted this as a major 
problem with the current arrangements for warfare approval, stating that due to 
parliamentary majorities, the whip system and other mechanisms, the efficacy of 
Parliament as a constitutional safeguard has been diluted.  The committee claimed 
that as a result of these developments, 
 
“it could be said that the ability of the United Kingdom governments to 
use the royal prerogative power to engage in conflict is paradoxically 
less democratic than when the Monarch exercised the power 
personally.”197   
 
So despite the appearance of modern government exercising the war power subject 
to appropriate democratic checks and balances, the Lords committee claimed that 
because of its streamlined control of the parliamentary system, government is often 
in a superior position to monarchs of old.  This fundamental shortcoming arguably 
undermines the recent proposed reforms to the war prerogative which seek to 
change the nature of Parliament‟s oversight and regulation of war decisions. 
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[3.2.3] Post-Blair Proposed Reforms to the War Prerogative 
 
Though this study is concerned with the war prerogative in the Iraq affair it must take 
account of recent proposed reforms to the power and Parliament‟s involvement with 
it.  The origins of these reforms germinated in the last three years of Mr Blair‟s 
premiership when the war power was investigated by both House of Commons198 
and House of Lords199 select committees, and was the subject of three private 
members‟ bills.200  However formal proposals to overhaul the war power were not 
instigated until Mr Blair left office.  Within days of becoming Prime Minister Mr 
Gordon Brown‟s government introduced a green paper on constitutional renewal.201  
Mr Brown made an accompanying speech to Parliament proposing that the war 
prerogative was one particular area that warranted reform.202  The subsequent 
period witnessed the publication of a government consultation paper on the war and 
treaty-making powers in October 2007203 and a white paper and draft bill on 
constitutional renewal in March 2008.204  The government‟s proposals have been 
subject to scrutiny by two select committees.205  However, in December 2008 it was 
confirmed that constitutional reform measures, including overhaul of the war 
prerogative, have been put on hold in light of changing priorities due to the global 
economic downturn.206 
 
Though no formal changes have yet been effected numerous options for reform of 
the war prerogative‟s current position have been discussed.  Three main options 
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have been considered.  The first possible reform, evaluated by a 2005 House of 
Lords committee, is to formalise the war power‟s position by vesting it in the Prime 
Minister according to statute.207 This would place Parliament as the legal source of 
the power rather than the Crown.    But this conceptual change in the nature and 
basis of the power would be insignificant in practical terms and the war power itself 
would remain largely intact.  Because it would insufficiently change the current 
position the committee did not favour this option208 and it has not been discussed as 
a viable option since.  A second potential option is enacting a statute which makes 
prior parliamentary approval of war a legal requirement to deploy (though subject to 
specified emergency exceptions).209  This reform option has been supported by 
leading academics such as Brazier210 and Hennessy,211 the former on the basis of 
the strength that a legal provision would provide.    
 
The third reform option is to require prior parliamentary approval of war according to 
written convention in the form of a parliamentary resolution rather than statute.  This 
option would also be subject to specified emergency exceptions.  The convention 
option was first proposed by the Lords select committee in 2005 which 
recommended a written convention requiring government to seek advance 
parliamentary approval for the deployment of troops outside of the UK.212  In 
emergency deployments where advance approval is not possible, information on the 
deployment should be provided within 7 days and retrospective approval should be 
sought.213  Compulsory prior parliamentary approval of war in a non-legal format was 
also the favoured of four reform options214 considered in the government‟s 2007 
consultation paper.215  The government‟s subsequent white paper proposed that a 
detailed parliamentary resolution setting out the procedures for obtaining 
parliamentary approval of deployments as the best way forward.216  This view was 
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shared by the joint committee set up to oversee the bill‟s progress.217  Ultimately a 
parliamentary resolution requiring the House‟s approval of war, a form of „soft law‟,218 
seems the most likely reform option.  This may fall short of legal change, but, as a 
Commons select committee argued in May 2008, it could represent a move towards 
that eventual outcome: “A parliamentary resolution may, for the moment at least, be 
the pragmatic way forward, as a first step towards establishing a legal principle for 
parliamentary involvement in conflict decisions.”219  
 
Vitally the decision to reform the war power raises a host of associated dilemmas 
that also require attention.  Three main issues seem to recur across the range of 
parliamentary and governmental publications.  First, how should „war‟ or „military 
action‟ be defined?  As the government‟s 2007 consultation paper stated, “If ... 
parliament‟s role is to be more explicit ... then it will be essential to have an 
understanding of what the meaning of the term „armed conflict‟ is.”220  How should 
such a term be defined or, as Brazier claims, could the existence of armed conflict 
simply be left as a factual question of „common sense‟?221  Similar interpretive 
ambiguities could equally arise in relation to the meaning and extent of emergency 
exceptions to the parliamentary approval requirement.222  A second vital issue 
concerns the information that should be provided to Parliament when it decides 
whether to approve military action.  The efficacy of Parliament in its new formalised 
role would remain heavily reliant on appropriate information being available to it.223  
The 2005 Lords select committee‟s reform proposals therefore included suggestions 
for deployment information224 that should be placed before Parliament to enable it to 
properly undertake its role.225  The government‟s 2007 consultation paper similarly 
considered practical questions concerning the information that should be supplied to 
Parliament in the event of a proposed deployment.226  Though the paper expressed 
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concern that information which could benefit an adversary must not be publicised,227 
general information such as the size of a deployment and its legal basis could be 
provided if the Prime Minister deemed it appropriate.228  The provision of information 
to Parliament is an integral issue and will indeed be a material factor influencing its 
decision, as the Iraq affair amply demonstrated. 
 
One final major issue raised by proposed reforms is the extent of discretion that the 
Prime Minister should continue to enjoy over various aspects of the parliamentary 
vote.  In May 2008 a Commons select committee expressed disappointment with this 
aspect of the government‟s proposals, stating that its “draft resolution on war-making 
powers leaves too much discretion in the hands of the Prime Minister.”229  It 
expressed specific concerns regarding prime ministerial control of information to 
Parliament: “A Prime Minister should not ... be able to present information to 
parliament in a way which is partial or subjective, leading Members of the Commons 
perhaps to support a conflict which they might not support if more information was 
available to them.”230  The committee therefore suggested a number of 
improvements that could be made to the government bill, including additional checks 
on the prime ministerial discretion over the publication of military information.231  Two 
months later a joint parliamentary committee232 charged with considering the draft 
constitutional renewal bill investigated concerns regarding prime ministerial 
discretion over aspects of the parliamentary approval process including the 
information provided to Parliament, the timing of a vote and his proposed capacity to 
determine when the exceptional circumstances provision should apply.233  In their 
evidence to the joint committee leading experts, including Payne, Weir and Tomkins, 
indicated that these prime ministerial discretions undermined the proposed reforms 
to the war prerogative and served to limit their effectiveness.234  Despite this 
evidence the committee accepted that prime ministerial retention of discretion in 
these matters was appropriate on the basis that he will be best placed to make such 
decisions.235 
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The Implications of a Formalised Parliamentary Role 
 
Despite the ongoing issues outlined above there has been a clear movement 
towards greater parliamentary involvement in the war power that started in the post-
Iraq stage of the Blair premiership.  This trend has continued despite the concerns 
about more explicit parliamentary involvement expressed in some quarters.  Across 
the range of select committee investigations three key concerns emerge.  The first 
relates to potential delays to deployments that parliamentary involvement may 
cause.  This concern was expressed by senior military figures in their evidence to a 
Lords committee in 2006; greater parliamentary involvement would hinder 
operational effectiveness236 and may result in less flexibility in emergency situations.  
The government consultation paper in October 2007 stated that the eventual reform 
“must provide sufficient flexibility for deployments which need to be made without 
prior approval for reasons of urgency or necessary operational secrecy.”237  
Furthermore, the potential impact of any reform upon multi-national organisational 
deployments (e.g. Nato or U.N. actions) must be carefully considered.238  The 
potential problem of delay to military action is discussed at Part 3.3 below.  
 
A second concern regarding greater parliamentary involvement with the war power is 
that it may lead the decision to be dictated by public opinion and/or allow greater 
media influence.239   This is arguably an unconvincing argument, particularly when 
recourse to the importance of democratic accountability is so often made in caselaw 
and parliamentary reports in this area.240  It essentially implies that government 
should be insulated from such pressures when making decisions of war and thus 
specifically aims to prevent the views of the populace from acting as a more effective 
brake upon the war power.  The 2006 Lords Select Committee, cited evidence from 
the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces that: “drew attention 
to ... the „double democratic deficit‟ of the use of force under ... international 
auspices, arguing that there was inadequate accountability at the domestic level in 
some states, not compensated for at the international-level of decision-making.”241  
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The key point highlighted here is that accountability is institutionally lacking at 
national and international level, allowing warfare decisions to be made by elites 
without the support or involvement of the populace.  This study reveals the extent to 
which such criticisms are applicable to the British system, particularly in the Iraq 
affair. 
 
A final concern regarding proposed reforms is that an additional express requirement 
of parliamentary approval (particularly in legal form) may undermine the legal 
certainty of a decision to go to war,242 for example if a dispute arises as to whether 
the „exceptional circumstances‟ justifying military action without prior approval are 
present.  Related to this are concerns that formalising the position may draw the 
judiciary into this area.243  Though such issues should be considered carefully, they 
fail to take account of the fact that the national or international legality of a 
deployment may be questionable irrespective of such reforms, thus undermining its 
credibility in any event as demonstrated by the Iraq affair.  Furthermore, legal 
challenges to the Iraq war and its conduct have drawn the judiciary into this area 
despite the continued absence of legal reform, as Chapter 5 discusses. 
 
Despite numerous concerns regarding reform to the war power, there are practical 
and theoretical benefits to ensuring greater parliamentary involvement with the war 
power.  Supporters of reform suggest that parliamentary involvement will increase 
the legitimacy and accountability of deployment decisions.244  Justifications for 
greater legislative control of the war power can be traced back to arguments 
propounded by the framers of the US constitution who rejected the British 
monarchical model, instead choosing to place the US war power with the legislative 
body.  By adopting this framework in America, the US constitution, according to 
James Madison writing in 1798, “supposes, what the History of all Govts 
demonstrates, that the Ex. Is the branch of power most interested in war, & most 
prone to it.  It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the 
Legisl.”245  So the founders of the US constitution recognised that the executive limb 
was institutionally the most geared towards war and thus sought to curb its 
tendencies by placing the power in the legislature (which, unlike the British model, is 
a separate institution not subject to the direct control of the executive).  Similarly 
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Justice Joseph Story of the US Supreme Court recognised dangers of the executive 
holding war-making powers: “The power of declaring war is not only the highest 
sovereign prerogative; ... it is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous, 
that it requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all the councils 
of the nations. ... It should therefore be difficult in a republic to declare war; but not to 
make peace.”246  It will be demonstrated in Part 3.3 that these rationales directly 
conflict with those traditionally employed to justify the British war power. 
 
 
[3.3] Traditions of Leadership and the War Prerogative 
 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the British constitution has traditionally 
placed only limited judicial and parliamentary checks upon executive prerogative 
decisions to undertake military action.  This tradition continued over the broad Iraq 
era and to the present day, notwithstanding recent proposed reforms.  Such limited 
checks allow considerable freedom of manoeuvre for the Prime Minister who, in 
conjunction with the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary, plays a central role in 
this area.  As stated in the Introduction to this study, “War is an intensely prime 
ministerial activity”,247 and this is arguably attributable to the legal symbiosis between 
premier and monarch.  As a Crown prerogative the conduct of war was once the 
preserve of the King.  As Lord Reid stated in Burmah: 
 
“The reason for leaving the waging of war to the King (or now the 
executive) is obvious. A schoolboy's knowledge of history is ample to 
disclose some of the disasters which have been due to parliamentary 
or other outside attempts at control. … it would be very strange if the 
law prevented or discouraged necessary preparations until a time 
when it would probably be too late for them to be effective.”248 
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This passage raises two interesting issues.  Firstly, Lord Reid identifies the historical 
basis for the link between the King and his prerogative to „wage war‟.  This 
prerogative has now passed via convention to the executive (in reality but not in law).  
Thus modern government‟s conduct of war (and its underlying rationale) is rooted in 
the notion of monarchy, a link that was initially explored in Chapter 2.  This 
association has been criticised by Gladstone who has stated of the war power, “Like 
all prerogative powers, this one harks back to the medieval notion of the Crown as 
absolute sovereign.”249  Similarly Lord Lester has criticised such medieval 
prerogatives as anomalous.250  This perhaps highlights why, as Fisher‟s discussion 
of the US war power explains, the framers of the US constitution deliberately chose 
to depart from the British monarch-centred system.251 
 
The second related issue discussed by Lord Reid is the justification for leaving this 
patriarchal, autocratic system intact.  He indicates that any other constitutional 
arrangement, particularly one involving stronger scrutiny could result literally in 
„disaster‟.  By highlighting the potentially catastrophic results of such checks in 
„emergency‟ situations, Lord Reid employs what Poole has more recently termed „the 
rhetoric of risk‟,252 a device that continues to exert a subtle influence in recent cases 
as Chapter 5 demonstrates.  Such „disaster‟, Lord Reid indicates, would stem from 
the delays that scrutiny would cause.  Implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that 
decisions regarding war must be made rapidly.  This is clearly going to be the case 
regarding the day-to-day conduct of military operations (such as the WWII decision 
to destroy Burmese oilfields to prevent their use by the advancing Japanese army as 
in Burmah), but will it always be true of the initial decision to engage in warfare?  A 
2006 House of Lords select committee report distinguished between „wars of 
necessity‟ and „war of choice‟,253 the former being relatively atypical.  In his evidence 
to the committee Professor Freedman suggested that the decision to engage in war 
of choice “frequently evolves more slowly, allowing governments to weigh up the 
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factors involved before deciding whether and how to intervene.”254  The Lords 
committee concluded thus: “Although there have been exceptions, ... recent history 
shows that the processes leading up to the deployments are generally protracted, 
allowing plenty of time not only to evaluate and plan for the action but to obtain 
parliamentary support.  The fact that it might be inconvenient for the Government to 
seek this support is hardly a justification for denying it.”255  A long build-up was 
arguably present in the Iraq decision which was discussed at national and 
international level in the months leading up to the deployment as Chapter 1 outlined.  
So it seems that the second issue raised by Lord Reid is outmoded and has been 
overtaken by a change in political culture.  Similarly Part 3.2.3 has demonstrated that 
Lord Reid‟s traditional assumption that declarations of war are best made by an 
unfettered executive have been modified in recent years.  For example the 
government‟s own war powers consultation paper published in October 2007 does 
not view parliamentary involvement as potentially disastrous.  It first accepts that the 
waging of war will not always be subject to time constraints and second, proposes 
practical measures that could apply in such circumstances.256  
 
Nevertheless despite recently shelved reform activity it remains the case that 
domestically the prerogative to conduct military action is presently subject to fewer 
formal parliamentary or judicial controls than other prerogative areas, and the extent 
to which this was the case over the course of the Iraq affair is the concern of this 
study.   
 
 
 
[4] The Prerogative Analysed 
 
 
This Chapter has afforded a detailed understanding of the prime ministerial 
prerogatives, including the war power which is the focus of this study.  It has 
investigated in detail the prerogatives used by Mr Blair in the Iraq affair as outlined in 
Chapter 1.  It has considered the nature of prerogative power and the constitutional 
checks upon it which will form the basis for further investigation of Mr Blair‟s use of 
the war and related prerogatives during Iraq in Chapter 5.  This part will now reveal 
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insights arising from application of the two analytical devices to the preceding 
discussion.   
 
 
[4.1] Disparity Between Legal Framework and Reality 
 
 
From the preceding discussion of the premier‟s prerogatives it appears that there is a 
clear disparity between the prerogative at law and practice; the prerogatives are 
powers exercised by the monarch at law, but not in reality.  All of the vital prerogative 
powers discussed in this chapter emanate from the Crown and legally vest in the 
monarch.  The monarch undertakes a range of tasks at law using these powers, from 
dissolving Parliament and appointing ministers to declaring war.  Yet it is clear that 
current constitutional reality bears little relation to this ancient legal view because 
these powers are utilised in fact by the Prime Minister and ministers by virtue of the 
conventions discussed in Chapter 3.  The disparity between the legal and factual 
positions of prerogative is not merely restricted to who actually exercises the power 
because this very issue directly determines the degree of scrutiny the prerogative 
power will be subject to, both at law and in political practice. 
 
The disjunction between law and political reality was acknowledged by Lord Roskill 
in the leading case of GCHQ.  Commenting on historical depictions of prerogative he 
stated “fascinating as it is to explore this mainstream of our legal history, to do so in 
connection with the present appeal has an air of unreality” which inevitably involved 
“the clanking medieval chains of ghosts of the past.”257    Lord Roskill‟s comments 
here are arguably consistent with the proposition that the historical legal framework 
that creates and sustains prerogative power is perhaps misrepresentative or „unreal‟, 
acting as an illusory surface which veils real events beneath.  As will be seen in 
subsequent chapters, Lord Roskill‟s comments have proved influential, and are cited 
in recent cases.258  The recurrence of historical ghosts and their medieval chains 
across prerogative caselaw is surely no accident.  This striking and evocative 
imagery is used by judges attempting to resolve disputes regarding modern 
government power according to a legal framework that does not accord with it.  It is a 
phrase adopted to indirectly concede that the medieval legal edifice of monarchical 
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prerogative power does not accord with the political workings occurring within it, and 
indeed may conflict with them.  It is clear that in political terms, monarchy has been 
relegated to a peripheral political role and its prerogatives are now exercised in fact 
by ministers.  It is thus clear that legal understandings have not accorded with 
constitutional reality for centuries, a proposition that was investigated in Chapter 2.   
 
What are the implications of this divergence for the constitutional efficacy of 
„prerogative‟ generally?  „Prerogative‟ has proved to be remarkably enduring as a 
concept which explains executive power at common law.  Yet accepted views of it 
have changed drastically from its Blackstonian origins as a narrow set of powers 
vested only in the King Himself.  Dicey‟s wider formulation moved away from 
emphasis upon the King‟s personal powers, though it still utilised „the Crown‟ (in an 
abstract sense) as an essential component of prerogative.  Dicey‟s version 
encompassed the specific monarchical powers and a vast range of activities beyond 
these.259  In this sense Dicey‟s reformulation of „prerogative‟ seems to have enabled 
the term to continue as a basis for modern governmental power.  Essentially, with 
the growth and complexity of the modern capitalist liberal state in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Dicey‟s wide yet fluid rendering of prerogative enabled two 
things; first, government could become involved in a wider range of activities without 
further legislative prerequisites or obstacles; and second, the judiciary could continue 
to keep the constitution as an ordered, self-contained totality notwithstanding these 
developments.  So according to current legal understanding Diceyan prerogative is 
by no means obsolete; indeed it could be asked whether „prerogative‟ would have 
survived as a viable concept without Dicey‟s changes to its definition and resulting 
nature.  However despite its convenience, the prerogative‟s survival has not 
necessarily been constitutionally beneficial.  In its present form it could be claimed 
that the prerogative obscures a full and proper understanding of modern government 
power, stagnates reform,260 and potentially hampers constitutional development.261 
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In some respects the success of Dicey‟s „prerogative‟ has enabled the traditional 
monarch‟s prerogatives to remain intact.  For example it is arguable that the Law 
Lords in GCHQ reintroduced the spirit or influence of the Blackstonian view into the 
law, albeit discreetly.  They did this by drawing a distinction between two types of 
prerogative, despite the fact they emanate from the same source. This distinction 
took the form of ring-fencing from judicial scrutiny the narrow, high prerogatives most 
closely associated with the monarch.  The Law Lords did not explicitly state that they 
were immunising the monarch‟s personal prerogatives, instead citing „subject matter‟ 
as the determining factor.  Yet it seems particularly coincidental that the prerogatives 
most closely associated with monarch, such as defence of the realm and dissolution 
of Parliament, were the ones bestowed immunity on the basis of „subject matter‟.  
Prime ministerial powers inevitably benefitted as their exercise is particularly 
entwined with monarch.  The premier‟s powers therefore appeared to be shielded 
from judicial review by their association with monarch; the extent to which this is 
correct in the Iraq-era war prerogative caselaw will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
The War Prerogative 
 
Disparities between law and reality in relation to the war prerogative should also be 
afforded particular attention.  Legal views of the British war power are inherently tied 
to the notion of „monarch‟.  This is to be expected in light of the fact that monarchs 
historically used this power and it continues to be exercised by the monarch at law.  
Importantly, a number of cultural assumptions associated with an autocratic monarch 
can be detected in caselaw in this area.  Frequently cited as justifications for judicial 
deference to executive exercise of the war and related prerogatives are the 
potentially damaging consequences of hindering or intervening in government 
powers, as well as the importance of maintaining national security.  Perhaps most 
significantly judges start from the premise that „government knows best‟, i.e. that it is 
in the best position to make informed decisions regarding warfare and related issues 
of national security.  The influence of these reasons in the Iraq-era prerogative 
caselaw will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The political reality of the war prerogative diverges from the legal view discussed 
above, both in its actual exercise and the principles employed to justify it.  The 
political reality is more nuanced and less clear cut than its legal counterpart.  In 
practice the war prerogative is exercised by the Prime Minister, though Parliament‟s 
support for war is essential and its role arguably strengthened towards the end of the 
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Blair premiership.  Proposed reforms aim to formalise and galvanise Parliament‟s 
involvement further.  The justifications underpinning parliamentary control of the war 
power materially conflict with those advanced in favour of the monarchical model.  
Such justifications include the need for greater democratic accountability, the 
importance of fully debating the implications of warfare and finally ensuring that 
governments that may be inclined to conduct war are effectively checked.  
Nevertheless, the emerging strengthened position of Parliament should not be 
overstated and should be viewed in light of three important political realities.  First 
the executive can control Parliament by virtue of its party majority in the Commons.  
More importantly there will always be a need for individual leadership in warfare and 
the Prime Minister remains the one individual with direct access to the war power 
because he has the exclusive capacity to advise the monarch regarding use of the 
war power at law.  Finally clusters of monarchical prerogatives can be used in 
combination to facilitate a premier‟s achievement of his (or his government‟s) 
preferred use of the war prerogative.  For example during the Iraq affair Mr Blair 
used his exclusive access to the prerogative powers of Cabinet chairmanship, 
dissolving Parliament and conducting defence matters in a very specific and highly 
effective way as identified in Chapter 1 and detailed in Part 2 of this chapter. 
 
So in political reality it appears that there is an ongoing complex and fluctuating 
balance of power between Prime Minister (and government) and Parliament in 
relation to the war prerogative, and in some limited respects this echoes the 
struggles between the monarch and Parliament in previous centuries.  De facto 
control of war power remains in prime ministerial hands but there is a relative shift of 
political influence in Parliament‟s favour.  This modification is occurring beneath the 
unchanging legal framework that places the monarch in de jure control of the war 
power, and which will continue to do so unless and until proposed reforms are put on 
a statutory footing.  Thus, as Chapter 3 confirmed, the rupture between the law and 
reality of the war prerogative is increasing as the latter continues to evolve away 
from the former.  The preceding discussion has thus established that there is a clear 
disparity between the respective legal and political positions of the war prerogative.  
Additionally there is a corresponding conflict between the principles that animate 
each respective position. 
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[4.2] The Role of Boundaries in Prerogative 
 
 
Discussion in this chapter has afforded detailed understanding of prerogative 
generally and the war power specifically, including the checks and balances upon it.  
It is clear from this discussion that boundaries play a vital role in understandings of 
the prerogative power.  They are erected by the judiciary in relation to prerogative in 
two distinct ways. 
 
First, boundaries are used to determine the very scope of prerogative.  It has been 
shown that the prevailing Diceyan view defines prerogative by what it is not (it is not 
statutory and it is not unlawful).  By declaring the proper scope of statutes and by 
setting out the boundaries of lawful conduct, a remaining (or residual) area 
authorised by prerogative is created.  Thus it is the boundaries of law as declared by 
the courts that essentially create prerogative.  As Part 1 confirmed, these boundaries 
are informed by the two Diceyan constitutional fundamentals of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law.  Determining these boundaries (and thus the 
corresponding perimeter of prerogative) is a matter of legal interpretation and the 
courts are ideally placed to undertake this task in relatively clear and consistent 
terms. 
 
The second, and most significant use of boundaries in relation to prerogative are 
those employed to distinguish between different types of prerogative exercised by 
government.  Part 3 explained that in GCHQ the Law Lords differentiated 
prerogatives that the courts would be willing to scrutinise from those they would not 
by ring-fencing those in the area of „high policy‟. Though the GCHQ ring-fencing 
must be viewed in light of subsequent caselaw in Chapter 5, it will be confirmed that 
a distinction of sorts remains intact between justiciable and non-justiciable 
prerogatives (or in Jowell‟s terms, between those matters that fall within the law‟s 
ambit and those which lie within the „appropriate province of politicians‟).262  The 
viability of this distinction between matters of law and policy is arguably artificial and 
somewhat arbitrary.  Harris, for example, has questioned it in the following terms: 
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“The theoretical position that the courts should not review, and 
consequently not make policy decisions, does not correspond exactly 
with the practical needs of the community, or the way that courts 
operate in reality. ... Policy, to a greater or lesser degree, permeates 
most judicial decision-making.”263 
 
The construction of these second boundaries acts to protect the war power which is 
situated firmly within the ring-fenced area of non-justiciability. The boundaries also 
ensure that the Prime Minister‟s cluster of prerogatives, including appointing 
ministers, chairing Cabinet and dissolving Parliament, are similarly immune to 
judicial scrutiny.  These powers are central to the office and may provide a premier 
with political leverage in relation to Cabinet and his parliamentary party.  Such 
powers will be immune from judicial scrutiny, however partisan or unorthodox their 
exercise may appear.   
 
The second type of boundary is of vital importance because the foundations upon 
which they are constructed are more ambiguous and elusive than the more concrete 
legal ones sustaining the borders of prerogative.  Can the underlying principles that 
determine the positioning of these second boundaries be clearly ascertained, 
particularly in matters of war, defence and foreign affairs?  Cases such as Chandler, 
The Zamora and more recently Marchiori indicate that up to three interconnected 
rationales have arguably influenced judicial approaches in this area.  First, vague 
notions of the separation of powers indicate that the three state limbs should 
undertake their proper functions and not stray beyond their allocated roles; thus the 
judiciary should adjudicate according to the law and the executive should govern 
(which includes managing matters of defence and foreign affairs).  Second, there 
exists an unequivocal desire on the part of judges to avoid involvement in political 
matters, which is perhaps attributable to the influence of the separation of powers 
doctrine and the culture of positivism as discussed in Chapter 3.  Finally, related to 
the preceding points, there is an acknowledged lack of expertise in matters of 
defence and national security on the part of the judiciary.   
 
The lack of clarity and blurring of these notions which underpin the boundaries 
between justiciable and non-justiciable has a consequential impact on the 
boundaries themselves.  However, it is also arguable that the three rationales above 
are reducible to, or certainly compatible with, the basic and fundamental aim to keep 
non-legal decisions, particularly matters of wider politics or policy, out of the 
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courtroom.  In this sense, caselaw involving the war and related prerogatives 
demonstrates judicial concern with maintaining what Douzinas calls law‟s „internal 
purity‟ by eliminating „law‟s other‟ from the law itself.264  Yet, as Chapter 5 reveals, 
this task is arduous, complex and perhaps not always entirely successful.  How „well 
policed‟ are the „checkpoints‟ between law and non-law in this area?265  Can these 
boundaries be clearly and precisely rendered?  Not necessarily, according to Harris 
who claims that judges may disagree as to where such boundaries should be 
drawn.266  Furthermore, “[I]n some contexts it may be difficult for the court to manage 
delineation between justiciability and non-justiciability in such a way as to maintain 
community confidence in the line which is being drawn.”267  Such difficulties 
encountered in the Iraq caselaw are subjected to detailed investigation in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter Five  
Caselaw Concerning the War and Related 
Prerogatives During and After the  
Iraq Affair  
 
 
 
 
The Blair government‟s conduct of the Iraq „war‟ triggered a number of legal 
challenges.  Much of the resulting caselaw specifically considered the Crown 
prerogative to wage war and a range of associated legal issues.  This Chapter 
provides an account of prominent caselaw concerning the war prerogative over the 
broad Iraq period which must be considered against the wider political and 
constitutional events outlined in previous chapters. 
 
Previous chapters established that the Crown prerogative power to wage war (along 
with other powers) is exercised by the monarch at law but is in reality exercised by 
the Prime Minister (and Foreign Secretary) according to the „paramount‟ ministerial 
advice convention.1  Specifically, Chapter 4 established a detailed understanding of 
prerogative power and confirmed that judicial checks upon the war prerogative are 
limited.  These matters form the basis for discussion in this chapter. 
 
A number of points regarding the Iraq caselaw must be noted at the outset.  First, all 
of the cases to be discussed in this Chapter involve the war prerogative or related 
powers that are categorised within the general prerogative to conduct foreign affairs.  
Though this study is specifically concerned with the war prerogative, consideration of 
cases involving the prerogative to conduct international diplomacy are important and 
require attention because its exercise in these cases was linked to UK action in Iraq 
and the „war on terror‟ and, more importantly, it has occupied the same ring-fenced 
area as the war prerogative and is therefore viewed by the judiciary in similar terms.  
Second, though these cases involve challenging various prerogatives related to 
conduct the Iraq war, it will be seen that the specific prerogatives referred to are 
often blurred or uncertain, though all involve foreign affairs and/or defence in some 
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capacity.  Third, despite covering a range of disputes, most of the cases in this 
chapter hinge upon two issues: jurisdiction and justiciability.   
 
The justiciability issue is the primary concern of this study in that it directly concerns 
the legal view of the prime ministerial war prerogative at English law.2  This chapter 
accordingly isolates and discusses judicial approaches to various foreign affairs-
related decisions made via the prerogative, specifically whether they fall within 
subject matter capable of being reviewed by the courts.  The second issue, 
jurisdiction, has required the courts to decide whether international law can apply 
domestically without express enactment, i.e. whether English courts have jurisdiction 
regarding disputes of international law.3  Many of the cases discussed in this 
Chapter, primarily in the area of judicial review, involve a range of complex, 
interwoven issues.4  Issues involving matters of jurisdiction or international law will 
be covered only to the extent that they are relevant to the aims of this study.   
 
This chapter starts by providing a general overview of emerging developments in war 
and related prerogative caselaw over the broad Iraq period.  Parts 2 and 3 proceed 
to undertake detailed discussion of these select cases through the prism of the two 
analytical devices outlined in the Introduction.  These parts isolate and extensively 
analyse two important issues which emerge from the Iraq caselaw; namely the role 
of judicially erected boundaries between law and non-law in this area and the 
identification of any disparities between the Iraq caselaw and reality operating 
beneath.  This analysis of the Iraq-era caselaw yields deeper insights into the war 
prerogative and judicial checks upon it. 
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[1] Overview of Developments in Legal Checks over 
the Broad Iraq Period  
 
 
Chapter 4 confirmed that select high policy prerogatives, including „making treaties‟ 
and „defence of the realm‟, were deemed non-justiciable in the leading case of 
GCHQ.5  It also confirmed that subsequent cases have made incursions into certain 
formerly ring-fenced areas.6  This part provides an overarching account of war and 
related prerogative caselaw over the broad Iraq period and considers emerging 
developments.  It seeks to identify and discuss the operation and efficacy of judicial 
checks upon the war and related prerogatives, with specific attention to the 
justiciability of prerogatives in this area.  To aid this overarching account of emerging 
developments, the cases will be discussed chronologically. 
 
 
[1.1] Abbasi v Foreign Secretary [2002]7 
 
 
The first case of significance is Abbasi which involved a challenge to the foreign 
affairs prerogative of conducting diplomacy rather than conducting military action.  It 
specifically concerned the provision of diplomatic assistance to British subjects 
whose human rights may be violated by a foreign state.  In Abbasi the mother of a 
British national detained by US government in Guantanamo Bay applied for judicial 
review of the Foreign Secretary‟s refusal to make representations to the US 
government on her son‟s behalf.  The application was refused and she appealed.  
One of the two main issues raised by this case was whether executive action in the 
conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs was capable of judicial review.8  Despite its 
concerns about the Guantanamo camp,9 on the facts before it the Court of Appeal 
                                                     
5
 Council of Civil Service Unions & Others v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374, HL.  Hereinafter 
referred to as „GCHQ‟. 
6
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bentley [1994] QB 349; R v Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte Everett [1989] QB 811. 
7
 R (on the application of Abbasi and another) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs and another [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, [2002] All ER (D) 70, CA. 
8
 The other was whether the legitimacy of an action taken by a foreign sovereign state (i.e. the US) was 
within the jurisdiction of the court. 
9
 Sands writes of the Abbasi judgment: “the [Court of Appeal] judgment made clear that silence was not 
an option.  The Court expressed the hope that its deep concern and anxiety would be drawn to the 
attention of the American courts.”  P Sands QC, Lawless World (Penguin, London, 2006) p 166 
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answered this issue in the negative and the application was dismissed.10  The court‟s 
reasoning regarding justiciability is of particular significance.   
 
The Foreign Secretary argued that executive decisions when dealing with foreign 
states were not subject to judicial scrutiny; Lord Phillips accepted that such 
reasoning was based on „formidable‟ and „powerful‟ authorities.11  Nevertheless, he 
elsewhere considered authorities indicating that “the issue of justiciability depends ... 
on subject matter and suitability in the particular case”, suggesting that the subject 
matter of the disputed prerogative was not the sole determining factor.  The court 
ultimately refused to accept an outright blanket ban on the judicial review of all 
matters involving government refusal to render diplomatic assistance; such decisions 
could be justiciable.  Though it was clearly situated within the previously ring-fenced 
area of foreign affairs,12 this specific, narrow function might be judicially reviewable.  
Lord Phillips put forward three reasons for this proposition. 
 
Firstly, the relationship between judicial review and prerogative could not 
automatically rule out the prospect. Lord Phillips drew upon two features of caselaw 
that left this issue open.  First, the principle of „legitimate expectation‟13 may apply 
where government pursued „a regular practice that the claimant can reasonably 
expect to continue‟.14  Additionally, caselaw indicated that once ring-fenced areas of 
prerogative had gradually come within the ambit of judicial review;15 there was 
therefore a logical possibility that such developments could continue in the future.  
The second reason as to why the conduct of diplomacy might be reviewable was that 
the Foreign Office had previously published and acted in accordance with a policy 
indicating “a clear acceptance by the government of a role in relation to protecting 
the rights of British citizens abroad, where there is evidence of miscarriage or denial 
of justice”16 thus providing a legitimate expectation of assistance in such 
circumstances.  The final reason for the court‟s decision was the government‟s 
                                                     
10
 Despite the Court of Appeal‟s ruling the British government formally requested the return of the 
British detainees in spring 2004.  Ibid 171.  
11
 Abassi (n 7) paras 37-38.  
12
 GCHQ (n 5). 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Abassi (n 7) para 82.   
15
 Bentley (n 6); Everett (n 6). 
16
 Abbasi (n 7) para 92. 
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successfully-deployed arguments in previous cases that diplomatic means rather 
than the court interference was the appropriate method of resolving such situations.17   
 
Despite finding that the government‟s refusal to provide diplomatic assistance could 
be justiciable in limited circumstances,18 the Abbasi application was nevertheless 
dismissed.  The Foreign Office was obliged to consider taking diplomatic action on 
an individual‟s behalf and refusal to undertake such consideration could be 
reviewable.19  So reviewability applied in a very limited capacity and did not extend to 
substantive decisions regarding the conduct of diplomacy, or what the court 
maintained was still a „forbidden area‟.20 The caution and discomfort of the judgment 
in this foreign affairs area was evident.  Lord Phillips spoke of the need for „delicate 
diplomacy‟21 and great „circumspection‟ regarding „interven[tion] where diplomats fear 
to tread.‟22  Furthermore he stated that “The expectations are limited and the 
discretion is a very wide one”.23  The government had been making ongoing 
representations to the US government regarding the Guantanamo detainees and in 
the court‟s view this was sufficient to meet Abbasi‟s reasonable expectations and 
discharge the Foreign Secretary‟s obligations.24  The court concluded:  
 
“On no view would it be appropriate to order the Secretary of State to 
make specific representations to the United States, even in the face of 
what appears to be a clear breach of fundamental human right, as it is 
obvious that this would impact on the conduct of foreign policy, and 
impact upon such policy at a particularly delicate time.”25 
 
So the Abbasi judgment indicated that though judicial review was technically 
possible in the specific area of diplomatic assistance, the potential effect of this 
development was limited.  In real terms the possibility of review was minimal, and 
indeed the court acknowledged that judicial review would „kick in‟ only in „extreme 
case[s]‟.26  Despite this point, Kilroy noted the potential future impact of Abbasi in 
                                                     
17
 Ibid paras 96-8. Underlying this final reason was the rationale that government could not put forward 
legal arguments that directly contradicted those previously made now that these did not favour their 
position in the present case.  
18
 Ibid para 106 (iv)-(v). 
19
 Emphasis added.  Ibid para 106(iv).  The obligation is limited to considering. 
20
 Ibid para 106(iii),(iv). 
21
 Lightman J, quoted ibid para 37 
22
 Donaldson MR, quoted ibid. 
23
 Ibid para 106(iii). 
24
 Ibid para 107(i). 
25
 Ibid para 107(ii). 
26
 Ibid para 104. 
 158 
 
broadening the scope of judicial review;27 discussion in Parts 1.2-1.5 considers the 
extent to which subsequent cases developed this potential. 
 
 
[1.2] C.N.D. v Prime Minister [2002]28 
 
 
CND was a highly significant case brought in the lead up to the Iraq war, prior to 
invasion, when the UN Security Council negotiations were ongoing.  It demonstrates 
the courts being asked to specifically engage with prime ministerial exercise of the 
war prerogative.    
 
Two preliminary points about CND can be noted at the outset.  Firstly the claimants 
named the Prime Minister as defendant in the action.  The case was brought to 
challenge his anticipated prerogative decision regarding military action in Iraq.  CND 
therefore continues the assumed and silent operation of the ministerial advice 
convention and provides a further instance of the legal framework in this area being 
viewed in its wider conventional context.29  However, interestingly the judgment 
avoids any reference to the Prime Minister, other than in the title of the proceedings. 
 
A second interesting aspect of the CND judgment is the way it illustrates the 
ambiguities surrounding specific prerogative powers; there was judicial divergence 
regarding exactly which specific prerogatives the case involved.  Brown LJ claimed 
that the prerogative of defence of the realm was being exercised.30  Kay J indicated 
that the subject-matter of the case was foreign policy generally and the deployment 
of armed forces,31 and similarly Richards J stated that the claim involved foreign 
affairs and defence prerogatives.32  These disparities were by no means a central 
issue in the case because in practical terms it makes little difference which specific 
category of prerogative authorises the decision.  As Chapter 4 demonstrated, 
prerogative covers government action in all of these areas, none of which are self-
contained and some of which may overlap.  But significantly, the failure of the 
                                                     
27
 C Kilroy, „R. (on the application of Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs: reviewing the prerogative‟ (2003) E.H.R.L.R. 222, p 228. 
28
 CND v Prime Minister (n 2). 
29
 See Chapter 3, Part 3.1. 
30
 CND v Prime Minister (n 2) para 18. 
31
 Ibid para 50. 
32
 Ibid para 59. 
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judiciary to attribute a clear distinct prerogative under which the decision would be 
taken demonstrates the fluid and inchoate nature of prerogative power consistent 
with its Diceyan definition.33 
 
In CND the claimants wanted the court to provide a „true‟ interpretation of UN 
Resolution 1441,34 particularly clarifying whether it permitted military action by the 
UK and US without the need for a further UN resolution if Iraq failed to comply with 
its terms.  CND applied to the Divisional Court for a declaration that any military 
action taken by the government against Iraq without a further UN Resolution would 
be in breach of international law.  In any event, this substantive point was never 
covered because in keeping with other caselaw in this area the two main issues of 
jurisdiction and justiciability arose, thus requiring the court to initially consider 
whether it had the appropriate capacity to consider this legal issue. 
 
The three Divisional Court judges put forward similar reasons for their rejection of the 
CND claim, each concluding that providing a declaration regarding resolution 1441 
would impinge upon the governmental (or specifically prime ministerial) exercise of 
the war-related defence and foreign affairs prerogatives.  Despite this, the judges 
structured their arguments in different ways and their respective approaches to the 
justiciability issue are interesting.  
 
CND, drawing on a variety of judgments, including Abbasi, argued that the excluded 
prerogatives set out by Lord Roskill in GCHQ no longer applied, or in short, „there 
[were] no longer any no-go areas for the court.‟35  The judges‟ approaches to this 
issue varied and ultimately no conclusive statement on the matter was put forward. 
 
Of the three judgments, Kay J afforded justiciability the greatest weighting in his 
resolution of the case, citing it as „the first reason‟ why the CND application must 
fail.36  Furthermore, his treatment of the ring-fencing issue was the clearest, refusing 
to accept the claimants‟ arguments that the blanket protection of high prerogatives 
has been removed completely.  Though Kay J conceded that the areas set out in 
GCHQ had been reduced, the immunity in relation to the foreign affairs and warfare 
prerogative remained intact:  “the authorities provide no hint of retreat in relation to 
the subject-matter of the present case.  This is hardly surprising.  Foreign policy and 
                                                     
33
 See Chapter 4, Part 1. 
34
 Discussed in Chapter 1, Part 1.4.   
35
 CND v Prime Minister (n 2) para 18. 
36
 Ibid para 50.  He did not consider the „jurisdiction‟ issue at all.  
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the deployment of the armed forces remain non-justiciable.”37  Thus Kay J attempted 
to maintain the ring-fencing of the high policy prerogatives in this case despite cases 
such as Abbasi that potentially called this tradition into question. 
 
The judgments of Kay J‟s colleagues were less conclusive regarding the ring-fencing 
issue.  Brown LJ did not make specific reference to the high policy prerogatives or 
ring-fencing, though he did cite the „illuminating‟ Abbasi judgment that had refused to 
automatically rule out review whilst also identifying „forbidden areas‟.38  Furthermore 
he briefly quoted the court in Rehman39 that it is “well established in caselaw that 
issues of national security do not fall beyond the competence of the courts”.40  This 
brief extract was not conclusive and Brown LJ did not provide further elaboration 
upon either authority.  Nevertheless their inclusion by Brown LJ appeared to indicate 
that the courts would not automatically refrain from becoming involved in cases 
solely on the basis that they involved high policy areas such as national security.  
However Brown LJ still went on to find that a court declaration would be damaging to 
national interests.41   
 
Adopting Abbasi terminology Richards J claimed that issuing a declaration would 
entail the court entering „forbidden areas‟; foreign affairs and defence must be the 
sole preserve of the executive.42  He continued: “Of course the field of activity alone 
does not determine whether something falls within a forbidden area: „Justiciability 
depends, not on general principle, but on subject matter and suitability in the 
particular case‟.”43  Thus Richards J seemed to accept that the ring-fencing of 
forbidden areas prevailed, but the decision regarding where to ring-fence would now 
be more refined and would depend on the „suitability‟ of court intervention and not 
solely upon subject-matter.  In any event Richards J concluded that a declaration 
regarding resolution 1441 would encounter problems in relation to both suitability 
and subject matter.  CND‟s claim was an attempt to restrict the Government‟s room 
for manoeuvre regarding military action and prior diplomacy.  He claimed in 
unequivocal terms that this attempt could not succeed: 
 
                                                     
37
 Ibid para 50. 
38
 Ibid para 28. 
39
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 AC 153. 
40
 CND v Prime Minister (n 2) para 42. 
41
 Ibid paras 41, 45. 
42
 Ibid para 59. 
43
 Emphasis added.  Abbasi (n 7) cited ibid para 59. 
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“That takes [the claim] squarely into the fields of foreign affairs and 
defence.  In my view it is unthinkable that the national courts would 
entertain a challenge to a Government decision to declare war or 
authorise the use of armed force against a third country.  That is a 
classic example of a non-justiciable decision.”44 
 
Richards J‟s view here was expressed in somewhat emphatic terms.  Despite 
appearing to qualify the earlier GCHQ ring-fencing approach in light of recent 
developments such as Abbasi, he went on to effectively ring-fence the more specific 
war prerogative. 
 
 
[1.3] Al Rawi v Foreign Secretary 
 
 
Like Abbasi, the Al Rawi case involved the foreign affairs prerogative to conduct 
diplomacy rather than to deploy troops.  Indeed the facts of the case were very 
similar to Abbasi but the claim was brought by non-UK nationals who were detained 
at Guantanamo Bay.  The Guantanamo detainees were long-term residents of the 
UK but did not have British national status.45  On this basis the defendant Foreign 
Secretary declined to make a formal request to the US for the detainees‟ return, 
claiming that he was under no such obligation under international law.  A judicial 
review application challenging the Foreign Secretary‟s refusal was brought by the 
detainees and their families.  Human rights arguments based on Articles 346 and 847 
were raised.48  The claimants submitted that, like British nationals, they had a 
legitimate expectation that a formal request would be made on their behalf. 
 
The Al Rawi case was initially considered by the Divisional Court where the 
applications were dismissed.  The claimants appealed and the matter was afforded 
further consideration by the Court of Appeal.  The salient points made by each court 
regarding the ring-fencing issue are now discussed chronologically. 
 
 
                                                     
44
 Emphasis added.  Ibid para 59(ii). 
45
 The first three claimants were long term residents in the UK.  The second and third claimants had been 
granted refugee status.  The fourth to seventh claimants were families of the Guantanamo detainees, 
some of whom were British nationals. 
46
 The right against inhuman and degrading treatment 
47
 The right to respect for private and family life. 
48
 A full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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[1.3.1] Al Rawi in the Divisional Court [2006]49 
 
The Divisional Court held that requiring the Foreign Secretary to make a formal 
request to the US in the absence of a clear legal duty would constitute an 
interference in relations between sovereign states.  Furthermore, in terms of 
justiciability, the Foreign Secretary‟s prerogative decision was one of foreign policy 
and the court was not equipped to assess such judgements in this area. 
 
Latham LJ‟s joint judgment considered the justiciability of prerogative decisions in 
this area.  In doing so he drew heavily upon the Abbasi judgment.50  Following that 
case, Latham LJ claimed that decisions affecting foreign affairs (undertaken by 
prerogative) were a „forbidden area‟.51  Yet despite the connotations of protected or 
ring-fenced high prerogatives this raised, it seems that the court did not continue the 
GCHQ approach.  The area was not automatically forbidden because (following Lord 
Bingham‟s comments in Jones)52 Latham LJ stated: 
 
“Clearly this could not deflect us from giving relief in restricted terms … 
We would undoubtedly have been entitled to intervene”.53   
 
So Al Rawi indicated that the courts were technically capable of judicially reviewing 
the foreign affairs prerogative.  This appeared to crystallise the position emerging 
from earlier caselaw and represented a departure from the legal position set out by 
the House of Lords in GCHQ.  The ring-fencing around this high policy or political 
prerogative had arguably been removed; this area of prerogative would not now 
enjoy blanket protection.  Nevertheless, the court made it clear that the exceptional 
                                                     
49
 R (on the application of Al Rawi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] 
EWHC 972 (Admin); [2006] All ER (D) 46 (May). 
50
 Ibid paras 4 –55. 
51
 Ibid para 89 
52
 Regina v Jones (Margaret) and others [2007] 1 AC 136, HL. Here Lord Bingham found that accepting 
defence arguments in this criminal appeal would inevitably entail the court casting judgement upon the 
government‟s exercise of prerogative.  This was not appropriate because “there are well established 
rules that the courts will be very slow to review the exercise of prerogative powers in relation to the 
conduct of foreign affairs and the deployment of the armed services, and very slow to adjudicate upon 
rights arising out of transactions entered into between sovereign states on the plane of international 
law.”  Emphasis added, para 30.  Note here that Lord Bingham‟s language referred to a general 
reluctance on the part of the courts (they will be „very slow‟) to get involved.  But this did not 
categorically rule out the possibility of reviewing the foreign affairs prerogative, indeed it implicitly 
assumed that review may be technically possible but would be undertaken sparingly.   
53
 Al Rawi, DC (n 49) para 90.  The passage proceeds to list requirements for such an intervention:  “if we 
were to conclude that he would appear to have failed to take into account either appropriately or at all 
any relevant material.  … [or] if we had considered that he had made an error at law.”  See also para 
84. 
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requirements54 to justify judicial intervention would make it „difficult for the claimants 
to succeed‟ in their request that the defence make a formal request.55  The requisite 
conditions for judicial involvement were not present here and even if they were, the 
court would merely require the defendants to re-take decision rather than issue a 
formal request.56   
 
So Latham LJ‟s judgment confirmed that the courts were not prevented from 
reviewing a prerogative decision in foreign affairs per se.  However, there would be 
limitations on judicial scrutiny in certain areas, particularly in relation to foreign affairs 
where the executive had wide discretion.57  Summarising Abbassi, Latham LJ stated:  
 
“whilst a decision in relation to diplomatic intervention was not immune 
from judicial scrutiny, that scrutiny had to take into account the very 
special nature of foreign policy considerations which are not in 
themselves justiciable.”58   
 
The interesting point about this statement is its emphasis on the foreign affairs 
prerogative as „very special‟; decisions here generally concerned matters of policy 
which were viewed as beyond the judicial remit.  This clearly distinguished foreign 
affairs from other non-„special‟ prerogatives.  Significantly, implied distinctions 
between foreign affairs and regular prerogatives were evident elsewhere in Latham 
LJ‟s judgment.  For example he adopted the language of caution when considering 
the foreign affairs prerogative, referring to it as a delicate area‟59 and furthermore 
“one in which the courts have consistently trod cautiously.”60  
 
So it is clear that though foreign affairs areas of prerogative were not automatically 
immune, the courts still viewed them differently.  A distinction of sorts between this 
high policy prerogative and regular prerogatives was therefore maintained, or in 
basic terms subject matter would still be an issue.  Nevertheless, the departure from 
GCHQ appears to be two-fold: first the automatic immunity from scrutiny afforded to 
foreign affairs has been down-graded to a mere strong presumption against scrutiny, 
                                                     
54
 One of two necessary conditions must have been present: either the defendants‟ decision must have 
failed to take account of recent international proposals regarding the status of refugees, or alternatively 
the defendants‟ decision must have been based upon an unrealistic approach to detainee conditions in 
Guantanamo.  Ibid para 93. 
55
 Ibid para 90. 
56
 Ibid paras 90, 93. 
57
 Ibid para 54: “the limits of the court‟s scrutiny were clearly set by the nature of the decision under 
consideration.” 
58
 Emphasis added.  Ibid para 54.   
59
 Ibid para 97 
60
 Ibid para 89. 
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and second, if courts are willing to undertake a degree of scrutiny in relation to this 
higher prerogative, it will be extremely limited in scope.  So rather than ring-fencing 
prerogatives by subject matter the courts now appear to ring-fence their scrutiny; in 
the area of foreign affairs prerogative any scrutiny will be very tightly limited.  This 
seems to be a discernible shift experienced during the Iraq era caselaw.   
 
 
[1.3.2] Al Rawi in the Court of Appeal [2007]61  
 
Laws LJ‟s joint Court of Appeal judgment dismissed the appeal and confirmed the 
Divisional Court‟s findings regarding the non-justiciability of prerogative in this area.  
The judgment made some interesting comments in relation to this issue.  It 
confirmed at the outset that the conduct of foreign affairs “is so particularly the 
responsibility of the government that it would be wrong for the courts to tread such 
ground”.62  The Court of Appeal also made some general comments that provided a 
further indication of a move away from the GCHQ ring-fencing of high policy 
prerogatives.  For example it stated that “The scope of judicial review relating to 
security questions is tightly constrained, though not as severely as in the past.”63  
This comment clearly summarised the general trend; a discernible relaxation of 
restrictions on judicial review in this area.  Nevertheless, the statement was couched 
in somewhat vague terms and did not pinpoint the precise mechanics of this 
development. 
 
Elsewhere Laws LJ dealt more explicitly with the notion of ring-fencing.  In response 
to defence arguments (based on Abbasi) that the claimants wanted the court to enter 
„a forbidden area‟64 Laws LJ stated: 
 
“This is a powerful submission, but we do not think it has the force 
without more to carry the whole case in [the government‟s] favour.”65  
 
This seems to indicate that the court was unwilling to allow the government to simply 
rely on the basic argument that foreign affairs was an immune, non-justiciable area; 
                                                     
61
 R (Al Rawi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees intervening) [2006] EWCA Civ 1279, [2007] 2 WLR 1219, CA. 
62
 Ibid para 2.  Furthermore acknowledging that “the courts have not the competence to pass objective 
judgement ... in so intricate an area of state practice.” 
63
 Ibid para 42. 
64
 Ibid para 63. 
65
 Ibid para 64. 
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„more‟ was required and the court indicated that the matter must be considered „point 
by point‟.  Again this provided further indication that the automatic ring-fencing of this 
prerogative had been removed.  But despite this apparent progress, the court still 
deemed the Foreign Secretary‟s conduct non-justiciable because the claimants‟ 
arguments to the contrary „[fell] foul of two principles‟.66  First such arguments 
required “the court to enter into what in Abbasi … was described as a „forbidden 
area‟, that is, the conduct of foreign relations.”67  Citing this as a factor seems 
ambiguous and somewhat inconsistent with the court‟s earlier comments outlined 
above because it indicates that notions of „forbidden areas‟ and ring-fencing may still 
prevail.  Nevertheless, it is arguable that the court was saying that instead of 
applying automatically, the notion of „forbidden area‟ now constituted only one factor 
(arguably a major one) which determined whether a court would scrutinise a 
prerogative decision.  The second principle which led the court to reject the 
claimant‟s arguments was as follows; “what is and what is not a relevant 
consideration for a public decision-maker to have in mind is (absent a statutory code 
of compulsory considerations) for the decision-maker, not the court, to decide.”68  
Thus the court indicated that it was unwilling to be prescriptive about how the 
Foreign Secretary should make this kind of decision; a wide margin of discretion in 
the prerogative of foreign affairs would remain.69 
 
So as one would expect, the Court of Appeal resolutely refused the claimants‟ 
request to play a greater supervisory role in government foreign policy decisions.  To 
do so would „represent an outlandish view of the relation between the judiciary and 
executive.‟70  Ultimately to justify judicial involvement in such an area the claimants 
would have to establish „at the least‟ that the Foreign Secretary‟s decision was 
„frankly perverse‟.71  This onerous and exceptional benchmark was not satisfied in Al 
Rawi.  
 
                                                     
66
 Ibid para 131 
67
 Ibid.  The court‟s reason for this was as follows; “[The claimants] seek to persuade us to order the 
Foreign Secretary to adopt a different judgement as to the conduct of negotiations with the United 
States, upon a delicate policy issue, from that which, upon mature consideration, she has already 
made.  That offends the first principle”, para 132. 
68
 Ibid para 131.  The court‟s reason for this was as follows; “[The claimants‟] judicial review grounds 
list something like 37 factors which it is said should have been taken into account. … They have all 
been constructed by the lawyers, as if for all the world it is for the court to decide what the Foreign 
Secretary should and should not bear in mind in deciding what policy to adopt.  That offends the 
second principle”, para 132.  
69
 In foreign affairs decisions “the class of factors … which it is open to the decision-maker to treat as 
relevant or not, must be particularly wide.”  Ibid para 140. 
70
 Ibid para 134. 
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 Ibid para 141. 
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[1.4] Gentle v Prime Minister 
 
 
Gentle was another significant case in this area that considered the prerogative 
regarding international relations and warfare, and approved Abbasi,72 and CND.73  In 
Gentle the Prime Minister was named as lead defendant along with the Defence 
Secretary and the Attorney General, again demonstrating the central prime 
ministerial role in this area.  Furthermore, following CND, it continued the assumed 
operation of the ministerial advice convention and the viewing of the legal framework 
in its wider conventional context. 
  
The claimants were mothers of soldiers who had died whilst on duty in Iraq.  They 
sought an independent inquiry into whether the government had taken reasonable 
steps to ensure the invasion of Iraq was lawful under international law.74  They 
argued that Article 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (the right to life) had been 
breached as it appeared that the government had not taken reasonable steps, 
therefore an inquiry was necessary.75  The government refused to hold an inquiry 
claiming, among other reasons, that the extra-territorial actions of a state were non-
justiciable.  The claimants sought permission to judicially review this decision, 
pursuing the case ultimately to the House of Lords.  The respective judgments of the 
Court of Appeal and Law Lords are now discussed in turn. 
 
 
[1.4.1] Gentle in the Court of Appeal [2006]76 
 
The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the claimants‟ application, holding that 
Article 2 did not impose an obligation to ensure that military action was lawful 
                                                     
72
 Abbasi (n 7). 
73
 CND v Prime Minister (n 2). 
74
 As distinct from whether the invasion itself was in accordance with international law. 
75
 The claimants argued that human rights are protected in all areas including high policy areas.  Their 
arguments thus attempted to increase the field of „unlawfulness‟ that government must avoid by 
widening the scope of the Article 2 right, thus limiting Diceyan prerogative.  If successful this would 
have had the effect of limiting the war prerogative because government would always have to take 
reasonable steps to ensure its use of the prerogative was internationally lawful (though arguably this 
need not have necessarily set a particularly onerous standard for a government to meet if it had 
followed proper procedures).   
76
 R (on the application of Gentle and another) v Prime Minister and others [2006] EWCA Civ 1689, 
[2007] QB 689 CA. 
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internationally.77  The government was therefore under no obligation to set up an 
inquiry.  Furthermore, according to the separation of powers this area concerned the 
executive rather than the courts.  The issue of justiciability recurred, the defendant 
arguing that its extra-territorial actions were not subject to judicial review.  Non-
justiciability formed one of four reasons why the defence claimed it was under no 
obligation to take reasonable steps to ascertain the international lawfulness of 
invasion.78  The court accepted this defence point, reiterating the basic proposition 
that the conduct of foreign and military affairs outside of the UK was not justiciable.   
 
As a starting point the Court of Appeal claimed that the lawfulness of sending forces 
to Iraq was not justiciable for „one or both‟ of two reasons;79 first, the court was not in 
a position to provide a ruling on international law, and second, the issue in dispute 
fell within foreign affairs and defence policy which was the exclusive concern of 
government prerogative.  The court declared that these two issues, jurisdiction and 
justiciability, were „closely bound up together‟ because considering the international 
law would inevitably impinge upon government‟s exercise of the prerogative.80  This 
demonstrates that prime ministerial or ministerial decisions in matters of war will be 
situated in the area of overlap between the two prohibited areas of non-jurisdiction 
and non-justiciability, effectively dual-insulating ministerial decisions in this field from 
judicial scrutiny. 
 
The Court of Appeal in Gentle did not provide a clear, explicit statement on whether 
the high prerogatives of war, defence and foreign affairs were to remain formally 
ring-fenced or not.  Its position on this point remained somewhat ambiguous and the 
court cited various mixed authorities that provided little clear indication of the 
direction this ring-fencing may be taking.  On one view the judgment cited numerous 
authorities that tilted in favour of the view that ring-fencing of high prerogatives had 
been removed.  The first indication was the court‟s reference to Abbasi,81 the case 
that potentially called the automatic ring-fencing of the high policy foreign affairs 
prerogative into question and suggested that in exceptional circumstances the 
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 Ibid para 42. 
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 Ibid para 25.  The first 3 reasons put forward by the defence included: (1) the Article 2 right did not 
extend to decisions to deploy armed forces, (2) the international lawfulness of warfare was irrelevant to 
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exercise of this prerogative might be technically reviewable.82  However, the Gentle 
court did not build upon or develop any of the detail set out in Abbasi.  Elsewhere the 
court drew upon the authority of Marchiori.83  Though the extract cited from this case 
was arguably mixed on the issue of ring-fencing, it broadly appeared to indicate that 
the formal ring-fences had been removed.  In the extract, Laws LJ stated that in 
matters of defence the judiciary would police the transgression of constitutional 
bounds “no matter how grave the policy issues involved”, though he immediately 
qualified this assertion with the concession that the courts were in „no position‟ to set 
limits on defence matters.84  This seemed to indicate that no high policy area could 
be automatically declared off-limits but also that no judicial limits could be applied to 
the defence prerogative.  These appear to be contradictory statements despite Laws 
LJ‟s claim to the contrary.  However, more conclusively he later stated “judicial 
review remains available to cure the theoretical possibility of actual bad faith on the 
part of ministers making decisions of high policy.”85 
 
Taking an alternative view, the strongest indication that the formal immunity of high 
prerogatives remained intact lay in the repeated references to „forbidden areas‟86 that 
were the „exclusive‟ responsibility of government.  Such points were corroborated 
elsewhere in the judgment; for example, though the court cited the Abbasi judgment 
as mentioned above, the extract from that case which it chose to include in its own 
judgment set out the traditional GCHQ ratio that prerogatives involving high policy 
subject matter were unsuitable for judicial review because the judiciary were 
unequipped to assess such areas.87  Together these potentially supported the 
proposition that the GCHQ ring-fencing of high policy prerogatives remained largely 
intact.  In summary, the stance of the Court of Appeal in Gentle was inconclusive 
and relied on mixed authorities.  This perhaps reflects the fact that caselaw in this 
area was in a transitional phase and judges were not yet ready to explicitly commit to 
one view or the other.  
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[1.4.2] Gentle in the House of Lords [2008]88 
 
The claimants in Gentle appealed and the case was heard by a nine member panel 
of the House of Lords who unanimously dismissed the appeal.   The Law Lords 
confirmed that Article 2 did not extend to obliging a government to take reasonable 
steps to obtain full and proper advice regarding the legality of military action.  Three 
reasons for this ruling were put forward.  The second reason, of primary relevance 
for the purposes of this study,89 was that the HRA was not an appropriate 
mechanism for resolving questions about warfare.  An inquiry according to Article 2 
would involve drawing the judiciary into matters which they were ill-suited to 
consider.  Furthermore the traditional caution of the courts in high policy areas such 
as war and foreign relations was an issue that counted heavily against the right. 
 
In their judgments the Lords were primarily concerned with Article 2 arguments, 
though limited consideration was paid to justiciability issues, particularly by Lord 
Bingham and Baroness Hale.  Lord Bingham‟s leading judgment put forward the 
reasons mentioned above, which the other Law Lords approved.  He was quite clear 
that this area did involve governmental high policy and interpreting the Article 2 right 
as the claimants requested would draw the judiciary into areas they were reluctant to 
enter.90  Interestingly Lord Bingham implied that warfare and foreign affairs must 
continue to be viewed in a different way to other areas, even in the context of 
resolving human rights disputes rather than judicial review:  
 
“The restraint traditionally shown by the courts in ruling on what has 
been called high policy – peace and war, the making of treaties, the 
conduct of foreign relations – does tend to militate against the 
existence of a right.”91 
 
Lord Bingham was essentially saying that it was technically possible for individual 
rights to exist in this field, but an important factor against finding in favour of the 
existence of a wider right in this case was the fact that it occurred in a high policy 
area.  So when determining the scope of the statutory restraints that regulated the 
executive‟s conduct of warfare matters, the court‟s approach to interpretation started 
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from a more deferential basis because of the prerogative subject matter in question.  
Though the high policy prerogatives may no longer be formally ring-fenced from 
judicial review, they remain relatively immune from such scrutiny, and this rationale 
may even apply in HRA disputes that occur in high policy areas.  Lord Bingham‟s 
judgment seemed to imply that human rights may be weaker when confronting 
governmental conduct of defence and warfare which is ironic because high policy 
areas such as these are perhaps ones in which human rights are most likely to be 
threatened by utilitarian considerations. 
 
Despite the sympathetic tone of Lady Hale‟s judgment she likewise found against the 
claimants and approved Lord Hoffman‟s judgment.  She provided clear and explicit 
confirmation that formal ring-fencing on the sole basis of subject matter is redundant 
in the context of HRA disputes: 
 
“It is now common ground that if a Convention right requires the court 
to examine and adjudicate upon matters which were previously 
regarded as non-justiciable, then adjudicate it must.  The subject 
matter cannot preclude this. ”92   
 
This statement was made in relation to HRA issues and did not refer to judicial 
review specifically.  However, strong evidence suggests that it arguably extends to 
judicial review in light of trends outlined in the preceding cases such as Abbasi and 
Al Rawi.  Furthermore, other judicial review authorities explicitly support the 
proposition that automatic ring-fencing of high policy areas is no longer the correct 
approach.  For example in Roth v Home Secretary93 Laws LJ said of the defence 
prerogative: 
  
“The first duty of government is the defence of the realm. It is well 
settled that executive decisions dealing directly with matters of 
defence, while not immune from judicial review (that would be 
repugnant to the rule of law), cannot sensibly be scrutinised by the 
courts on grounds relating to their factual merits”94 
 
Significantly if automatic immunity is not available to defence, often acknowledged 
as a central prerogative most exclusively the concern of government, then surely it is 
not available to other lesser policy prerogatives.  Thus the entire notion of ring-
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fencing is called into question.  Similarly, in Bancoult at the Court of Appeal95 Sedley 
LJ said of Lord Roskill‟s ring-fenced prerogatives:  
 
“a number of his examples [of immune subject matters] could today be 
regarded as questionable: the grant of honours for reward, the waging 
of a war of manifest aggression or refusal to dissolve Parliament at all 
might well call in question an immunity based purely on subject 
matter.”96   
 
When the Iraq caselaw is viewed in the context of these authorities it strongly 
indicates a move away from the formal immunity of GCHQ so that court involvement 
in these high policy areas cannot be automatically ruled out.  In disputes concerning 
judicial review or human rights the courts could now technically get involved. 
 
 
[1.5] Summary of Developments 
 
 
Over the trajectory of the Iraq judgments there occurred a degree of legal progress in 
two respects: first, the broadening possible scope of judicial review and second, the 
potential for the HRA to limit government conduct in any policy area.  The GCHQ 
ring-fencing that traditionally automatically immunised high policy prerogatives from 
judicial scrutiny was arguably being dismantled.  This occurred gradually, the seeds 
of potential being sown in earlier cases such as Abassi,97 and the position 
crystallising across subsequent judgments.  The potential removal of ring-fencing 
technically meant that, in law, prerogatives such as war and defence would no longer 
be granted routine formal exemption from the scrutiny of the courts solely on the 
basis of subject matter; technically the appearance of a relative strengthening of the 
judicial limb in relation to these prerogatives thus occurred.  This was a definite legal 
development which potentially impacted upon the war and related prerogatives.  
 
Yet despite this change to the legal position, in the Iraq cases the courts without 
exception refused to scrutinise ministerial prerogative-based decisions in relation to 
foreign affairs and warfare etc. on the basis that such decisions fell within the overlap 
of two areas traditionally avoided by the judiciary, namely non-jurisdiction and more 
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significantly non-justiciability.  In relation to this latter issue a distinction of sorts was 
still adopted by the judiciary between „special‟ and „non-special‟ prerogatives.98 
Though automatic immunity was removed, a strong presumption against scrutiny of 
war and related prerogatives prevailed.  This was supplemented by the further 
concession that any judicial review of such areas would be extremely limited in 
scope or, in other terms, any scrutiny would be tightly ring-fenced (as evidenced in Al 
Rawi).99  Thus the approach of the courts to such prerogatives in the Iraq caselaw 
was little more than a modest refinement and, vitally, of little practical consequence 
in reality.  Parts 2 and 3 now apply the two analytical devices to the preceding 
caselaw to see whether they can provide any underlying insights into why the 
judiciary continued to evade oversight of the high prerogatives despite their removal 
of the ring-fencing. 
 
 
 
[2] The Law-Politics Boundaries in Iraq Caselaw 
 
 
It has been established that judicially erected boundaries play a vital role in the 
constitutional components relevant to the premier and war prerogative.  For example 
Chapter 3 discussed judicial and academic use of boundaries in relation to 
conventions where the prevailing approach has been to separate and distinguish 
laws from non-legal, political conventions.  More significantly Chapter 4 discussed 
how the creation of legal boundaries around and within prerogative is a central 
aspect of the mainstream legal understanding of it. The boundaries governing 
prerogative power take effect in two ways.  First, the extent of prerogative power 
itself is determined by statute and common law.  Second, boundaries have been 
utilised to distinguish between different areas of prerogative, some of which are 
subject to a greater degree of judicial scrutiny than others.  Part 1 of this chapter has 
established that though the GCHQ ring-fence of immunity which previously encircled 
high policy prerogatives is now questionable, a similar form of ring-fencing of the 
likelihood and scope of judicial scrutiny in these high policy areas has replaced it.  
The war prerogative (and related high policy prerogatives) is arguably an area where 
boundaries to judicial scrutiny should be drawn.  Perhaps problematically it is the 
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judiciary that must reason how, why and where these boundaries will be created and 
maintained.  What are the precise underlying ideas that inform or influence such 
decisions? 
 
The boundaries which separate law from wider politics (informed by positivism and 
the separation of powers) become significant in judgments concerning the prime 
ministerial war and related prerogatives as further discussion of select Iraq caselaw 
now demonstrates.  The leading cases of CND, Al-Rawi and Gentle demonstrate the 
dilemmas facing the judiciary in this area particularly effectively.  They highlight the 
difficulties and ambiguities inherent in judicial attempts to preserve a coherent and 
certain view of the war and related prerogatives at law.  
 
 
[2.1] CND v Prime Minister 
 
 
CND‟s arguments in its legal challenge to the Prime Minister included the claim that 
the court did have the capacity to make a ruling on a pure point of international law 
(namely whether military action would be unlawful without a second UN 
resolution).100  In making such arguments CND adopted positivist-style reasoning, 
claiming the court could focus solely on the legal issue of determining the 
resolution‟s meaning without having to consider the wider policy issues of the 
premier‟s decision.   The court rejected this argument for three interconnected 
reasons.101  The main reason of interest to this discussion was that the issue of 
international law could not be divorced from the surrounding political and diplomatic 
context and the resolution‟s meaning was not an isolated legal issue.  For Brown LJ 
interpreting the resolution was “not the clear-cut question of construction suggested 
by CND but rather is fact-sensitive and dependent upon the developing international 
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situation.”102  Essentially it was not possible to view the legal issue in isolation.  
Brown LJ proceeded to outline reasons for his findings:  
 
“I reject [CND‟s] submission that it would be permissible in principle to 
isolate and rule upon legal issues e.g. as to whether the decision was 
taken in breach of international law.  The nature and subject matter of 
such a decision require it to be treated as an indivisible whole rather 
than breaking it down into legal, political, military and other 
components and viewing those components in isolation for the 
purpose of determining whether they are suited to judicial 
determination.”103   
 
The reasoning here is interesting.  Brown LJ indicated that in relation to this prima 
facie legal issue, law and political considerations were blurred and therefore it could 
not be scrutinised.  Political and other non-legal elements fed into the legal issue and 
were inseparable.  This clearly demonstrates Brown LJ appearing to uphold and 
maintain the long-held law-politics distinction.  Because the political, legal and other 
factors merged in this way, the boundary between „legal‟ and „non-legal‟ could not be 
clearly identified and drawn. This was a mixed issue and Brown LJ therefore 
segregated the entire point as beyond the capacity of the court, despite the fact that 
a legal question of interpretation clearly lay at its core.   
 
It is important to consider the detailed basis for Brown LJ‟s finding that the 
interpretation of resolution 1441 was an issue where law and politics conflated.  One 
major factor was his heavy emphasis on defence evidence, particularly the witness 
statement of a senior Foreign Office official;104 detailed and significant extracts of this 
statement were included in his judgment.105  Note for example the following Foreign 
Office claim that: 
 
“it is an unavoidable feature of the conduct of international relations 
that issues of law, politics and diplomacy are usually closely bound up 
together.  The assertion of arguments of international law by one 
state is in practice regarded by other states as a political act, and 
they react accordingly.”106   
 
In this extract the Foreign Office official effectively claimed that law and politics are 
blurred at international level.  Brown LJ accepted this point as „not merely persuasive 
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but in large part self-evident‟.107  Richards J also accepted this defence evidence, 
using it as a basis for his own reasoning108 and rejected CND‟s „neat attempt to 
isolate a purely judicial issue‟.109  
 
It is of course appropriate that in a case such as CND involving governmental 
discretionary powers the court should pay careful attention to the detailed views and 
reasons put forward by government.  Furthermore it is certainly the case that 
refusing to enforce unenacted international law reflected the prevailing view in 
English law. Nevertheless there is a logical difficulty inherent in this approach.  By 
accepting the defence statement absolutely, Brown LJ tacitly agreed that in such 
circumstances it is correct in English law for the courts to defer to the government‟s 
preferred interpretation of international law.  He furthermore accepted that in reality 
such an interpretation will be motivated by the political interests of the country (as 
defined by the government).  This led to the somewhat unsatisfactory position in the 
Iraq affair that a party political Cabinet minister answerable to the premier (the 
Attorney General) was permitted primary responsibility for deeming the conduct of 
the government (of which he was a member) internationally lawful or otherwise.  
Judicial refusal to intervene, however cogently reasoned, meant that the 
government‟s view of its own legality was afforded priority in English law.  It is 
perhaps a legitimate claim that English courts are not suited to the role of interpreting 
international laws, but surely the same claim could apply to government.  Other 
cases such as Gentle110 and Jones111 show that the separation of powers doctrine is 
influential in this area.  Yet the approach of the CND court offended the separation of 
powers in two respects; firstly, the executive is institutionally unsuited to undertake 
the role of legal interpretation,112 and secondly, tacitly enabling the government to 
definitely declare its own actions internationally lawful (albeit in English law) 
constituted an overlap or concentration of power.113  
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The difficultly remains that in CND the court accepted defence evidence that the 
issue the claimants sought to bring before the court (i.e. the interpretation of 
resolution 1441) was mixed, that it involved a fusion of law and politics.  Law was 
clearly a vital aspect of the question but the issue was nevertheless categorised as 
political and delineated as a „forbidden‟ area.114  Evidently the court in CND was 
faced with a difficult dilemma.  Nevertheless the decision to avoid political 
considerations, particularly in an inherently politically contentious case such as CND, 
was an unavoidably political decision in itself.  Davies makes such a point in relation 
to law generally: 
 
“Excluding politics as an explicit part of [legal] theory is as political an 
approach as including it, especially when it is only too obvious that the 
object under description reflects a particular political standpoint.”115 
 
Bringing politically contentious cases such as CND before the courts forces them to 
engage with these highly charged arguments in any event.  Even the judicial 
preference for disengagement and their cautious refusal to intervene here was itself 
not a neutral or dispassionate position as it inevitably and ultimately favoured the 
political aims of the Blair government.  As Allan claims, “deference to the judgement 
of others is rarely neutral: it is likely, in practice, to disguise an endorsement of the 
views acceded to, though implicit rather than fully or persuasively reasoned.”116  The 
cases in this chapter highlight the judiciary‟s natural inherent conservatism and tacit 
protection of strong government in matters involving war, foreign affairs and 
defence.117  The judiciary‟s effectiveness as a check on such powers is thus 
institutionally compromised.  
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[2.2] Al Rawi (Divisonal Court) 
 
 
A further example of judicial insulation of the legal from the political is evidenced in 
the Divisional Court‟s Al-Rawi judgment. One essential point of dispute between the 
parties in Al Rawi was the most effective way of handling the diplomacy surrounding 
the claimant detainees.  The claimants‟ and defendants‟ respective views regarding 
the appropriate exercise of the foreign affairs prerogative differed, and the court‟s 
decision involved it having to select which view should ultimately prevail.  Latham LJ 
outlined the claimants‟ arguments, a number of which took issue with points put 
forward by the defence.118  It was this conflict with the Foreign Office view, according 
to the judge, which was the „real problem facing the claimants‟.119  He stated;     
 
“[The claimants‟] arguments are strong arguments in the context of 
political debate.  But the question which we have to determine is not 
whether these arguments would or should prevail in the political arena, 
but whether or not they are sufficient to justify the conclusion that [the 
Secretary of State] has failed to exercise his judgement [under 
prerogative] in a proportionate way.”120   
 
Latham LJ was claiming these arguments were good121 but essentially political.  The 
court‟s sole concern was determining a legal issue, namely the domestic lawfulness 
of the Foreign Secretary‟s exercise of prerogative.  Latham LJ‟s judgment thus 
affords a further illustration of law‟s concern with eliminating non-law from its ambit; it 
was solely concerned with resolving a legal issue and only arguments based in law 
would be considered for such purposes.  In adopting this approach Latham LJ 
essentially insulated the minister‟s decisions from substantive criticism in the case 
because he effectively categorised the claimants‟ non-legal criticisms as irrelevant 
and unrelated to the legal issues per se, thus effectively marginalising them.  As 
Davies writes, 
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“This separation protects law ... from fundamental critique, because 
any analysis [or argument] which does not have as its first point of 
departure law‟s story about itself is by definition not centrally about 
law, but about something else.”122   
 
Al Rawi demonstrates the courts appearing to implicitly protect government 
decisions regarding foreign affairs in this area from wider political-constitutional 
criticism, or effectively limiting the grounds on which criticism can be made, albeit in 
the context of a courtroom.   
 
 
[2.3] Gentle in the Court of Appeal 
 
 
The law-politics boundary was also a material issue in the Court of Appeal‟s Gentle 
judgment when the court considered whether Article 2 required the government to 
take reasonable steps to ensure the international lawfulness of warfare.  It concluded 
that Article 2 did not require this123 and the „principal‟ reason it put forward is 
interesting.  The court looked at two aspects of undertaking military action; first the 
duty to ensure that such action is lawful (i.e. the legal issue) and second the duty to 
ensure such action is „militarily or politically desirable or sensible‟ (i.e. the political 
issue).  The court found that that these two aspects of a decision to take military 
action (the legal and the political) were inherently linked and could not be 
separated,124 a proposition that formed the first stage in the reasoning which led it to 
its ultimate finding.  This approach bore significant similarities with the earlier CND 
ruling.  Indeed the Court of Appeal approved the CND finding that a clinical point of 
(international) law could not logically be divorced from its wider non-legal context in a 
positivist sense:  
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“the court in CND rejected the submission that it would be possible to 
consider legal questions of international law while respecting the 
principle of the non-justiciability of non-legal issues of policy.  It was in 
our opinion correct to do so because we can see no basis upon which 
it would be possible sensibly to consider one without the other.  They 
are closely bound up together.”125   
 
In the second stage of its reasoning, the court looked at the „political issue‟, 
concluding that member states have no legal duty under Article 2 to ensure that 
military action is politically sensible126 because this is an issue for government alone 
to determine; “these are questions of policy and within the exclusive discretion of 
the state.”127  From here, the court appeared to reason that because the two issues 
of international legality and political wisdom of military action were intricately 
connected, if the latter could not come within the scope of Article 2 then neither could 
the former.  In basic terms, because the two were inseparable the legal issue must 
logically enjoy the same immunity from judicial scrutiny as the political issue.  As the 
court stated: 
 
“the position seems to us to be the same as that described by 
Richards in the CND case.  It is not possible to isolate a purely judicial 
or legal issue as a “clinical point of law”.”128   
 
In this sense Gentle affords a further example of law‟s concern with eliminating non-
law (or even law tainted with non-law) from its ambit.129  Here the legal issue was 
tainted by the political and the only appropriate response by the courts in such 
circumstances was to provide an interpretation of Article 2 which avoided it.  But 
could the reasoning of the court not equally be logically reversed?  Could the legal 
core of the issue not have made it the concern of Article 2 (and therefore the court) 
notwithstanding its political elements?  The response to this must be in the negative.  
It is clear that a wider approach of this kind would be inconsistent with the 
fundamental ethos animating and underpinning law in this area which attempts to 
“[keep] outside law‟s empire the non-legal, the extraneous, law‟s other. ... to impose 
upon law the law of purity and of order, of clear boundaries and of well-policed 
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checkpoints.”130  The Iraq caselaw provides textbook examples of the courts 
struggling to undertake this very task in difficult and complex circumstances.  In 
Gentle this led the Court of Appeal to appear to state, somewhat paradoxically, that 
the (international) lawfulness of military action in Iraq was primarily a political 
issue.131  This surely neglected the basic point made by Allan that “Insofar as any 
question arising is understood as having, in principle, a correct legal answer, it raises 
a matter of law for the court to determine.”132  In seeing the legal and political issues 
as inherently linked, the pretence of a discernible partition between law and politics 
arguably collapsed or, in Davies‟ terms, “The myth of closure [of law from non-law] 
breaks down at certain points, taking with it the whole edifice of normative 
certainty.”133 
 
The role of the separation of powers in the law-politics divide 
 
The Court of Appeal in Gentle essentially deemed the international lawfulness of 
military action a mixed issue and this was a major factor which prohibited Article 2 
from imposing a duty on government to ensure such lawfulness.  This issue 
combined with separation of powers reasoning as a justification for declining to 
expand the ambit of Article 2.  The court stated that because the issue was „political‟ 
the alternative forum of Parliament (directed by „public opinion and the „ballot box‟) 
was more appropriate to raise complaints and debates about the legality of the Iraq 
invasion.134  This separation of powers-based reasoning was also used to justify a 
similar form of judicial restraint in the House of Lords judgment135 and other cases 
such as CND136 and Jones.137  But in the Court of Appeal‟s Gentle judgment this 
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rationale can be questioned in two ways.  First it surely glosses over the fact that 
there was wider uncertainty amongst MPs and the wider populace about both the 
constitutional propriety of government conduct and the international legality of 
military action in Iraq.138  The court‟s refusal to order an inquiry arguably allowed 
damaging uncertainty surrounding these issues to prevail.  Was „public opinion‟ and 
the „ballot box‟ really a more appropriate domestic forum to determine whether the 
war was internationally lawful?  A second problem with the use of separation of 
powers reasoning in Gentle (and other Iraq caselaw) is that it was based upon a 
selective interpretation of the doctrine.  It failed to acknowledge that the English 
constitution has a fused executive and legislature and that this concentration of 
power can act to skew the constitutional balance and limit parliamentary checks on 
the war and foreign affairs prerogative as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4.  Judicial 
references to alternative and superior parliamentary checks on government‟s war 
and foreign affairs prerogatives neglected to acknowledge one vital fact; that 
legislative-executive overlap (in addition to other monarch-based prerogatives 
available to a premier)139 can fundamentally undermine the efficacy of such 
safeguards, particularly in times of strong governmental majorities.  By absolving 
itself of involvement in this area the judiciary tacitly transferred the task of scrutiny 
solely to Parliament, whilst failing to acknowledge that latter‟s own non-legal 
inadequacies in this respect.   
 
The separation of powers was often cited as a factor underlying judicial restraint in 
relation to the war and defence prerogative yet this doctrine could be utilised by 
judges in a pro-active manner because the original doctrine was put forward to 
prevent concentrations of power and thus protect individual liberties.140  Nevertheless 
the courts have historically preferred an executive-favoured interpretation of the 
doctrine which avoids politics and thus limits their role.  The interpretive approach of 
either pro-activity or deference is viable, but emphasis on the latter is more 
consistent with (and perhaps attributable to) the centralised, monarch-based system 
of the English constitution (and indeed other western states).141  Yet the potential 
problem of adopting this deferential interpretation of the separation of powers 
doctrine is identified by Allan who writes: 
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 “A rigid doctrine of separation of powers, which assigned exclusive 
competence over particular questions either to Parliament or the 
executive, would weaken judicial review to the point of futility.”142 
 
It is seems from surveying the Iraq caselaw that the judiciary rendered itself impotent 
in real terms in relation to government conduct of war and foreign affairs despite 
paying a degree of lip service to the contrary. 
 
The role of the Attorney General’s advice in the law-politics divide 
 
Vitally the inseparability of legal from other non-legal issues in Gentle did, according 
to the Court of Appeal, „receive some support‟143 from the reasoning process behind 
the Attorney-General‟s legal advice to government regarding the international 
lawfulness of military action in Iraq.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the Attorney 
General‟s advice was initially cautious and negative in tone though days later he 
changed his opinion to more supportive, positive terms.144  This series of events is 
catalogued in the Gentle judgment145 and the court accepted defence witness 
evidence that the significant change in advice was a result of the Attorney‟s fresh 
consideration of further background political and diplomatic material.146  Nowhere in 
the Gentle judgment was the question raised as to why this material information was 
not considered prior to the A-G‟s initial advice bearing in mind the fundamental 
importance of ensuring that advice was as full and accurate as possible.  
Furthermore the court at no point commented upon the procedural propriety of the 
steps taken by government to ascertain the international lawfulness of military action 
(even on an obiter basis).  This was perhaps partly attributable to the lack of legal or 
formal conventional regulation in central government; the dearth of applicable 
concrete benchmarks rendered such a task impossible.  
 
Judicial treatment of the A-G‟s advice in Gentle was very interesting and displayed a 
degree of deference.  The chain of reasoning started with the court‟s willing 
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acceptance of this defence evidence as (a) unquestionable fact, and (b) not an 
improper or prima facie questionable way to provide legal advice.  This led to the 
court to accept (as per defence evidence) that (a) overt political factors did inevitably 
motivate the A-G‟s interpretation, and (b) that it was entirely legitimate (in English 
law) that interpretations of international law could be directed by the political views of 
central government ministers, particularly the Prime Minister.  Finally, the courts 
used this as a justification to not become involved with the issue because 
distinguishing law and politics here was impossible, thus leading to the conclusion 
that an inquiry would be inevitably political.147  It appears therefore that the court‟s 
finding that law and politics were blurred in Gentle was perhaps partly based on 
government actions that had acted to fuse the legal and political more fully than 
might otherwise have been the case, and the importance the judges attached to 
government witness statements to that effect.  There is a clear circularity in this 
approach. 
 
 
[2.4] Summary of Discussion 
 
 
This Part has identified and investigated instances in high prerogative caselaw 
where boundaries between law and non-law were utilised by judges.  Such 
boundaries are central to legal understandings of the war and related prerogatives; 
their presence is common across the Iraq cases because all involve politically 
contentious legal issues.  Cases such as CND and Gentle demonstrate the efforts of 
judges to exclude non-legal considerations, impose clear boundaries and maintain 
the purity of their discipline.  Clear practical problems would occur if courts did not 
delineate in this fashion.  Nevertheless such attempts to maintain clarity and 
certainty do inevitably involve concessions in other respects. 
 
One potentially negative impact of boundaries in the war prerogative area is 
apparent; in the process of striving to exclude politics from the legal domain the 
judges marginalise their potential scrutinising role in relation to high prerogatives.  
This is particularly so in Britain‟s „political constitution‟,148 and even more so in the 
inherently political area of the war and related prerogatives where ministerial 
decisions will always be contentious.  Excluding politics in such circumstances 
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severely limits the efficacy and vigour of the judicial role as a check on the ministerial 
foreign affairs and related prerogatives.149  Such limits need not be problematic per 
se if alternative constitutional checks are effective but, as previous chapters have 
indicated, this was not necessarily the case over the Iraq affair.  Yet, as Jenkins 
claims, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect the judiciary to compensate for the relative 
weakness of Parliament in this respect.150 
 
The consistency and overall coherence of the foundations upon which the law-
politics boundaries were erected in Iraq caselaw can also be questioned in certain 
respects.  Though the decisions in these cases were certainly correct at law and 
though the judgments took great care to avoid political opinion or comment, it 
appears that a silent, subtle form of politics did infiltrate both judicial reasoning and 
outcomes in this area.  Closer analysis has established that reasoning in these 
judgments was at times predicated upon inconsistent and selective use of the 
separation of powers doctrine and a positivist refusal to consider political issues, 
both of which acted to favour government. Both doctrines continue to underlie the 
longstanding and logical judicial desire to restrict their focus to solely legal issues 
and avoid contentious political debate.  So decisions regarding where boundaries 
were drawn were more provisional and agenda-driven than the judiciary expressly 
acknowledged.  This is not to criticise the judges in these cases whose positions 
were difficult and constrained, but to acknowledge that despite attempts to maintain 
a facade of impassive political neutrality (or what Griffith terms „the myth of 
neutrality‟)151 the judicial role is institutionally and structurally geared towards 
supporting government in this context.   
 
Furthermore, the actual outcome of each Iraq case was unavoidably political152 
because declaring ministerial prerogative decisions domestically lawful inevitably 
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validated them (albeit in a limited legal sense).  The practical effect of these 
judgments is that ministerial prerogative decisions regarding war, foreign affairs and 
defence are legally unrestrained domestically.  Additionally a strong centralised 
government is fostered and effectively immunised from meaningful legal scrutiny in 
all but the most exceptional cases.  For these reasons the Iraq caselaw illustrates 
the fallacy and contingency of maintaining a clear law/politics boundary.   
 
 
 
[3] Disparities between Law and Reality   
 
 
[3.1] Disparities Identified 
 
 
From the discussion in this chapter it is seems that three disparities between the 
legal appearance of the war power and its constitutional reality can be briefly 
identified.  First the Iraq cases show judges removing the legal limits on scrutiny in 
relation to the high policy prerogatives, including those relating to the conduct of 
foreign affairs.  But nevertheless it seems that this legal progress has had minimal 
practical effect in reality.  Second, caselaw in this area repeatedly demonstrates 
judges professing to avoid matters of policy and attempting to distinguish legal and 
non-legal issues, studiously avoiding the latter.  Yet in reality it is arguable that the 
judicial approaches in this politically contentious area are inevitably more political 
than they appear (as discussed in Part 2).  Third, the notion of monarch which 
historically forms the foundations for the premiership and has underpinned the area 
of foreign affairs and war (as demonstrated in Lord Reid‟s Burmah judgment)153 has 
continued despite the emergence of democratic government.  Though recent Iraq 
caselaw avoided any overt monarchical references, it arguably indicated that the 
notion of monarch (or remnants of it) still prevailed in this legal area, both structurally 
and culturally.  Closer consideration of these three disparities between the law and 
underlying reality indicates that they are all united by one common issue, namely 
knowledge or expertise.  Knowledge has a fundamental role to play in each of the 
three disparities; it underpins and interlinks each respective disparity and the ways in 
which it does this will now be briefly outlined in turn. 
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The Appearance of Progress regarding Legal Limits upon Scrutiny 
 
The appearance of potentially strengthening judicial checks in relation to many 
central government prerogatives has been discussed in Part 1.  Yet this must be 
considered against the backdrop that in reality such changes have made little 
difference to the actual outcomes in cases so far, and would be unlikely to do so in 
future unless the circumstances were exceptional.154  It is difficult to envisage a 
situation where a judgment in this area might be unfavourable to the government‟s 
preferred exercise of the war or related prerogatives because as a basic minimum 
any applicant would have to establish incredibly onerous conditions.  So despite the 
appearance of increased possibilities for judicial scrutiny the reality remains that the 
courts continue to adopt deferential stances in relation to the war and related 
prerogatives as demonstrated in Iraq caselaw.  Vitally this is because the deference 
has shifted from the once explicit acknowledgement of such a position (exemplified 
by the formal immunity of high prerogatives in GCHQ) to a more subtle and silent 
(but just as powerful) form.  The Iraq caselaw clearly indicates that the courts are 
highly deferential in their approach to government information and evidence in the 
field of foreign and defence policy, an issue that will be considered further in Part 
3.2.  As a result of this more implicit judicial deference, prima facie changes in the 
law (such as the potential removal of formal ring-fencing) lead to identical outcomes 
in fact.  As Allan has stated, “Due deference turns out, on close inspection, to be 
non-justiciability dressed in pastel colours.”155 
 
The Appearance of Avoiding Policy and the Non-Legal  
 
A second disparity between legal appearance and reality has been established in 
this chapter; in war prerogative caselaw the courts seek to avoid entanglement in 
policy matters and to maintain an appearance of political neutrality, yet by selectively 
utilising boundaries between law and non-law and evading engagement in certain 
areas they still make silent political decisions and become inherently involved in a 
less explicit form of politics.  Additionally, the politically neutral appearance of the 
courts can be also questioned in another, more fundamental, way; do the courts treat 
evidence or information in war prerogative caselaw impartially or do they 
automatically afford the government a privileged position in relation to knowledge?    
Discussion of Iraq caselaw in Part 3.2 will argue that the latter is correct.  In 
                                                     
154
 See Abbasi (n 7) para 104; Al Rawi, CA (n 61) para 141. 
155
 Allan (n 116) 689. 
 187 
 
particularly contentious cases such as these, this privileging of government 
information is unavoidably political because it acts to reinforce executive power in 
foreign affairs and defence matters and creates an uneven playing field for potential 
challengers.  This is consistent with Foucault‟s claim that knowledge itself is a 
political issue.156   
 
The Continued Underlying Influence of Monarchy  
 
Chapter 2 explained that the office of Prime Minister is parasitic upon the Crown and 
prerogative powers are based upon and influenced by monarchy.  In caselaw 
concerning the war prerogative attachment to the notion of a strong protective 
monarch (or his modern counterpart) who knows best and will protect the nation 
continues and subtly underpins judicial views.  Lord Hoffman‟s utilisation of the 
Hobbesian social contract as a justification for the state‟s monopoly on force in 
Jones is one such example.157  A further example is found in CND where Brown LJ 
outlines the following extract from Marchiori:  
 
“The defence of the realm … is the Crown‟s first duty … Potentially 
such a thing touches the security of everyone; and everyone will look 
to the government they have elected for wise and effective 
decisions.”158 
 
This paternalist passage indicates that the Crown defence prerogative lies firmly 
within government hands and indeed constitutes its foremost role.  Furthermore 
people will „look to government‟; this assumes they seek strong leadership which will 
defend the country.  Finally government will make „wise‟ decisions, or the right 
decisions on the basis of its „wisdom‟ or knowledge.  Such archaic assumptions are 
arguably entwined with the monarch-based legal framework in this area.  Of course 
national security or defence risks must never be treated flippantly or casually, but nor 
should default assumptions in this area always prevail as a matter of course. 
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Each of the three interlinked disparities between law and reality has now been 
identified and outlined.  This chapter now considers specific examples of the role 
played by knowledge in these disparities arising in the Iraq caselaw.   
 
 
[3.2] Views of Knowledge and Expertise in Iraq Caselaw  
 
 
The basis upon which the courts distinguish between justiciable and non or limited-
justiciable areas has been the subject of much academic debate.159  However, the 
Iraq caselaw indicates that one major factor determining the relative immunity of war 
and foreign affairs is knowledge, i.e. the respective knowledge or expertise of the 
government and courts in such matters.  That knowledge is a material factor 
determining the justiciability of an area of prerogative is acknowledged in 
constitutional literature160 and the case of Roth v Home Secretary [2003]161 where 
Laws LJ identified four principles governing when and how the courts should show 
deference to other branches of government.162  The third and fourth factors are 
interrelated and particularly relevant in the context of the Iraq caselaw.  The third 
principle emphasises the specific roles and responsibilities allocated by the 
constitution to the respective state limbs: “greater deference will be due to the 
democratic powers where the subject-matter in hand is peculiarly within their 
constitutional responsibility, and less when it lies more particularly within the 
constitutional responsibility of the courts.”163    This statement seems to imply that 
deference can be a matter of degree and that the degree may be determined by 
where a particular subject-matter lies in the spectrum between „legal‟ and „policy‟.  
Laws LJ supplemented this principle with an illustration of the defence prerogative 
claiming, as outlined in Part 1.4.2, that even defence matters cannot enjoy blanket 
immunity from judicial review, despite epitomising a prerogative area which is 
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inherently unsuitable for judicial involvement.164  These two propositions were 
presented alongside one another despite the fundamental contradiction between 
them.  Accepting their co-existence involves a form of legal double-think until one 
accepts that de facto immunity of such prerogatives continues to operate beneath 
legal appearances.  Laws LJ‟s fourth principle holds that the degree of deference to 
be adopted by a court will also depend upon the respective expertise of state limbs, 
specifically “whether the subject matter lies more readily within the actual or potential 
expertise of the democratic powers or the courts”165  This assumes that any dispute 
can be neatly partitioned into judicial or executive realms and fails to account for the 
fact that legitimate legal disputes may occur in areas of government expertise so that 
either or both types of expertise could technically be employed. 
  
Consistent with Roth, a clear, observable feature running through judicial reasoning 
in the Iraq cases is a general deference to executive information, usually witness 
statements, in the conduct of military action and related foreign affairs prerogatives.  
This rationale can be traced back through earlier cases166 and is epitomised by the 
following statement of Lord Parker in The Zamora [1916]: 
 
“The judge ought, as a rule, to treat the statement on oath of the 
proper officer of the Crown to the effect that the vessel or goods which 
it is desired to requisition are urgently required for use in connection 
with the defence of the realm, the prosecution of the war, or other 
matters involving national security, as conclusive of the fact”167 
 
Here Lord Parker indicated that executive statements regarding national security 
would be treated as „fact‟ or „truth‟, thus affording government a privileged position if 
litigation in this area arose.  The reasonable basis for this deference is the courts‟ 
acknowledgement that firstly, the executive has particular expertise in these matters 
and secondly, the government has exclusive access to the necessary information 
upon which such decisions are based.  This was demonstrated by the Court of 
Appeal in Abbasi which indicated that dealing with foreign states was  
 
“a matter for the Executive and no-one else, with their access to 
information and local knowledge.  It is clearly not a matter for the 
courts.  It is clearly a high policy decision of a government in relation to 
its foreign relations..”168 
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A further example was afforded by Richards J in CND who referred to the courts‟ self 
imposed „limitations‟ to justiciability „in recognition of the limits of judicial expertise‟.169   
Arguably the approach of the courts here is logical and justified; clearly the executive 
limb is concerned with military functions, will inevitably have the best information 
upon which to base its decisions and should be accorded relative hegemony in such 
fields on this basis.  Additionally judicial involvement in such areas entails inherent 
risks and may leave the judiciary vulnerable to criticism.170  Furthermore, perhaps as 
Lord Reid indicated, a more interventionist approach from the courts could result in 
delay and „disaster‟.171  Nevertheless, a more detailed exploration of the executive‟s 
apparent monopoly on knowledge in this area may yield fresh insights.  What is the 
extent and effect of the executive‟s superior position in relation to defence and 
warfare information and knowledge in a judicial context?  This matter will now be 
considered in further detail with reference to two interesting examples: the cases of 
CND and Al-Rawi respectively. 
 
Knowledge and Expertise in CND v Prime Minister 
 
In CND Brown LJ found that a court declaration confirming the meaning of UNSC 
resolution 1441 would be damaging to national interests.172  This finding was heavily 
based on defence evidence, specifically the contents of a senior Foreign Office 
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official‟s evidence.173  Significant extracts of the official‟s statement were included in 
his judgment.174  Referring to the substantive contents of Mr Ricketts‟ statement he 
claimed „all this is surely obvious‟.  Significantly he proceeded to state:  
 
“Even, however, were all this not obvious, we would at the very least 
be bound to recognise Mr Ricketts‟s experience and expertise in 
these matters and that the executive is better placed than the court to 
make these assessments of the national interest with regard to the 
conduct of foreign relations in the field of national security and 
defence.  We could not reject Mr Ricketts‟s views unless we thought 
them plainly wrong. ”175  
 
This epitomises judicial deference to government evidence in this area.  Brown LJ‟s 
starting point was that the government‟s account of the appropriate exercise of the 
foreign affairs prerogative (some of which was disputed by the claimants) was clearly 
(or „obviously‟) correct, thus applying a presumption of truth to this evidence.  Brown 
LJ then took this deference further, claiming that even where the substantive content 
of government evidence may appear questionable, the intrinsic expertise and 
knowledge of the government in these areas was a vital fact that must be 
recognised; such recognition surely continues Zamora-type evidential presumptions 
favouring government by automatically assuming the strength and credibility of such 
evidence even where its content may be contentious or questionable.  This was 
acknowledged when Brown LJ quoted the following:  
 
”It is … self-evidently right that the national courts must give great 
weight to the views of the executive on matters of national security.”176 
 
Brown LJ thus resorted to „self-evidence‟ to justify the courts‟ treatment of 
government evidence.  The term „self evident‟ indicates that the position adopted by 
the courts is so obvious that it requires no further reasoning to be advanced in its 
favour.  Yet why should this be the case?  Allan argues that deference to 
government need not “dictate the surrender of judgement; nor should any claims of 
[governmental] special knowledge or expertise go untested.”177  The automatic 
deference displayed in CND and other Iraq cases is surely a further indication that in 
matters of war, foreign affairs and defence the courts are incapable of providing 
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effective checks upon ministerial prerogative, instead being institutionally geared 
towards deference in one form or another.178  
 
The claim that the government has particular expertise in warfare etc. which places it 
in a superior position to make judgements is in one sense a clear and indisputable 
factual proposition based on observable evidence.  Furthermore, there are clearly 
very cogent reasons for judicial caution and deference regarding intervention in 
these prerogatives.179  However, the proposition that government has superior 
expertise which must be accounted for could be viewed in alternative terms which 
are less neutral and more political. 
 
The Prime Minister and relevant offices of state undertake specific functions such as 
defence and foreign affairs as ascribed by the constitution.  In the course of 
exercising power and undertaking these functions central government produces 
information.  For example, activities such as international diplomacy, conducting the 
military and security services will lead to the production of records, expertise and 
knowledge as an inherent by-product of these functions.180  Vitally, the executive 
also controls the access to and distribution of information relating to such matters.  
The government is seen as specialist in the conduct of defence and foreign affairs. 
The knowledge produced by the government in this respect is (and must be) viewed 
by the courts and others as authoritative.  So essentially, by virtue of the production 
and control of this „official‟ knowledge the government occupies a position of relative 
power.  The executive‟s knowledge regarding matters of foreign affairs, warfare and 
national security inevitably affords it a superior position in relation to other parties or 
institutions; this knowledge asymmetry leads to more significant inequalities in 
power.  This is supported by Poole who, in the context of terrorism caselaw, argues 
that “marginal advantages in terms of access and understanding to information 
relating to possible risks generate claims for enormous disparities in power.”181  Such 
disparities are also clearly demonstrated in the Iraq caselaw.  In summary, from the 
knowledge that arises as an intrinsic part of carrying out its functions in this area, an 
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 Poole (n 160) 247-8. 
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(n 156) 51-2. 
181
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automatic and entrenched monopoly or position of dominance for government is 
created.   
 
In light of the weight that courts must institutionally place on government evidence 
regarding defence and foreign affairs, it appears that government‟s position when its 
exercise of war or related prerogatives is legally challenged will be relatively secure.  
For example, government may be able to claim with relative ease that an issue is 
„political‟ thus affording it de facto immunity from judicial scrutiny due to the weight 
that the courts must attach to executive evidence; vitally this is equivalent to ring-
fencing high policy prerogatives in practical terms.  Though it is not formal immunity 
from judicial scrutiny at law, it arguably constitutes a license for government to claim 
it in reality.  Similarly, in reality, deposing the executive from this privileged position 
will be an onerous and almost impossible task for challengers.  Allan is critical of 
judicial presumptions of government‟s „superior institutional competence‟, instead 
arguing that “The soundness of any conclusion, even on a matter involving specialist 
expertise, must be capable of demonstration by argument; there is otherwise no 
opportunity for the litigant to challenge the government‟s course of action.”182  
Cogent though this criticism appears, it arguably overlooks the fact that judicial 
prioritisation of governmental evidence in matters of defence and war is an 
unavoidable consequence of the existing state structure that allocates such roles to 
government and is historically rooted in a strong, autocratic monarch;183 judicial 
approaches in these cases merely reflect this. 
 
Knowledge & Expertise in Al Rawi (Divisional Court) 
 
A similar approach to CND was adopted by the Divisional Court in Al-Rawi where the 
Foreign Office claimed a formal request for the return of Guantanamo detainees 
would be „ineffective and counter-productive‟.184  As in CND, the government relied 
on the statement of a senior foreign office official185 and the court drew heavily on 
parts of the official‟s evidence.  Mr Richmond‟s statement explained that negotiation 
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 Allan (n 116) 692.  Poole, speaking in the context of terrorism caselaw, is similarly concerned that 
inequalities in access to information may lead to an uneven playing field for litigants wishing to mount 
challenges: “This relationship has the potential to transform a contest between „players‟ mired in 
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informed assessment of risk can be based.  This privileged access to superior resources is carefully 
guarded: partial information is released, and only then at a time and in a manner of the government‟s 
own choosing.”  Ibid 246. 
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 See Chapter 2, Part 2. 
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 Al Rawi, DC (n 49) para 92. 
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 Mr Richmond, Director of General Defence and Intelligence at the Foreign Office 
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with the US over its Guantanamo detainee policy „has been, and remains, a complex 
process.‟186  Furthermore, in a familiar line of argument, he claimed that “Such 
assessments of whether, when and how to press another State require fine 
judgements to be made by Ministers, drawing on the FCO‟s experience and 
expertise.”187  Again, the point essentially being made was that government was 
best placed to make such decisions in light of its superior information.  The Divisional 
Court accepted such arguments and indeed referred to its own relative lack of 
expertise on no less than three occasions across the judgment.188  The court stated 
that properly assessing the government‟s judgement was „impossible‟ without 
knowledge of UK-US discussions,189 that it „simply [did] not have the tools to 
evaluate‟190 Foreign Office policy judgements in this area, and instead decisions 
“must to a significant extent depend upon the subjective assessments of the 
Foreign Office officials who have dealt face to face with their United States opposite 
numbers.”191  Such claims provide further demonstration of the weight routinely 
attributed to government statements in this area.   
 
Importantly, the court acknowledged that its incapacity to assess government 
evidence applied even though the government‟s preferred method of attaining 
release of the detainees „may not be a judgement with which we agree 
[politically].‟192  Overall these passages indicate that precedence was afforded to 
executive evidence regarding foreign affairs etc. irrespective of the court‟s own views 
and irrespective of the fact that such deference ultimately led to what the court 
conceded was arguably an „uncomfortable‟ and „unsatisfactory‟ outcome.193  Allan is 
critical of assumed judicial deference to government evidence in such 
circumstances, stating: 
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 Ibid para 39 
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 Emphasis added.  Ibid para 40 
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 Ibid paras 92, 96, 97. 
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 Ibid para 96.  The full extract reads:  “It is impossible for the court, without knowledge of how those 
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policy.” 
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 Ibid para 92.  See also para 97. 
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 Ibid para 97. 
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 The court concluded that the claimants‟ „powerful‟ arguments “founder, perhaps uncomfortably and 
unsatisfactorily, on the rock [of non-justiciability] which prevented the Abbasi claim from succeeding, 
and for the same reasons.”  Emphasis added.  Ibid para 96.   
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“A judge who allows his own view on the merits of any aspect of the 
case to be displaced by the contrary view of public officials – bowing to 
their greater expertise or experience or democratic credentials - forfeits 
the neutrality that underpins the legitimacy of constitutional 
adjudication.”194   
 
Allan‟s point here is consistent with the arguments made in Part 2 of this chapter that 
the position of the judiciary in politically contentious cases such as the Iraq caselaw 
cannot be impartial or apolitical.  Allan indicates that a more critical judicial approach 
could address such shortcomings, but the likelihood that this partiality is inherent 
within the judicial role in matters of war and defence cannot be eliminated. 
 
Knowledge and Expertise in Al Rawi (Court of Appeal) 
 
When Al Rawi came before the Court of Appeal the deference to government 
evidence continued in a similar vein.  Though the judgment did provide two minor 
examples of the Court adopting a slightly more critical stance to government 
evidence, such examination was extremely limited, brief and barely discernible.195  
Like the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal set out lengthy extracts of Foreign 
Office196 and Home Office197 evidence in its judgment, reciting them with a lack of 
any genuine examination.  Significantly, after reciting the Foreign Office statement 
passages for many paragraphs the court stated: “The narrative we have given 
generally suffices for the resolution of the issues.”198  In other words the factual basis 
on which case was to be decided was based very heavily on the government‟s 
account of situation; this stance surely represents a continuation of Lord Parker‟s 
dictum in The Zamora.199  It also contradicts the court‟s later claim that “the 
ascertainment of the weight to be given to the primary decision-maker‟s view (very 
often that of central government) can be elusive and problematic.”200  This statement 
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 First, the court appeared to doubt (though in very delicate terms) Mr Richmond‟s claim that US 
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does not reflect the reality, demonstrated in the Iraq caselaw, that the courts 
consistently attach a great deal of weight to government‟s evidence as a matter of 
course.  The caselaw does not at any point indicate the courts agonising about how 
to balance or resolve conflicting views of the situations. 
 
Later the Court of Appeal specifically dealt with the government‟s decisions.  It 
rejected the claimants‟ arguments201 on the basis that they would require the court to 
“judge, not only of the legality, but also of the wisdom, of government action in this 
field” which would be “an elementary mistake.”202  The court here acknowledged that 
it simply could not and would not question the „wisdom‟ of government foreign affairs 
or defence-related decisions, even against legal standards such as reasonableness 
or proportionality.  In this context the government was therefore afforded a kind of 
monopoly on „wisdom‟.  But what was the basis for this monopoly of sorts?  The 
court went on to explain why government is afforded „special responsibility‟ in foreign 
and defence matters: “It arises in part from considerations of competence, in part 
from the constitutional imperative of electoral accountability.”203  The Court of Appeal 
thus reiterated the dual factors of „competence‟ and „accountability‟ to justify the 
government‟s privileged evidential position in cases concerning defence and foreign 
affairs.  The first reason reflects the fact that government is specifically charged with 
the functions of defence and foreign affairs and will thus be viewed as enjoying a 
particular competence or expertise in such areas; this acknowledges the inherent 
power-knowledge relationship as discussed in the CND case above.  The second 
factor, the need for democratic accountability of such decisions, is partly based on a 
selective reading of the separation of powers doctrine as outlined in Part 2.3.  As 
discussed, the political neutrality, consistency and certainty of both factors can be 
questioned in certain respects.  Nevertheless the Al Rawi judgment provides further 
verification that knowledge is clearly a significant, material factor determining the 
                                                                                                                                                       
necessarily the wisest.  Accordingly, the ascertainment of the weight to be given to the primary 
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reference to the following authority by Lord Hoffman in Secretary of State for the Home Department 
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reviewability of prerogative areas of this sort, and one frequently cited by the 
courts.204  
 
 Another aspect of Michel Foucault‟s work on knowledge is relevant in this context 
and thus worth briefly outlining.  Foucault claims that there was a shift in approaches 
to knowledge in the eighteenth century which has prevailed to the present.  
Statements had previously been judged according to whether they were acceptable 
to religious orthodoxy or not; in other words, they were judged on their substantive 
content.205  Foucault documents a change which saw statements no longer being 
assessed according to whether their actual content was acceptable, but according to 
the source from which they had come; i.e. whether they were from an authoritative, 
„official‟ source.206  In basic terms, the requirement for orthodoxy of content became 
replaced with orthodoxy of source.  As Foucault states:  
 
“The problem is now: Who is speaking, are they qualified to speak, at 
what level is the statement situated, what set can it be fitted into, and 
how and to what extent does it conform to other forms and other 
typologies of knowledge.”207  
 
This rationale exemplifies the judicial approaches to information in the Iraq caselaw.  
The courts would not engage with the substantive contents or merits of opposing 
views in these cases.  Instead they prioritised evidence on the basis of its source; 
witness statements produced by government were automatically afforded 
precedence on the basis that they came from an (or rather the) authoritative source. 
 
As outlined above, it is arguable that the government‟s expertise inevitably arises as 
a result of carrying out its proper duties and that it is entirely proper for a less 
knowledgeable institution such as the judiciary to defer on this basis.  However, it is 
also vital to remain alert to the potential dangers of applying such automatic 
assumptions as a matter of course.  The deferential approach to government 
evidence in the Iraq caselaw potentially leads to one of two unsatisfactory 
conclusions: either the courts are unable to acknowledge the possibility that 
government may make political or constitutional errors in the conduct of war and 
foreign affairs; or they accept that mistakes may be made by government in such 
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matters, but concede these cannot be the courts‟ concern, even where legal disputes 
concerning rights may arise as a result.  As Allan states, deferential judicial 
approaches of this sort “[amount] to abandonment of impartiality between citizen and 
state: in acceding to the supposedly superior wisdom of the public agency ..., the 
court is co-opted into the executive ..., leaving the claimant without any independent 
means of redress for an arguable violation of rights.”208  It is interesting that while the 
courts in Iraq caselaw viewed government witness statements regarding foreign 
affairs as largely definitive of the situation, elsewhere Lord Butler‟s report was 
discrediting information provided to Parliament by the same government.  The Butler 
report provided a salient reminder that government creation and presentation of 
information to justify or support its conduct of military action may be flawed or 
incorrect.209  It furthermore afforded a stark lesson that one cannot always assume 
the truth or accuracy of statements solely on the basis that they emanate from a 
government that „knows best‟.  The high profile judgment in the recent Mohamed v 
Foreign Secretary210 and subsequent controversy surrounding the Foreign Office‟s 
tactics in that case211 provides a further cautionary tale.   
 
The operation of an inquisitorial and somewhat more circumspect judicial approach 
to government evidence would be welcome, particularly where the court is 
deliberating on cases with wider implications of the utmost importance.  However, 
such an approach is inconsistent with the internal rationale of the judiciary and the 
dynamics of its relationship with the executive in matters of war and defence; as has 
been established, the judicial role in this area is to protect or insulate ministerial 
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decisions from legal resistance, even in the case of an unpopular, controversial war 
of questionable international lawfulness. 
 200 
 
 
201 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
‘Prime Ministerial Exercise of the War Prerogative in the Iraq Affair: An 
Analysis’ 
 
 
 
This study has conducted an in depth investigation and analysis of prime ministerial 
exercise of the war prerogative in the lead-up to, during and after the Iraq decision in 
March 2003.  It is now possible to draw together the extensive material covered in 
the preceding chapters and present select conclusions about the area.  These will be 
structured to specifically address the three aims of this study that were outlined in 
the Introduction.  In the process of addressing these three aims this study, where 
necessary, employed the two analytical devices of investigating divergences 
between law and reality and the role of legal boundaries; significant or illuminating 
points raised by these devices will be included where relevant. 
  
[1] Aim 1: Understandings of the three key constitutional 
components established 
 
 
This study has undertaken a detailed investigation of conventions, prerogative and 
the Crown, attempting to establish an understanding of each component and its 
respective role in prime ministerial exercise of the war prerogative.  The following 
concluding points can be made. 
 
 
[1.1] The Crown 
 
Though the notion of „the Crown‟ has been inherently tied to monarchy, it is now a 
multi-faceted concept with no single clear meaning.  Because it can be used to 
represent the monarch, government or the state, the Crown‟s utility as a legal 
concept to assist in the resolution of modern disputes concerning government power 
is questionable.  However, this is not to detract from the fact that the Crown is 
situated at the apex of British constitutional law, perhaps reflecting Foucault‟s claim 
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that the ancient legal frameworks of western states were initially constructed around 
the monarch.1 
 
Despite its arcane, ancient nature, „the Crown‟ plays a fundamental role in modern 
prime ministerial use of the war power because legally, structurally and culturally a 
premier‟s powers are inextricably linked to the monarch as embodiment of the 
Crown.  The office of Prime Minister covertly evolved on the underside of the legal 
framework of monarchy, colonising the latter‟s Crown powers and fusing itself to that 
institution in the process.  In the exercise of the war and other prerogatives, this 
arrangement has necessitated a reciprocal relationship between the legally strong 
monarch and politically powerful premier.  This relationship, which leads Hennessy 
to describe Britain as a „double headed nation‟,2 is arguably the root of many of the 
issues concerning the war power discussed in this study.  These will be summarised 
further in Parts 2 and 3, but two initial insights regarding the benefits accruing to the 
Prime Minister because of this symbiosis with the monarch can be outlined.  First, 
the indeterminacies which permeate the Crown as the source of prime ministerial 
power (combined with additional layers of ambiguity in prerogative powers and the 
regulatory conventions) enable premiers to exercise their powers in a relatively 
unstructured, opaque arena of laissez faire.  Second, the existing arrangements 
bestow upon a premier a beneficial collection of once-monarchical powers which 
remain obscure and fundamentally unchanged from their medieval nature and form.  
Thus due to the Crown-based constitutional edifice, Prime Ministers have been able 
to utilise many prerogative powers subject to fewer constitutional or legal restraints; 
the Iraq affair demonstrated this occurring in relation to the war prerogative 
specifically.  
 
In light of the influence of the Crown in this area, it is arguable that criticisms that 
recent Prime Ministers, including Mr Blair, have acted presidentially, dominantly or 
exercised their powers against the spirit of the constitution are erroneous.  On the 
contrary, using power in this way is entirely consistent with the structure and culture 
of the British constitution which remains monarchical, autocratic and based on a 
central individual figurehead.3  What Bagehot termed the „dignified‟ window dressing 
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of monarchy4 cannot and should not detract from the failings of this arrangement in 
the respects outlined in this study. 
 
 
[1.2] Conventions 
 
A number of specific conventions play a vital role in prime ministerial use of the war 
power.  First and foremost, the paramount ministerial advice convention enables 
elected ministers to govern and specifically diverts the de facto war decision from 
monarch to premier.  This is supplemented by more general conventions which 
operate as constitutional checks in this area, e.g. collective Cabinet responsibility 
which requires Cabinet to make important decisions in matters such as warfare 
collectively, the resignation convention which necessitates the resignation of a 
government which loses a confidence vote in the Commons, and finally the potential 
or quasi-convention that Parliament must approve decisions of war.  These 
conventions play a pivotal role in the absence of legal regulation in this area.  Yet as 
Chapter 3 established, if one attempts to proceed beyond listing specific 
conventions, they are a curious, evasive and inchoate phenomena whose free-
standing status rests upon foundations of certain fragility. No meaningful definition is 
able to encompass all conventions and any attempt to pinpoint the specific core 
features of conventions (e.g. their bindingness or ethical basis) proves impossible.  
Even the most certain of a convention‟s characteristics, namely its distinction from 
law, is principally premised on a dominant positivist outlook which erects clear 
boundaries between the two. In any event, this distinction appears to have been at 
times silently and necessarily departed from in order to reach coherent, realistic 
decisions in select cases concerning Crown powers, as Bancoult5 and GCHQ6 
demonstrate.  The nature of conventions acts to potentially favour the Prime Minister 
in his preferred exercise of the war power in two key ways.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
circumstances of modern politics and modern technology?” K Morgan, „New Labour and the New 
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 W Bagehot, The English Constitution (Collins, London, 1963) p 66. 
5 R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2008] UKHL 61, [2008] 4 All ER 1055 (HL); [2007] EWCA Civ 498, [2008] QB 365 (CA); [2006] 
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First, conventional regulation benefits a Prime Minister because, by virtue of their 
non-legal status, they are generally excluded from the concern of courts.7  By 
adopting this positivist approach the courts have disqualified themselves from 
making potentially valuable contributions to the preservation and advancement of the 
conventions that regulate central government.  This tacitly protects the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet from greater judicial scrutiny and leads the courts to disregard 
the bypassing or re-moulding of some conventions.8  Second, common 
understandings of conventions as free-standing rule-like phenomena create an 
impression of informal, but largely effective, checks regulating ministerial conduct.  
This fosters a large, minimally-regulated field in which a Prime Minister can operate, 
and furthermore acts to placate the perceived need for more stringent regulation of 
central government.9  If one adopts an alternative and perfectly viable view that 
„convention‟ explains discrepancies between law and political reality then the 
capacity of „conventions‟ per se to act as meaningful constitutional checks upon a 
premier or ministers is compromised and the impetus for reform becomes more 
pressing. 
 
 
[1.3] Prerogative 
 
Chapter 4 provided three vital insights into the nature of prerogative, each of which 
has particular significance for the Prime Minister and/or the war power.  First, 
prerogative power is inherently monarchical in nature; it flows from the Crown, is 
comprised of the remnants of the King‟s once absolute power and continues to be 
exercised by the monarch at law.  The nature of prerogative power thus necessitates 
a somewhat idiosyncratic interaction between ministers and the monarch, and 
benefits the premier in his use of the war power in the specific ways discussed at 
Parts 1.1 and 2.1.  Second, the prevailing wide Diceyan view of prerogative 
redefined the power away from its early Blackstonian definition as a narrow set of 
powers enjoyed solely by the King. Ironically the success of Dicey‟s modern 
redefinition of prerogative may be one vital reason why the power has remained 
viable and thus many of the monarch‟s traditional prerogatives, particularly the ones 
discussed in this study, have remained unreformed and intact.  Finally, boundaries 
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205 
 
play a vital role in legal understandings of prerogative power by determining its 
scope but, most vitally, distinguishing between different types of prerogative, 
specifically those that are justiciable and those that are not.  The earliest such 
boundaries (or ring-fences) were constructed firmly on the basis of subject matter.10  
However, the Iraq caselaw altered the appearance and basis for distinguishing 
between reviewable and non-reviewable prerogatives. A summary of these 
developments is detailed at Part 3.2. 
 
 
[1.4] Summary of Findings regarding Disparities in this Area 
 
From investigation of these three components it is clear that important and 
interrelated disparities exist between the legal appearance and the constitutional-
political reality of the premiership and its powers.  This is because the formal, archaic 
terms used to label arrangements at the apex of the British constitution have 
remained intact, despite being superseded by political developments that have 
transformed the political workings of government in practical terms.  A number of 
significant points about such disparities can be outlined and these gaps lie at the root 
of many of the issues concerning the Prime Minister and war power outlined in this 
conclusion. 
 
There exists wide academic and judicial acceptance of a divergence between the 
Crown at law and the political reality occurring within; its status as a „legal fiction‟ 
very much reflects this.  Though the Crown‟s legislative and executive powers have 
been colonised by Parliament and government ministers respectively, their legal 
structure and form have remained intact and unaltered.  This has resulted in an overt 
disparity between law and reality at the very apex of the constitution; the law views 
the monarch as embodiment of the Crown as directing ministers whereas in political 
reality ministers are in the dominant position.11   In this respect the legal and political 
arrangements (as well as their respective ethical bases) specifically oppose or 
contradict one another and thus the Crown and its surrounding legal framework can 
only be understood with reference to non-law, specifically constitutional conventions 
that supplement and explain the law.  Similar acknowledgement of the vital disparity 
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leakage in de facto prerogative power from monarch to ministers, which in turn is arguably 
attributable to Dicey‟s wider, modern re-definition of prerogative power.   
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continues in judicial accounts of prerogative power, most prominently acknowledged 
by Lord Roskill in GCHQ,12 whose comments have revealingly been adopted in 
subsequent judgments.13  Conventions occupy the cleavage between the law and 
reality of the war power.  They act to explain discrepancies between the legal 
framework and the political reality occurring within, thus providing a coherent 
representation of the constitution despite these gaps.   
 
Overall, for the Prime Minister and ministers the divergence between appearance 
and reality is to some extent useful.  The mainstream legal-constitutional concepts 
adopted to provide an explanation of the British constitution (such as conventions, 
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law) arguably act as reassuring facades, or 
in Ward‟s terms „myths‟.14  These allow the academic community to congratulate the 
democratic and accountable aspects of the British constitution whilst marginalising 
the autocratic, monarchical legal structures which may act to negate or undermine 
the apparently progressive features of the constitution.  More specific points about 
precisely how this divergence benefits Prime Minister and his exercise of the war 
prerogative are made in Parts 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
[2] Aim 2: Conclusions regarding the operation and 
interaction of relevant constitutional components in the Iraq 
decision 
 
 
Certain caveats must be made before outlining any conclusions about the operation 
of constitutional components over the course of the Iraq affair.  Historically the Iraq 
affair represents a relatively brief and recent period.  It is therefore difficult to assess 
the permanent significance of some of the patterns, and views may change as more 
information emerges.  Nevertheless, three main conclusions about the operation and 
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accusing liberalism of replacing one myth (religion) with another. 
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interaction of the constitutional elements discussed in Part 1 and their impact upon 
the war prerogative can be made. 
 
 
[2.1] The operation and interaction of the ministerial advice convention 
and the Crown 
 
The operation of the ministerial advice convention is a key factor in prime ministerial 
use of the war power; this convention enables the premier to tap into the Crown and 
its prerogatives authorising war and a host of other actions.  The convention plays 
this integral constitutional role despite its tendency to discreetly operate beneath the 
legal radar due to its non-legal status. 
 
The important case of Bancoult,15 drawing upon the earlier rationale in GCHQ 
demonstrates that resolving cases involving ministerial prerogative power requires 
the courts to look beyond the archaic, narrow and inadequate legal framework that 
situates the monarch as ultimate decision-maker, and instead requires 
acknowledgement of modern constitutional convention.  At all levels the courts in 
Bancoult rejected government arguments, based on a narrow view of the legal 
framework in isolation, that prerogative Orders in Council were legally immune acts 
of the monarch.16  This argument could not „hide the fact[s]‟ according to Hooper 
LJ.17  The courts here founded their judgments on the constitutional reality that 
elected ministers made the disputed decisions.  This entailed implicit recognition of 
the ministerial convention, affording it a form of inchoate legal effect.  Vitally, it also 
demonstrates that the judicial boundaries between legal rules and non-legal 
conventions which are excluded from enforcement, can be silently departed from in 
this particular context despite similar boundaries being strictly adhered to elsewhere 
in the Iraq caselaw.    
 
Because the ministerial advice convention enables the Prime Minister to access 
many of the monarch‟s powers in the legal edifice, these powers at law can only be 
understood with reference to this „paramount‟ convention.  The convention acts to 
entwine the premiership with the monarch as embodiment of the Crown, leading the 
Prime Minister to function as a form of „proxy monarch‟.  This interaction of Crown 
                                                 
15
 Bancoult litigation (n 1). 
16
 This issue was considered in most detail in the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal hearings. 
17
Bancoult, DC, ibid para 163. 
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and convention affords the premier two important benefits.  First, the premiership‟s 
attachment to the structurally and culturally autocratic and undemocratic Crown and 
its powers potentially offsets to some extent the democratic accountability to which 
he is subject in political practice, as further discussion in Parts 2.2 and 2.3 
demonstrates.  Related to this, the interconnection between Prime Minister and the 
Crown enables the office-holder to potentially exploit a collection of unreformed, 
vague and amorphous powers, many of which remain free from lawful restraint or the 
effective scrutiny of the legislative and judicial limbs.  The war prerogative is just one 
such power.  Second, the Prime Minister-monarch symbiosis fostered by the 
ministerial advice convention provides subtle benefits to a premier in a judicial 
context, as caselaw concerning the war and related prerogatives demonstrates.  
Chapters 4 and 5 highlighted longstanding judicial attachment to a strong executive 
and wise, knowledgeable leadership which will defend and protect the country.18  
 
 
[2.2] The operation and interaction of the collective Cabinet 
responsibility convention and the Prime Ministerial chairmanship 
powers 
 
The close interaction between collective Cabinet responsibility and the chairmanship 
powers was a material issue in Mr Blair‟s exercise of the war prerogative in the Iraq 
decision.  Mr Blair used his monarch-based Cabinet chairmanship powers in a novel 
and distinctive way in the lead-up to the Iraq war.  This had the effect of bypassing or 
marginalising collective responsibility‟s capacity to act as a potential check upon his 
exercise of the war power.19   
 
Interestingly, one issue unites the various distinct ways in which Mr Blair used his 
chairmanship powers to consult with small groups of aides outside of Cabinet and 
war Cabinet, to replace detailed Cabinet discussions with briefings, and finally to 
dispense with detailed Cabinet agendas, minutes and papers circulated in advance.  
Common to all of these developments is a failure to effectively share information.  
The substantive decision-making in Iraq, the knowledge vital to gauging these 
                                                 
18
 See Chapter 4, Part 3.3 and Chapter 5, Part 3 specifically. 
19
 Chapters 3 and 4 established that supporting evidence to this effect is wide-ranging, spanning from 
Cabinet ministers to the Butler Report which expressed concern about the „reduced scope for 
informed political judgement‟ of Cabinet as a result of the way it was conducted; Report of a 
Committee of Privy Counsellors (chair: Lord Butler), „Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction‟, HC (July 2004) 898, para 611. 
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decisions, and therefore the accountability for them, were all detached from Cabinet, 
along with the Prime Minister himself.  This demonstrates that knowledge-power 
imbalances do not only infiltrate caselaw concerning the Iraq decision, but have a 
more extensive influence upon the exercise of the war prerogative.  It is arguable 
that Mr Blair‟s exercise of the chairmanship powers served to monopolise valuable 
knowledge concerning the Iraq decisions and thus influenced the operation of 
collective responsibility, arguably morphing it from a constitutional check into a 
source of prime ministerial strength by binding ministers to policy they had not 
properly considered or discussed.        
 
 
[2.3] The operation and interaction of the parliamentary approval 
‘convention’ and a cluster of key prime ministerial prerogatives 
 
Perhaps the most complex and arcane interaction between convention and 
prerogative in the Iraq affair was the way in which the strengthening parliamentary 
approval „convention‟ was largely undercut by a cluster of prime ministerial 
prerogatives that enabled Mr Blair to exert an influence over the parliamentary vote, 
and therefore the efficacy of the convention itself.  This cluster of prerogatives 
included: the power to appoint the Attorney General, the defence prerogative to 
authorise the prior deployment of troops and the power to advise a dissolution of 
Parliament. 
 
Chapter 3 confirmed that the „conventional‟ status of the parliamentary approval of 
warfare requirement is ambiguous and views of its scope and future bindingness 
vary among political players (notwithstanding post-Blair reform proposals which 
sought to formalise the position).  As a result it could not be conclusively established 
that a formal convention existed following the Iraq affair, though available evidence 
tilted in favour of its presence.  Irrespective of its status, evidence suggests there 
was a shift towards more concrete parliamentary involvement in the exercise of the 
war prerogative up to and following the Iraq decision,20 reflecting a corresponding 
shift in constitutional culture.  Nevertheless the effectiveness of this newly 
strengthened check is arguably undermined by countervailing constitutional features, 
                                                 
20
 Chapter 3, Part 3.3 outlines key evidence supporting this, including: (1) the extending of 
parliamentary „approval‟ to include a substantive vote, and the holding of such a vote in the Iraq 
decision, and (2) an increase in express statements regarding a strengthened parliamentary role from 
various prominent politicians. 
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specifically the party majorities enjoyed by government, the Whip system and, the 
focus of this study, the cluster of prime ministerial prerogative powers specified 
above that in the Iraq affair enabled the premier to exert an influence upon the vote 
and weighted the process in his favour.  All of these powers stem from the prime 
ministerial office‟s colonisation of the Crown and their impact upon the vote is now 
summarised.  
 
A Prime Minister instructs the monarch to appoint government ministers including the 
Attorney General, and this affords the premier a relative hegemony over ministers.  
During the Iraq affair, in the space of 10 days the Attorney General changed his 
advice regarding the international legality of warfare, and as Prime Minister, Mr Blair 
was in a position to influence him. Whether or not such influence was exerted, it is 
not unreasonable to view this chain of events with a degree of circumspection.  The 
Attorney‟s amended advice enabled Mr Blair to order the engagement of troops 
which was entirely reliant on a clear statement of legality.  It was furthermore the 
basis upon which Cabinet and Parliament judged the suitability of military action.  It 
is therefore difficult to argue that this was not a material factor in facilitating Mr Blair‟s 
preferred use of the war prerogative regarding Iraq; his position in relation to the 
Attorney at the very least appears to have played a discernible role in enabling him 
to secure deployment.  Furthermore this incident reiterates the powerful role of 
knowledge in such decisions, and the privileged position enjoyed by government (or 
the premier) in this respect. 
 
A further factor assisting Mr Blair to obtain parliamentary approval for engagement in 
Iraq was the exercise of the defence prerogative to deploy troops on the Iraqi border 
in advance in readiness for combat.  Though this prerogative decision was almost 
certainly taken for operational reasons, and its effect on the vote is arguably limited 
and difficult to quantify, evidence from the parliamentary debate indicates that this 
was a factor increasing pressure on MPs to vote in favour of war.  In this respect it 
aided Mr Blair‟s exercise of the war prerogative and correspondingly undermined the 
vote as a substantive check on the war power.  Finally, the prime ministerial de facto 
prerogative to dissolve Parliament by advising the monarch acts as a disciplinary 
device over dissent in his parliamentary party, albeit when combined with the 
confidence vote resignation convention.  Mr Blair utilised this device in the Iraq vote 
which acted to heighten the stakes for Labour MPs; failure to obtain approval would 
result in a damaging general election.  Like the defence prerogative, the precise 
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influence of this dissolution device is difficult to quantify and must not be overstated, 
though evidence in Chapters 1 and 4 indicate that it was a further influential factor 
enabling Mr Blair to mobilise parliamentary support for war.  
     
It is arguable that these uses of prerogative in the Iraq decision, particularly defence 
and dissolution, had at least a modest impact upon the parliamentary vote.  But it is 
the cumulative effect of these prerogatives which proves particularly significant; they 
demonstrate that a Prime Minister, using the Crown-based powers of monarchs of 
old, can manoeuvre a vital parliamentary vote, arguably stripping the vote of some of 
its meaning and justifying the later concerns of the House of Lords Constitutional 
Select Committee.21  These prerogatives are all longstanding constitutional features 
that have been utilised by governments in the past.  However, the specific 
combination in which they operated and their cumulative effect in the Iraq decision 
was arguably unique and unprecedented.  The specific characteristics of the Blair 
premiership and its surrounding political context at that time caused these 
constitutional features to come together, allowing the premier to authorise military 
action effectively despite the strength of opposition to such plans. 
 
 
 
[3] Aim 3: Deeper insights into the efficacy of checks and 
balances upon the war prerogative afforded by the Iraq affair 
 
 
This study‟s detailed investigation of the Iraq affair has offered numerous insights 
into the efficacy of checks and balances upon the war prerogative.  Overall, it has 
established that despite the appearance of strengthening checks in both 
parliamentary and judicial contexts, the actual constraints upon prime ministerial use 
of the war prerogative continue to be severely limited.  Astute prime ministerial use 
of prerogatives in Cabinet and Parliament can potentially facilitate the evasion or 
taming of political resistance in those institutions, whilst ministerial war and related 
                                                 
21
 Chapter 4 outlined the following quote from the committee‟s 2006 report: “it could be said that the 
ability of the United Kingdom governments to use the royal prerogative power to engage in conflict 
is paradoxically less democratic than when the Monarch exercised the power personally.”  Select 
Committee on the Constitution, „Waging War: Parliament‟s Role and Responsibility‟, HL (2005-06) 
236-I, para 40. 
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prerogative decisions enjoy de facto immunity from legal resistance in the courts.22  It 
seems that the autocratically structured British constitution may be essentially 
geared to support war, and the Iraq affair demonstrates that this may even apply in 
the case of a controversial war of dubious international legality. 
 
Specific insights into both the constitutional and legal checks upon the war 
prerogative respectively are now outlined. 
 
 
[3.1] Effectiveness of constitutional checks on the war prerogative 
 
Some conclusions regarding the precise operation of constitutional checks and 
balances have been outlined in Aim 2.  Building upon some of the specific points 
made therein, some deeper insights regarding the war power and constitutional 
checks upon it can be identified.  Two main insights emerge: 
 
[3.1.1] The efficacy of constitutional checks during the Iraq affair can be 
contrasted with their efficacy after it 
 
The Iraq affair demonstrates the relative weakness of parliamentary checks on the 
war prerogative.  In the March 2003 vote Mr Blair‟s use of the war prerogative was 
subject to limited challenge from Parliament and this was partly attributable to the 
factors outlined in Part 2.3, particularly Mr Blair‟s exercise of clusters of monarchical 
prerogatives which acted to manoeuvre the parliamentary vote in favour of military 
action.   
 
The Iraq decision arguably does highlight a „democratic deficit‟23 regarding warfare 
decisions at national level.  Evidence shows that the prerogative decision was made 
in disregard of the views of the British populace by a small isolated elite and with 
limited input or meaningful scrutiny from Cabinet or Parliament.  The following claim 
by Gladstone encapsulates the position cogently: 
 
                                                 
22
 “The powers that Prime Ministers wield, mostly derived from the ‘mystical but mighty’ powers of 
prerogative, are enormous, the constitutional constraints upon their office negligible.  This should 
concern us.” Ward (n 14) 72.  Ward‟s claim is especially pertinent in the context of military action. 
23
 Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces quoted in Waging War: Parliament’s 
Role and Responsibility (n 21) para 17.  
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“If it secures no other British national interest, the Iraq ‘war’ has 
awoken millions of British subjects to their powerlessness in the face of 
[Lord Roskill’s] ghosts [of the past].”24 
 
Despite inadequacies in checks at the time of the decision, it is arguable that the 
post-Iraq period has heralded prima facie more positive developments in relation to 
checks on the war power.25  First, light was ultimately shed upon the dubious 
practices of the Blair Cabinet by the 2004 Butler Report.26  Second, the inquiry the 
courts refused to order in Gentle has been recently instigated.27  Finally, the post-
Iraq era has witnessed an increase in scrutinising activity by parliamentary select 
committees28 and the introduction of proposals to formalise parliamentary 
involvement.  It seems that the constitutional failures of the Iraq affair did generate 
incremental adjustments in response to specific problems.  Admirers of the British 
constitution may claim that this is an apt illustration of its enduring flexibility.  But an 
approach comprised of piecemeal post-event responses is hardly ideal; where were 
effective checks when they were needed in March 2003? 
 
[3.1.2] The post-Iraq proposed reforms to the war prerogative will be of limited 
effect 
 
Tabled reforms to the war prerogative29 proposed the introduction of a parliamentary 
resolution setting out the terms for its approval of war.  Though the reforms indicated 
a prima facie potential increase in the strength of parliamentary checks upon the war 
power, this study demonstrates that they would not necessarily constitute a panacea; 
their effect would be limited for four interrelated reasons. 
 
First, the proposed reforms left untouched important shortcomings in existing 
checks.  Under proposals the Prime Minister retained an advantageous degree of 
discretion over various aspects of the parliamentary vote, for example, its timing and 
the information to be provided to Parliament.30  These factors materially favoured Mr 
                                                 
24
 David Gladstone, Public Administration Select Committee, „Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening 
Ministerial Accountability to Parliament‟, HC (2003-04) 422, Written Evidence, Ev 2. 
25
 However, the effect of these developments should not be overstated for the reasons discussed in 
Parts 2.2-2.3 and 3.1.2.   
26
 Butler Report (n 19).  
27
 Hansard HC vol 494, cols 23-24 (15 Jun 2009). 
28
 See Chapter 4, Part 3.2.3. 
29
 Lord Chancellor & Secretary of State for Justice, „The Governance of Britain – Constitutional 
Renewal‟ (Cm 7342-I, II & III 2008).   
30
 Public Administration Select Committee, „Constitutional Renewal: Draft Bill and White Paper‟, HC 
(2007-08) 499, p 3. 
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Blair‟s preferred exercise of the war power in the Iraq affair.  Second, the proposed 
reforms arguably overlooked one of the central constitutional failures that occurred in 
the Iraq affair, namely the sidelining of collective Cabinet responsibility as discussed 
in Part 2.2.  However this study has found that though the failure of Cabinet 
responsibility was undoubtedly important in the Iraq affair, the decision to undertake 
military action was facilitated by a range of complex, interacting factors, all of which 
can be ultimately traced back to the prime ministerial prerogative powers in some 
capacity.  Third, the proposed reforms left intact the monarch-based structures and 
culture that benefit the premier and government in relation to the war prerogative.  
For example, the Prime Minister would still enjoy the dissolution device and the 
defence prerogative.  Ultimately, the inherent ties between Prime Minister and 
monarch have led to war becoming „an intensely prime ministerial activity‟31 where 
once it was an intensely monarchical activity; the proposed reforms did little to alter 
this arrangement.  The final reason that proposed reforms, even those of a legal 
nature, may have been limited is illustrated by the US constitution which departed 
from the British monarchical model and vested the war power with Congress.  
Despite this arrangement, there has occurred a gradual presidential usurpation of 
the war power and a correlating waning of congressional involvement in recent 
decades.32  The problems facing the US power33 indicate that formally transferring 
the war power to the British Parliament would not necessarily be sufficient to temper 
it per se.34  Instead such measures can only operate effectively with a vigilant, 
inquisitive and independent culture amongst the elected representatives.35  Yet 
perhaps such a culture is inconsistent with what Foucault identifies as the autocratic, 
monarch-structured western legal systems and traditions.  
 
 
                                                 
31
 Hennessy (n 8) 103. 
32
 “Presidents have routinely exercised war powers with little or no involvement by Congress.”  L 
Fisher, Presidential War Power (2
nd
 edn, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2004) preface and 
ch 1. 
33
 “The last nine years have underscored the extent to which the power of war has shifted to the 
presidency, with little restraint by Congress or the courts and little comprehension by the general 
public of the damage done to constitutional values, representative government, and democracy.”  
Ibid, preface.  
34
 Interestingly, calls for reform of the US war power are also under discussion in America.  See „Panel 
Demands US war power reform‟, BBC Online (London, 16th December 2008) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7496587> accessed 7
th
 January 2009. 
35
 “What is perhaps most needed in undertaking reform, therefore, is neither a limiting statute nor 
questionable attempts to ‘make’ a new convention, but a more fundamental evaluation of the 
political unwillingness of MPs, under the current party system, to exercise Parliament’s legislative 
sovereignty and hold the Crown to account for its military adventures.”  D Jenkins, „Constitutional 
Reform goes to War: Some Lessons from the United States‟ [2007] P.L. 258, p 260. 
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[3.2] Efficacy of legal checks upon the war prerogative 
 
Cases also yield deeper insights into judicial treatment of the war prerogative at law.  
The Iraq caselaw demonstrated a gradual broadening of the potential reach of 
judicial review due to the removal of GCHQ ring-fencing which had previously 
shielded high policy prerogatives.  However, despite the comparative strengthening 
of judicial checks on prerogative power in this respect the courts ultimately refused to 
engage with prerogative decisions in war and related matters in any event.  
Prerogatives in these areas were still afforded special treatment by the judiciary and 
thus the removal of formal ring-fencing had minimal impact in practical terms. 
  
The two following important insights into the relationship between the judiciary and 
the war and related prerogatives at law were revealed: 
 
[3.2.1] Insights regarding boundaries between law and non-law 
 
In this area the judiciary employ boundaries between law and non-law, specifically 
eliminating political or policy issues from their concern.  However, the way in which 
the courts do this is selective and inconsistent, ultimately acting to favour the 
government of the day.  In Iraq caselaw the law-politics boundary was used by the 
judiciary as a basis for eliminating from their responsibility not just political issues, 
but also tainted legal issues, i.e. legal issues which were inherently entwined with 
political ones.  Seeking to maintain the „internal purity‟36 of law in this way led the 
courts to refuse to provide an interpretation of Resolution 1441 in CND, to the 
marginalisation of otherwise „powerful‟ arguments37 by the claimants in Al Rawi and 
finally in Gentle, to the finding that Article 2 HRA could not be interpreted to require 
government to take reasonable steps to ensure its military action was internationally 
lawful.  
 
Yet paradoxically, despite evading political engagement the judicial position is 
implicitly political in a more subtle way.  The Iraq cases involved inherently political 
litigation with therefore unavoidably political outcomes; the judicial inclination for 
disengagement in the „political‟ issues outlined above was not a neutral position as it 
                                                 
36
 C Douzinas, R Warrington & S McVeigh, Postmodern Jurisprudence, The Law of Text in the Texts 
of Law (Routledge, London, 1991) p 25. 
37
 R (on the application of Al Rawi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] 
EWHC 972 (Admin); [2006] All ER (D) 46 (May), paras 96, 87. 
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ultimately favoured the Blair government‟s political aims.  Judgments in the Iraq 
caselaw show that by attempting to eliminate politics from the legal domain the 
judiciary incapacitated itself in reality as a potentially meaningful and effective check 
on government‟s conduct of war and foreign affairs, despite the prima facie 
strengthening of judicial review mentioned above.  Thus it is arguable that the „myth 
of neutrality‟38 barely disguises the reality that the judicial institution can do little else 
but tacitly protect strong government in the context of war, defence and related 
matters. 
 
[3.2.2] Insights regarding disparities between law and reality 
 
Chapter 5 identified important disparities between the legal view and reality of the 
war prerogative.39  Vitally, it provided the insight that knowledge or expertise is a key 
factor underlying and explaining these disparities.40   
 
Authorities concerning defence matters indicate that executive views in this area 
have always enjoyed precedence in the courtroom.  This privileged position 
continued over select Iraq cases, though the judges in these cases articulated the 
rationale for this privileging in more detail than previously seen.  Defence evidence 
concerning both matters of opinion and fact was clearly afforded great weight across 
cases like CND and Al Rawi, and this is prima facie logically justified on the basis 
that government has superior expertise and exclusive access to information in this 
area.  Yet such treatment of government evidence translates into vast power 
inequalities; the automatic, entrenched knowledge monopoly the executive enjoys as 
an inherent part of its defence and foreign affairs functions makes challenging 
government decisions incredibly onerous and the prospects of success for claimants 
negligible.  Judicial deference to ministerial prerogative decisions on the basis of 
subject matter has been replaced with a de facto deference to government evidence, 
resulting in the equivalent position in real terms.  Despite its shortcomings perhaps 
the old position had the benefit of candour, whereas the new position more readily 
                                                 
38
 J A G Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (4
th
 edn, Fontana Press, London, 1991) p 271. 
39
 Two main disparities of significance relate to the discussion in this part so far: first, at law the 
explicit legal ring-fencing of the war and related prerogatives has been removed, but in reality it has 
been replaced with a subtle form of de facto immunity which results in identical outcomes in fact (as 
per Part 3.1); second, despite expressly claiming to avoid involvement in politics, the judiciary in 
reality adopts a silent form of politics and is by no means a neutral arbiter in war-related disputes 
between government and challengers (as per Part 3.2.1).   
40
 The recurring theme of knowledge/power has arisen throughout the investigation of checks and 
balances in this area. A more detailed exploration of the role of knowledge or information is beyond 
the scope of this study but would make an interesting field for further investigation. 
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conceals these imbalances.  However, one benefit of the new arrangement, as 
demonstrated in Abassi and Al Rawi for example, is that defending its case now 
requires government to explain in detail the reasoning behind its policies.  Though 
Lord Hoffman in Jones41 criticised the use of litigation for such purposes,42 it is a 
legitimate form of challenge and arguably highlights a lack of openness and 
transparency elsewhere. 
 
Chapter 5 provided a further related and significant insight into judicial checks upon 
the war prerogative; the weight that courts afford government evidence in such areas 
is institutionally mandatory and an inevitable part of the respective functions of the 
judiciary and executive within existing state structures.  Judicial failure to engage 
with the substantive content of government witness statements in the Iraq 
judgments, and their unquestioning acceptance of the merits of such statements on 
the sole basis that they emanated from an „official‟ expert source merely reflected 
this.  This provides further demonstration that the judiciary in war, foreign affairs and 
related cases cannot be strictly impartial; institutionally having to afford precedence 
to government views has the de facto effect of protecting ministerial decisions from 
legal challenge.  In this sense the judicial treatment of knowledge in these cases is 
fundamentally though subtly political and, in Allan‟s terms, impartiality between 
citizen and state is abandoned.43  For these reasons it must be concluded that the 
courts are incapable of effectively checking ministerial prerogative in war and related 
matters. 
                                                 
41
 Regina v Jones (Margaret) and others [2007] 1 AC 136, HL. 
42
 Commenting on the „phenomenon‟ of „litigation as the continuation of protest by other means‟ Lord 
Hoffman stated: “By this means [challengers] invite the court to adjudicate upon merits of their 
opinions and provide themselves with a platform from which to address the media on the subject.  
They seek to cause expense and, if possible, embarrassment to the prosecution by exorbitant 
demands for disclosure, such as happened in this case.”  Ibid para 90.  
43
 T R S Allan, „Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of “Due Deference”‟, C.L.J. 65(3), 
November 2006, pp. 671-695, pp 675-6. 
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